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ABSTRACT 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
OF HOST STATES AS A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ICSID 
CONVENTION 
 
Roberto Castro de Figueiredo 
 
This thesis addresses the problem concerning the contribution of foreign 
investments to the economic development of the host State as a jurisdictional 
requirement under the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”). 
The ICSID Convention governs the jurisdiction of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes for the institution of arbitral proceedings 
between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States. While the 
institution of arbitral proceedings under the ICSID Convention is contingent upon 
the consent of the disputing parties, the jurisdiction of the Centre is limited to 
disputes that fulfill certain requirements. One of the core requirements of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre is that the dispute must arise out of an investment. 
Although the ICSID Convention lacks a definition of investment, most arbitral 
tribunals that had to define the function and content of the investment requirement 
concluded that the ICSID Convention contains a notion of investment that may 
not be waived by the consent of the disputing parties. The majority of these 
decisions considered that the contribution to the economic development of the 
host State would be one of the elements of such notion of investment. According 
to these decisions, the economic development requirement, as an element of the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, could be inferred from the 
wording of the first recital of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, which states 
that the ICSID Convention was concluded considering the role of private 
international investments in the economic development. It is submitted in this 
thesis, however, that these decisions were based on a misapplication of the general 
rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which codified the existing customary international law rule of treaty 
interpretation, given that they ignore the ordinary meaning of the term 
“investment” as employed in the ICSID Convention. The general rule of treaty 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention establishes a method by which each 
source of the intention of the parties to the treaty plays a relevant role. Above all, 
treaty interpretation must be based on the text of the treaty, which must be 
interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms. The use of the 
object and purpose of a treaty is a second step and may not be relied on in order to 
contradict the ordinary meaning of the terms employed in the treaty and to confer 
a special meaning on them.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM IN CONTEXT 
1.1. Investment Arbitration and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 
Since the end of the 1990s, international arbitration has become one of the main 
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes between foreign investors and host 
States.1 This phenomenon seems to be directly linked to the proliferation, in the 
same period, of international treaties entered into by States for the protection and 
promotion of foreign investments (“investment treaties”), most of them bilateral 
investment treaties (“BITs”), but also bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
(“FTAs”) containing investment protection rules, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),2 and sectorial multilateral investment treaties, 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”).3 In addition to the substantive rules of 
protection, most investment treaties grant foreign investors the option to pursue 
their claims against host States before international arbitral tribunals as an 
alternative to recourse to local courts and to diplomatic protection afforded by the 
foreign investors’ home States. As a result, the number of disputes between 
                                                 
1
 See Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement – IIA Monitor No. 1 (2012), 
International Investment Agreements, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (“UNCTAD”), available at 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf>, (last visited on June 27, 
2012). 
2
 North American Free Trade Agreement of December 17, 1992, reprinted in 32 ILM 296/612 
(1993) (entered into force on January 1, 1994). 
3
 Energy Charter Treaty of December 17, 1994, 2080 UNTS 95, reprinted in 34 ILM 381 (1994) 
(entered into force on April 16, 1998). 
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foreign investors and host States referred to international arbitration has increased 
dramatically in the last years.4 
The investment arbitration phenomenon brought, on the other hand, new 
challenges to international arbitration practice, rooted in its commercial dispute 
tradition. Arbitral tribunals constituted for the settlement of investment disputes 
became accountable to a much wider audience. Differently from the traditional 
commercial arbitration, where the decisions rendered by arbitral tribunals have 
little, if any, publicity and their relevance is, in most cases, essentially limited to 
the disputing parties, the overwhelming majority of decisions rendered in 
investment arbitration are made public and their content has consequences not 
only to the disputing parties, but to a worldwide community.5 In investment 
arbitration, arbitrators have to be concerned not only with the outcome of their 
decisions and their consequences for the disputing parties, but also, and perhaps 
more relevant, they must give much more attention to how the decisions are 
reached. The decisions rendered in investment disputes contribute directly to the 
consolidation and understanding of the relatively new field of international 
investment law.  
                                                 
4
 See Sauvant, Karl P., The Rise of International Investment, Investment Agreements and 
Investment Disputes, in Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 3 (Sauvant, 
Karl, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
5
 See Wälde, Thomas W., Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples, in 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer 724 
(Binder, Christina, Kriebaum, Reinisch, August, and Wittich, Stephan, eds., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), at 725-726. See also Smutny, Abby Cohen, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and Commercial Arbitration: Are They Different Ball Games? The Actual Conduct, in 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series no. 14: 50 Years of the New 
York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference 167 (van den Berg, Albert Jan, ed., 
The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2009), at 168-170. 
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However, one of the most distinctive features of investment arbitration lies in its 
hybrid foundations, which stem from the convergence of rules of different source 
and nature.6 While the rule of party autonomy prevails in traditional commercial 
arbitration, arbitral tribunals in investment disputes are faced with a situation in 
which their discretion and the autonomy of the parties are limited. Especially in 
disputes referred to arbitration pursuant to investment treaties, arbitral decisions 
are not limited to the interpretation and application of private agreements entered 
into by the disputing parties, but they are also required to interpret and apply 
international treaties and customary rules of public international law.7  
                                                 
6
 According to ZACHARY DOUGLAS: 
“The analytical challenge presented by the investment treaty regime for the 
arbitration of investment disputes is that it cannot be adequately rationalised either 
as a form of public international law or private transnational dispute resolution. 
Investment treaties are international instruments between states governed by the 
public international law of treaties. The principal beneficiary of the investment 
treaty regime is most often a corporate entity established under a municipal law, 
while the legal interests protected by the regime are a bundle of rights in an 
investment arising under a different municipal law. The standards of protection are 
fixed by an international treaty, but the liability for their breach is said to give rise to 
a ‘civil or commercial’ award for enforcement purposes” (Douglas, Zachary, The 
Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BYIL 151 (2003), at 152 – 
footnotes excluded). 
7
 As observed by GUS VAN HARTEN: 
“Let us briefly revisit the key distinction between investment treaty arbitration and 
commercial arbitration. The authority for commercial arbitration flows from the 
consents of the disputing parties to resolve their dispute through arbitration. The 
authority for investment arbitration, in contrast, comes from the general consents of 
states given as part of an international agreement. The general consent, which is both 
prospective and open-ended, is a sovereign act of the state as legal representative of 
its territory and population; it is not the act of a mere disputing party, acting in a 
private capacity. As such, the jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals originates in 
a instrument of public international law, not private law, and the law governing the 
arbitration is that of the treaty rather than a contract. To turn this around by drawing 
analogies to commercial arbitration is to neglect the sovereign origins of the disputes 
that trigger investor claims, and of the regime in general” (Van Harten, Gus, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), at 128). 
See also Blackaby, Nigel, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (Or the Tale of the 
Dolphin and the Shark), in Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 217 (Mistelis, Loukas 
A., and Lew, Julian D. M., eds., The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), at 222-225; 
Veeder, V. V., Introduction to Investment Treaty Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration: Are 
They Different Ball Games?, in International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series 
no. 14: 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference 91 (van 
den Berg, Albert Jan, ed., The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2009); Hanotiau, Bernard, Investment 
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The hybrid foundations of investment arbitration become evident if the dispute is 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“Centre” or “ICSID”). The Centre was established in 1966 
as an international organization by the Washington Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID 
Convention”)8 under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (“IBRD”), the main international organization of the World 
Bank Group, and it was designed to provide dispute settlement facilities through 
the institution and administration of arbitral and conciliation proceedings between 
a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention and a national of another 
Contracting State. The Centre became in recent years one of the main 
international arbitration forums for the settlement of disputes between foreign 
investors and host States.9 By this date, the ICSID Convention has 158 
signatories, out of which 148 have the status of Contracting States.10 Except for a 
                                                                                                                                     
Treaty Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration: Are They Different Ball Games? The Legal 
Regime/Framework, in International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series no. 14: 
50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference 146 (van den 
Berg, Albert Jan, ed., The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2009); Moss, Giuditta Cordero, 
Commercial Arbitration and Investment Arbitration: Fertile Soil for False Friends?, in 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer 782 
(Binder, Christina, Kriebaum, Reinisch, August, and Wittich, Stephan, eds., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), at 784, 792-793; Wilske, Stephan, and Raible, Martin, The Arbitrator as 
Guardian of International Public Policy? Should Arbitrators Go Beyond Solving Legal Issues?, in 
The Future of Investment Arbitration 249 (Rogers, Catherine A., and Alford, Roger P., eds., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 259-261; Schill, Stephan W., International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law – An Introduction, in Investment Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law 3 (Schill, Stephan W., ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 
14-17. 
8
 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States of March 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159, reprinted in 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993) 
(entered into force October 14, 1966). 
9
 According to the UNCTAD, out of 450 known investment treaty disputes referred to 
international arbitration, 279 were referred to ICSID arbitration. These figures, however, do not 
include contract based disputes and might also not be accurate due to confidentiality agreements. 
See supra note 1, at 2.  
10
 According to the last update of April 18, 2012. The list of signatories and Contracting States of 
the ICSID Convention can be found at the official website of the Centre, at 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDo
cument&language=English>. 
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few significant exceptions, such as Brazil, Canada,11 India, Mexico, Poland and 
Russia,12 most capital-exporting and importing States are parties to the ICSID 
Convention, proving its wide acceptance and relevance in the international 
community. 
The functions of the Centre in the settlement of disputes are very similar to the 
role played by traditional arbitral institutions, such as the International Chamber 
of Commerce (“ICC”) and the London Court of International Arbitration 
(“LCIA”). As in any other type of arbitration, the institution of arbitral 
proceedings under the aegis of the ICSID Convention is contingent upon the 
consent of the disputing parties, given that the mere ratification of the ICSID 
Convention does not make arbitration compulsory for the Contracting States and 
their nationals. As stated in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, “no 
Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval 
of this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under any obligation 
to submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration.”13 
In addition, the rules pertaining to arbitral proceedings instituted under the ICSID 
Convention confer great latitude of autonomy on the disputing parties.14 For 
instance, the constitution of arbitral tribunals under the ICSID Convention 
                                                 
11
 Canada signed the ICSID Convention on December 15, 2006, but has not completed the 
ratification process yet. 
12
 Russia signed the ICSID Convention on June 16, 1992. However, it seems very unlikely that 
Russia will ratify the ICSID Convention in the near future. 
13
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 4. 
14
 While the jurisdiction of the Centre is governed by the ICSID Convention and it is limited by 
requirements which may not be waived by the will of the disputing parties, the adoption of 
arbitration, as a means of dispute settlement similar to a commercial arbitration model, confers 
great latitude of autonomy on the disputing parties. See McLachlan, Campbell, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: The Legal Framework, in International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress 
Series no. 14: 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference 
95 (van den Berg, Albert Jan, ed., The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2009), at 98-99.  
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(“ICSID tribunals”) does not differ much from the way in which arbitral tribunals 
are normally constituted in traditional commercial arbitration, once the disputing 
parties have a significant autonomy in the appointment of the members of ICSID 
tribunals.15 While Article 3 of the ICSID Convention provides that the Centre 
must maintain a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators,16 whose 
members are designated by each Contracting State17 and by the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council of the Centre,18 ICSID tribunals may be constituted by 
persons who are not members of the Panel of Arbitrators. An arbitrator must be 
select from Panel of Arbitrators only when the appointment is made by the 
Chairman of the Administrative Council.19 
But the distinctive feature of arbitral proceedings instituted under the ICSID 
Convention lies in the fact that the Centre, differently from other arbitral 
institutions, is an international organization. For this, pursuant to the so-called 
principle of speciality,20 the functions of Centre are governed by its constitutive 
treaty, the ICSID Convention, which, as an international treaty, may not be 
                                                 
15
 Pursuant to Article 37(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 
“the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, 
who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties” (1 ICSID 
Reports 3 (1993), at 13). 
16
 Article 3 of the ICSID Convention provides that “[t]he Centre shall have an Administrative 
Council and a Secretariat and shall maintain a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators” (1 
ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 5). 
17
 Article 13(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that “[e]ach Contracting State may designate to 
each Panel four persons who may but need not be its nationals” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 7). 
18
 Article 13(2) of the ICSID Convention provides that “[t]he Chairman may designate ten persons 
to each Panel. The persons so designated to a Panel shall each have a different nationality” (1 
ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 7). 
19
 Article 40(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that “[a]rbitrators may be appointed from 
outside the Panel of Arbitrators, except in the case of appointments by the Chairman” (1 ICSID 
Reports 3 (1993), at 14).  
20
 In accordance with the principle of speciality (or principle of attributed powers), international 
organizations have limited international personality and their functions must be exercised within 
the limits of mandate conferred on them by their member States. See Legality of the Use by a State 
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996, ICJ Reports 66 (1996), 
at 78-79. See also Schermers, Henry G., and Blokker, Niels M., International Institutional Law: 
Unity within Diversity (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 4th ed., 2003), at 155-157. 
 9
modified by the will of the disputing parties.21 To this effect, Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention provides that: 
“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or 
any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”22 
In addition, the submission of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre does not 
affect only the disputing parties; it creates positive and negative obligations to all 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention, which aim at isolating arbitral 
proceedings instituted under the ICSID Convention from the municipal laws of its 
Contracting States.23 By virtue of Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, “[c]onsent 
of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, 
be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.”24 
Under this provision, the Contracting States’ local courts must refrain from 
exercising their jurisdiction over the dispute referred to ICSID arbitration and they 
are also prevented from interfering in arbitral proceedings instituted under the 
                                                 
21
 See Wittich, Stephan, The Limits of Party Autonomy in Investment Arbitration, in Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences 47 (Knahr, Christina, Koller, 
Christian, Rechberger, Walter, and Reinisch, August, eds., Utrecht: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2010), at 53-54. 
22
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 9. 
23
 See Delaume, G., The Finality of Arbitrations Involving States: Recent Developments, 5 Arb. 
Int’l 21 (1989); Broches, Aron, Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards, 6 ICSID Rev. – 
FILJ 321 (1991), at 336; Schreuer, Christoph H., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 1082-1086. However, if a party seeks the 
recognition and enforcement of an ICSID award in a non-Contracting State, the provisions of the 
municipal law of that State and of international treaties to which the non-Contracting State is a 
party will apply (see Nathan, Kathigamar V.S.K., The ICSID Convention: The Law of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (New York: Juris Publishing, 2000), at 
61). 
24
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 10. 
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ICSID Convention.25 Moreover, arbitral awards rendered under the ICSID 
Convention are not subject to any kind of review by the local courts of the 
Contracting States;26 and the recognition of arbitral awards rendered under the 
ICSID Convention by all Contracting States is automatic and the local courts of 
the Contracting States are prevented from denying the enforcement of the 
pecuniary obligations imposed by the award.27 
But while the submission of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre imposes 
several multilateral obligations, the ICSID Convention creates a fragmentation of 
the decision-making process. The authority to decide whether or not a dispute falls 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre is conferred on each individual ICSID 
tribunal without any review mechanism by a central body. In accordance with 
Article 36(3) of the ICSID Convention, the administrative body of the Centre, the 
Secretariat, has limited powers; it is only allowed to deny the admission of a 
request for arbitration when the dispute falls manifestly outside the jurisdiction of 
the Centre.28 In this sense, Article 41(2) of the ICSID Convention provides that: 
                                                 
25
 See Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 347. 
26
 In this sense, Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that: 
“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or 
to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall 
abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that 
enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this 
Convention” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 17 – emphasis added). 
See Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 1082-1083. 
27
 Pursuant to Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention: 
“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award 
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A 
Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or 
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if 
it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state” (1 ICSID Reports 3 
(1993), at 17). 
See Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 1114-1116. 
28
 Article 36(3) of the ICSID Convention provides that:  
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“Any objection by a party to the dispute that that dispute is not within 
the jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not within the 
competence of the Tribunal, shall be considered by the Tribunal which 
shall determine whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to 
join it to the merits of the dispute.”29 
And given that the application of a treaty provision cannot be dissociated with the 
manner in which such provision is understood,30 the interpretation of the ICSID 
Convention on matters concerning the jurisdiction of the Centre is exercised 
solely by each arbitral tribunal.31 The ICSID Convention does not set forth a 
mechanism whereby ICSID tribunals are required to refer questions of 
interpretation to the Contracting States of the ICSID Convention or to any other 
body.32 
                                                                                                                                     
“The Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the 
information contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or 
refusal to register” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 13). 
29
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 14 – emphasis added. 
30
 See Haraszti, György, Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973), at 9, 15; Bos, Maarten, Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation, in 
The Law of Treaties 327 (Davidson, Scott, ed., Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 
2004), at 335-337; Orakhelashvili, Alexander, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 285. As the International Court of 
Justice observed in the Nottebohm case, “[s]ince the Alabama case, it has been generally 
recognized, following the earlier precedents, that, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, 
an international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to 
interpret for this purpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction” (Judgment of November 
18, 1953, ICJ Reports 111 (1953), at 119) 
31
 Arbitral awards rendered under the ICSID Convention are subject to annulment proceedings. 
The institution of annulment proceedings is, however, contingent upon the request of a disputing 
party and not by any Contracting State. Pursuant to Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention, 
“[e]ither party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the 
Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly 
constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption 
on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is 
based” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 16)  
32
 During the formulation of the ICSID Convention, it was suggested that ICSID tribunals would 
have to refer questions of interpretation in matters of jurisdiction to the International Court of 
Justice. However, this idea was rejected, once it would not be practicable and could create 
undesirable delays (see Broches, Aron, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 Recueil des Cours 331 (1972), at 368-369; 
Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 523-524). Article 64 of the ICSID Convention provides that “[a]ny 
dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of 
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Accordingly, at the same time that the ICSID Convention creates a multilateral 
system of dispute resolution through the establishment of an international 
organization and the imposition of obligations on all Contracting States, the 
decision as to whether a dispute falls within the jurisdiction is subject to the 
interpretation given by each individual ICSID tribunal in a proceeding in which 
only the disputing parties take part and without any mechanism of harmonization 
of the decisions. 
1.2. The Investment Requirement of the ICSID Convention and the 
Economic Development Requirement 
In exercising the authority conferred on them by Article 41(2) of the ICSID 
Convention, ICSID tribunals have given conflicting interpretations to the 
jurisdictional requirements set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
One of the most controversial issues raised in the practice of the ICSID tribunals 
concerns the function and meaning of the term “investment” as employed in 
Article 25(1) (the “investment requirement”). Given the lack of a definition of the 
term “investment” in the ICSID Convention and the role played by the consent of 
the disputing parties for the purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of the Centre, 
                                                                                                                                     
Justice by the application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another 
method of settlement” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 20). This provision, however, does not confer 
on the International Court of Justice the authority to give preliminary rulings or to review 
decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals and ad hoc committees as a court of appeal, nor does it give 
to the Centre the possibility of requesting advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice 
(see Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 1260-1264). Article 64, nevertheless, allows the submission to 
the ICJ of disputes under Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, which authorizes a Contracting 
State to exercise diplomatic protection in favor of its national if the other Contracting State fails to 
comply with an ICSID award (see infra note 84); and under Article 54(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, which imposes on all Contracting States the obligation of recognition and 
enforcement of ICSID awards (see supra note 27). Under these circumstances, matters related to 
the interpretation of the ICSID Convention may be eventually submitted to the International Court 
of Justice (see Broches, A., idib., at 379-380; Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 1263).  
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the question as to whether the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention 
has an objective meaning became debatable in ICSID practice and writings. 
In such debate, the majority of ICSID decisions considered that, while the 
institution of arbitral proceedings is contingent upon the consent of the disputing 
parties, the term “investment” places an objective limitation on jurisdiction of the 
Centre. According to these ICSID tribunals, the ICSID Convention contains a 
notion of investment that may not be waived by the will of the disputing parties 
and, therefore, must be assessed independently from the consent of the disputing 
parties. 
Based on the distinction between the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention and the consent of the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre, the majority of the ICSID tribunals that were required to interpret the 
meaning of the term “investment” as employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention followed the so-called Salini test. According to the Salini test, which 
was named after the decision rendered in the case of Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and 
Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco, the notion of investment within the meaning of the 
ICSID Convention contains certain elements that distinguish an investment from 
an ordinary commercial transaction. In addition, most ICSID tribunals that 
followed the Salini test considered that, in order to comply with the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention, the dispute must arise out an investment 
that contributed or would have contributed to the economic development of the 
host State (the “economic development requirement”).  
 14 
But the economic development requirement was not only applied in order to place 
a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Centre. Before the Salini test emerged in the 
practice of ICSID tribunals, the economic development requirement was relied on 
in the case of Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia to expand the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention. Even if the dispute does not arise 
out of an investment within its ordinary meaning, the Centre would have 
jurisdiction nonetheless if a transaction or activity subject-matter of the dispute 
contributed or could have contributed to the economic development of the host 
State.  
In both forms, nevertheless, either to expand or to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Centre, the existence of the economic development requirement was based on the 
first recital of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, which states that the ICSID 
Convention was concluded “[c]onsidering the need for international cooperation 
for economic development, and the role of private international investment 
therein.”33 
It is submitted in this thesis, however, that the ICSID decisions that applied the 
economic development requirement to expand or to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Centre were based on a misinterpretation of the notion of investment within the 
meaning of the ICSID Convention. Once these ICSID decisions have recognized 
the existence of a distinction between the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention and the consent of the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre, the construction of the notion of investment within the meaning of the 
ICSID Convention is a matter of treaty interpretation. And as such, ICSID 
                                                 
33
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 4. 
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tribunals are required to interpret the provisions of the ICSID Convention, as an 
international treaty, in accordance with the general rule of treaty interpretation 
embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna 
Convention”).34  
                                                 
34
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969, 115 UNTS 331, reprinted in 8 ILM 
679 (1969) (entered into force January 27, 1980). 
It seems well settled that the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention 
reflected the existing customary international law at the time the ICSID Convention was 
concluded. In the Territorial Dispute case, between Libya and Chad, the ICJ applied the rules of 
treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention to a treaty concluded in 1955 on the basis 
that they were the existing international customary law rules of treaty interpretation (see Judgment 
of February 3, 1994, ICJ Reports 6 (1994), at 21-22). See also Dispute Regarding Navigational 
and Related Rights, Judgment of July 13, 2009, 48 ILM 1183 (2009), at 1200; Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay, Judgment of April 20, 2010, available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf>, (last visited on May 4, 2010), at para. 65. 
The general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention was recognized by the ICJ on 
several occasions as the codification of the existing customary international law on law of treaties. 
In this sense, in the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 case, the ICJ observed that the principles of 
treaty interpretation “are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary 
international law on the point” (Judgment of November 12, 1991, ICJ Reports 53 (1991), at 70). 
See also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain case, 
Judgment of February 15, 1995, ICJ Reports 6 (1995), at 18; Oil Platforms case, Judgment of 
December 12, 1996, ICJ Reports 803 (1996), at 812; Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, Judgment of 
December 13, 1999, ICJ Reports 1045 (1999), at 1059; Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan case, Judgment of December 17, 2002, ICJ Reports 625 (2002), at 645; Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals case, Judgment of March 31, 2004, ICJ Reports 12 (2004), at 48; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory case, Advisory 
Opinion of July 9, 2004, ICJ Reports 136 (2004), at 174; Legality of Use of Force case, Judgment 
of December 15, 2004, ICJ Reports 1160 (2004), at 1199.  See also Vallat, Francis, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 40 Annuaire de l’A.A.A. XI (1970), at XXIV; Sinclair, 
Ian, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2nd ed., 1984), at 19; Jennings, Robert, and Watts, Arthur, Oppenheim’s International Law 
(Harlow, Essex: Longman, 9th ed., 1992), at 1271; Torres Bernárdez, Santiago, Interpretation of 
Treaties by the International Court of Justice Following the Adoption of the 1989 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Liber Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern – in honour 
of his 80th birthday 721 (Hafner, G., Loibl, G., Rest, A., Sucharipa-Behrmann, L., and Zemanek, 
K., eds., The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), at 721; Shaw, Malcolm N., International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th ed., 2003), at 839. 
Several ICSID tribunals and ad hoc committees have recognized the applicability to the ICSID 
Convention of the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. In this sense, see Banro 
American Resources, Inc. and Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema S.A.R.L. v. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Award of September 1, 2000 (excerpts), 17 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 382 (2002), 
at 388-389; Zhinvali Development Limited v. Georgia, Award of January 24, 2003, 10 ICSID 
Reports 3 (2006), at 69-70; Tokios Tokéles v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction of April 29, 2004, 
20 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 205 (2005), at 216; Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of February 8, 2005, 20 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 262 (2005), at 295-296; Metalpar S.A. and 
Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of April 27, 2006, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Metalpar-Argentina-Jurisdiction.pdf>, (last visited on April 1, 
2009), at para. 91; MCI Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Ecuador, Award of July 31, 
2007, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MCIEcuador.pdf>, (last visited on December 
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While the purpose of treaty interpretation is the search for the intention of the 
parties to the treaty in order to give effect to the consent of the parties to be bound 
by the treaty, the search for the intention of the parties under the Vienna 
Convention is not up to the discretion of the interpreter. The general rule of treaty 
interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention establishes a method in which 
each source of the intention plays a specific role. To this effect, pursuant to 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”35 The general 
                                                                                                                                     
1, 2008), at para. 43; Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, Award of April 15, 2009, 21(3) 
World Trade and Arb. Materials 729 (2009), at 755; Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. 
Malaysia, Decision on Annulment of April 16, 2009, a48 ILM 1086 (2009), at 1095; Bureau 
Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Paraguay (“Bureau 
Veritas”), Decision on Jurisdiction of May 29, 2009, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BIVACDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf>, (last visited on April 12, 
2010), at para. 59; Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment of September 1, 2009, 
available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Azurix-Annulment.pdf>, (last visited on September 
4, 2009), at para. 83; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary 
Objection to Application for Annulment of October 23, 2009, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ContCasObjectiontoAppforAnnul.pdf>, (last visited on 
December 1, 2009), at para. 23; Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and others 
v. Ukraine (“Inmaris”), Decision on Jurisdiction of March 8, 2010, 22(5) World Trade and Arb. 
Materials 1045 (2010), at 1062; Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, Decision on Proposal for 
Disqualification of an Arbitrator of March 19, 2010, 24 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 267 (2009), at 276; 
Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, Decision 
on Annulment of March 25, 2010, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/RumeliAnnulment.pdf>, (last visited on July 20, 2010), at para. 
70; Railroad Development Corporation v. Guatemala, Decision on Jurisdiction of May 18, 2010, 
available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/051810RDCvGuatemala-
SecondDecisionJurisdiction.pdf>, (last visited on May 30, 2010), at para. 111; Burlington 
Resources Inc. v. Ecuador (“Burlington”), Decision on Jurisdiction of June 2, 2010, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BurlingtonResourcesInc_v_Ecuador_Jurisdiction_Eng.pdf>, 
(last visited on June 24, 2010), at para. 104; Saba Fakes v. Turkey, Award of July 14, 2010, 
available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Fakes_v_Turkey_Award.pdf>, (last visited on July 
20, 2010), at para. 76; Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM SA v. Senegal, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of July 16, 2010, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Millicomv.SenegalDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf>, (last visited on 
September 18, 2010), at para. 58; Enron Corporation, Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina, Decision 
on Annulment of July 30, 2010, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf>, (last visited on August 2, 2010), 
at para. 114; Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1, Ltd. v. Peru (“Duke Peru”), 
Decision on Annulment of March 1, 2011, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/DukevPeruFinal_1Mar2011_Eng.pdf>, (last visited on March 
10, 2011), at para. 85. See also Schreuer, Christoph, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty 
Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 3(2) TDM (2006), at 1-2. 
35
 8 ILM 679 (1969), at 691-692. 
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rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention reflects the so-called 
doctrine of textual approach, according to which the main source of the intention 
of the parties to the treaty lies in the actual text of the treaty, which must be 
understood in accordance with the natural or ordinary meaning of its terms in the 
context in which they occur.  
The decisions that applied the economic development requirement to expand or to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the Centre failed to observe the method required by the 
general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. In order to justify 
the existence of the economic development requirement, these decisions gave 
primacy to the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention — the contribution to 
the economic development — as a source of the intention of the Contracting 
States of the ICSID Convention, to the detriment of the actual text of the ICSID 
Convention and of the ordinary meaning of the term “investment” as employed in 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Under the general rule of treaty 
interpretation, however, the use of the object and purpose of a treaty is always a 
second step and may not contradict the ordinary meaning of the terms employed 
in the treaty. 
2. THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
2.1. Research Problem and Delimitations 
This thesis focuses on the problem developed in the practice of ICSID tribunals 
concerning the application of the economic development requirement in order to 
expand or to restrict the jurisdiction of the Centre. The assessment of the research 
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problem is made through the legal analysis of the ICSID decisions that applied the 
economic development requirement and their consistency with the general rule of 
treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention. For this purpose, the 
thesis addresses two questions: (a) whether the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention has an objective meaning that distinguishes the compliance 
with such requirement from the consent of the disputing parties to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre; and (b) whether, based on this distinction, the ICSID Convention 
contains a jurisdictional requirement that allows ICSID tribunals to expand or to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the Centre based on contribution to the economic 
development of the host State.  
This thesis makes an exhaustive research of all published decisions of ICSID 
tribunals and ad hoc committees that dealt with the fulfillment of the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention, and especially those that addressed the 
existence and application of the economic development requirement.36 Particular 
attention is also given to the decisions of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (“PCIJ”) and of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), to the extent that 
these decisions provided the foundations for the codification of the general rule of 
treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
It should be noted that this thesis does not address procedural questions that might 
arise from the application of the economic development requirement. 
Accordingly, this thesis does not deal with questions as to the correct timing for a 
disputing party to challenge the jurisdiction of the Centre based on the non-
fulfillment of the economic development requirement; whether an ICSID tribunal 
                                                 
36
 The research is based on decisions rendered and made public until June 1, 2012. 
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has the authority to assess the compliance with the economic development 
requirement on its own initiative; or who bears the burden of proof when the 
fulfillment of the economic development requirement has to be decided. 
2.2. Relevance of the Research Problem 
The choice for the problem addressed in this thesis is justified due to the relevance 
that the topic has gained in the context of investment arbitration. First, the Centre 
is one of the main forums for the settlement of investment disputes37 and the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention — from which the economic 
development requirement derives — is one of the core elements of the jurisdiction 
of the Centre. Secondly, the assessment of the existence of the economic 
development requirement raises several questions concerning the application to 
the ICSID Convention of the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention that entail a comprehensive study of the topic that has not been made 
so far. While the economic development requirement was dealt with before, most 
previous writings did not attempt to demonstrate how its existence may be 
justified and how its compliance may be assessed in accordance with the general 
rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
Economic development as a jurisdictional requirement was for the first time 
addressed in 1996 by Professor CHRISTOPH SCHREUER in his commentary on 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.38 In a passage of his commentary — which 
                                                 
37
 See supra note 9. 
38
 See Schreuer, Christoph H., Commentary on the ICSID Convention: Article 25, 11 ICSID Rev. – 
FILJ 320 (1996). 
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became part of his most famous work “The ICISD Convention: A Commentary”, 
published in 200139 — SCHREUER argued that: 
“The only possible indication of an objective meaning that can be 
gleaned from the Convention is contained in the Preamble’s first 
sentence, which speaks of ‘the need for international co-operation for 
economic development and the role of private international investment 
therein.’ This declared purpose of the Convention is confirmed by the 
Report of the Executive Directors which points out that the 
Convention was ‘prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership 
between countries in the cause of economic development.’ Therefore, 
it may be argued that the Convention’s object and purpose require that 
there must be some positive impact on development.”40 
But except for this statement, SCHREUER did not proceed to an analysis of the 
topic in the light of the general rule of treaty interpretation of the ICSID 
Convention. In addition, while SCHREUER suggested the existence of the 
economic development requirement, he did not attempt to explain how ICSID 
tribunals could assess the compliance with such requirement. However, in the 
recent publication “Principles of International Investment Law”, co-authored by 
Professor RUDOLF DOLZER, SCHREUER opined that “[i]n case of an investment 
lawfully admitted and implemented, the very consistency of the project with the 
legal order of the host state should indicate the contribution to the development of 
the host state.”41 In the second edition of his work “The ICISD Convention: A 
Commentary”, SCHREUER added that: 
“Any concept of economic development, if it were to serve as a 
yardstick for the existence of an investment and hence for protection 
                                                 
39
 See Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 124-125. See also Schreuer, Christoph H., Malintoppi, 
Loretta, Reinisch, August, and Sinclair, Anthony, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2009), at 116-117. 
40
 Schreuer, C., supra note 38, at 358 – footnote excluded. 
41
 Dolzer, Rudolf, and Schreuer, Christoph, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), at 69. 
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under ICSID, should be treated with some flexibility. It should not be 
restricted to measurable contributions to GDP but should include 
development of human potential, political and social development and 
the protection of the local and global environment.”42 
Some authors have uncritically accepted the opinion of SCHREUER on the 
existence of the economic development requirement. This is the case of MARTIN 
ENDICOTT43 and WALID BEN HAMIDA.44 While both authors admit the existence of 
the economic development requirement and suggest a criterion based on which the 
compliance with such requirement may be assessed, they do not demonstrate how 
their conclusions were reached, especially based on the application of the general 
rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention.  
The existence of the economic development requirement was also advocated by 
OMAR E. GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR.45 According to GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR, “there is a general 
acceptance that contribution to economic development of the host State is an 
element that defines an ICSID protected investment.”46 GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR 
supports his opinion on the idea that economic development was one of the main 
purposes of the ICSID Convention and the link between the Centre and the 
IBRD.47 For him, “ICSID is not another arbitration Center;”48 its “purpose cannot 
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 Schreuer, C., Malintoppi, L., Reinisch, A., and Sinclair, A., supra note 39, at 134 – footnote 
excluded. 
43
 See Endicott, Martin, The Definition of Investment in ICSID Arbitration: Development Lessons 
for the WTO?, in Sustainable Development in World Trade Law 379 (Gehring, Markus, and 
Segger, Marie-Claire C., ed., The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005), at 383. 
44
 See Ben Hamida, Walid, Two Nebulous ICSID Features: The Notion of Investment and the 
Scope of Annulment Control, 24 J. Int’ l Arb. 287 (2007), at 293-295. 
45
 See García-Bolívar, Omar E., Protected Investments and Protected Investors: The Outer Limits 
of ICSID’s Reach, 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 145 (2010), at 153-158. 
46
 Ibid., at 158. 
47
 Ibid., at 153-155. 
48
 Ibid., at 155. 
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be detached from economic development.”49 As to the assessment of compliance 
with the economic development requirement, GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR notes that: 
“[A] hermeneutic analysis of the ICSID law shows that there are ways 
to ascertain the contribution to economic development of a foreign 
investment. If an investment is contrary to public interest, has not left 
any knowledge to the host country, has not enhanced the economy or 
its productivity or has not increased the standards of living of the host 
country or the labor conditions, it has probably made no contribution 
to the economic development of that country.”50 
Other authors, on the other hand, have denied the existence of the economic 
development requirement, but none of them attempted to explain why this 
requirement would not exist under the ICSID Convention in the light of the 
general rule of treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention. Professor 
IBRAHIM FADLALLAH suggests that the economic development requirement is “a 
political requirement: it is not necessary to make it a legal condition.”51 
DEVASHISH KRISHAN considers that the Preamble of the ICSID Convention does 
not entail this condition52 and, even if the economic development requirement 
existed, “an economic transaction constituting an investment, by definition, 
contributes to economic development.”53 Professor EMMANUEL GAILLARD 
concludes that the reference to economic development in the Preamble of the 
ICSID Convention would be “a mere acknowledgement that investment fosters 
                                                 
49
 Idem. 
50
 Ibid., at 158. See also García-Bolívar, Omar E., Economic Development at the Core of the 
International Investment Regime, in Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration 586 
(Brown, Chester, and Miles, Kate, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
51
 Free translation of the French original: 
“Le développement est une exigence politique: il n’est pas nécessaire d’en faire une 
condition juridique” (Fadlallah, Ibrahim, La Notion D’Investissement: Vers Une 
Restriction à la Compétence du CIRDI, in Global Reflections on International Law, 
Commerce and Dispute Resolution – Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner 
259 (Aksen, Gerald, Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz, Mustill, Michael J., Patocchi, Paolo 
Michele, and Whitesell, Ane Marie, eds., Paris: ICC, 2005), at 267). 
52
 See Krishan, Devashish, A Notion of ICSID Investment, in Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
International Law 61 (Weiler, T., ed., Huntington, New York: JurisNet, 2008), at 74. 
53
 Idem – footnote excluded, emphasis in the original. 
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economic development. This acknowledgement does not mean that economic 
development is essential to the notion of investment.”54 ZACHARY DOUGLAS 
points out that the economic development requirement would be “an unworkable 
criterion for the existence of an investment because of its subjective nature; 
whether or not a commitment of capital or resources ultimately proves to have 
contributed to the economic development of the host state can often be a matter of 
appreciation and generate a wide spectrum of reasonable opinion.”55 BRIGITTE 
STERN mentions “the difficulty of integrating the development dimension into the 
definition of investment by international arbitrators.”56 
The existence of the economic development requirement was also dealt with by 
Professor KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE in his extensive work on investment treaties. 
VANDEVELDE notes that “[i]f all that is required is a potential contribution to 
development, then the [economic development requirement] adds nothing because 
every asset will satisfy it. If the inquiry is whether the investment actually does 
contribute to development in some significant way, then the existence of treaty 
protection would depend upon the success of a particular investment.”57 
VANDEVELDE argues, however, that “to accord treaty coverage only to successful 
investments is inconsistent with the purposes of the BITs.”58 
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 See Gaillard, Emmanuel, Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of 
Investment in ICSID Practice, in International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer 403 (Binder, Christina, Kriebaum, Reinisch, August, and Wittich, 
Stephan, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 414. 
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 See Douglas, Zachary, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), at 202 – footnote excluded. 
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 Stern, Brigitte, The Contours of the Notion of Protected Investment, 24 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 534 
(2009), at 543. 
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 Vandevelde, Kenneth J., Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 134. 
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 Idem. 
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Finally, in an article published in the end of 2008, the economic development 
requirement of the Salini test was discussed by Professor SÉBASTIEN MANCIAUX.59 
Differently from the previous writings, MANCIAUX bases his analysis on the 
application of the notion of economic development as a criterion used to 
determine whether a transaction or activity may qualify as an investment within 
its ordinary meaning.60 
The analysis of the economic development requirement is also inserted in a broad 
debate among scholars regarding the ability of investment arbitration tribunals to 
effectively observe in practice the hybrid foundations of investment arbitration 
and the correct use of the general of treaty interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention in their decision-making function. 
In one of the last writings of Professor THOMAS W. WÄLDE, dedicated to the 
problem of treaty interpretation in investment arbitration, he noted that “[a]t 
present, one might even talk of a ‘struggle’ for the soul of investment arbitration 
between international commercial arbitration and (public) international law 
bars.”61 This assertion was made in the context of his profound criticism against 
the inappropriate transplant of a commercial arbitration approach into the field of 
investment disputes. WÄLDE suggested that “[t]ribunals often do not practise what 
they preach; reference to the Vienna Rules is now mandatory, but such reference 
does not mean the Rules are taken and applied seriously,”62 and “it is difficult to 
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 See Manciaux, Sébastien, The Notion of Investment: New Controversies, 9(6) J. World 
Investment & Trade 1 (2008). 
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 Ibid., at 17. 
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 Wälde, T., supra note 5, at 725. 
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 Ibid., at 730. 
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find a tribunal which formally and properly applied the Vienna Rules step by 
step.”63 
WÄLDE was not against the participation of commercial arbitration practitioners in 
investment disputes; he believed that many practitioners from a commercial 
arbitration background were able to understand the peculiarities of the legal issues 
pertaining to this new field. His criticism was directed to those who think that the 
decision-making function in investment disputes is similar to the approach 
adopted in the commercial arbitration tradition.64 According to WÄLDE, the 
commercial arbitration approach is characterized by the fact that: 
                                                 
63
 Ibid., at 746. In the same sense, as noted by MAHNOUSH ARSANJANI and Professor MICHAEL 
REISMAN: 
“International law’s canon for interpreting international agreements is codified in the 
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managed their affairs” (Arsanjani, Mahnoush H., and Reisman, W. Michael, 
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(Paulsson, Jan, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in Appeals Mechanism in 
International Investment Disputes 241 (Sauvant, Karl, ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), at 262-263). 
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“The essence of international commercial arbitration culture is to 
provide an effective resolution of dispute between the parties — and 
nothing further. That culture also brings a strong focus on the facts 
rather than on the law; that is most visible in the style of reasoning 
that is meant to assuage the losing party rather than to show in depth 
and detail how the law is applied and developed. Since awards are as a 
rule not published, there is little concern by the arbitrators about the 
legal quality of the award and how it will be seen by a critical 
professional and academic audience. These practices are now evolving 
under the pressure that comes with the publication of awards.”65 
The use of a commercial arbitration approach in investment disputes, however, 
does not affect only the “style” of the decisions. In certain circumstances, this 
approach has direct consequences to the outcome of the case, to the extent that it 
may influence the way in which arbitral tribunals interpret the legal instruments 
applicable to investment disputes.  
                                                                                                                                     
Professor SORNARAJAH also criticized the adoption of a commercial arbitration approach in 
investment disputes: 
“Further, the tribunals, unlike courts and other tribunals within constitutional 
systems, are constituted largely of persons having experience in commercial 
arbitration. Hence, they tend to lean toward commercial solutions based on 
commercial prudence and give little concern to the predicament of a State faced with 
fashioning policy in the context of circumstances that may have undergone changes. 
The pronouncements of commercial arbitrators on substantial issues of international 
law involved in treaty-based investment arbitration can be open to question. 
Tribunals can consist of judges or arbitrators inexpert in matters of international law 
or without a long period of experience in the field, which makes it difficult to speak 
authoritatively as representative tribunals of the international community. The 
further charge, made by some, is that they may have an ideological predisposition 
toward solutions that favor international business” (Sornarajah, M., A Coming 
Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 39 (Sauvant, Karl, ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), at 42 – footnotes excluded). 
See also Sornarajah, M., The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in The 
Future of Investment Arbitration 273 (Rogers, Catherine A., and Alford, Roger P., eds., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), at 276-277. 
65
 Wälde, T., supra note 5, at 725-726 – footnote excluded. The commercial arbitration approach 
defined by WÄLDE seems to be similar to the “dispute-oriented approach” identified by OLE 
KRISTIAN FAUCHALD. According to FAUCHALD, in adopting a dispute-oriented approach, a 
tribunal “restricts its arguments to those presented by the parties to the dispute, […] restricts it 
arguments to those strictly necessary to justify its conclusion, […] bases its decision on an 
integrated and overall assessment” (Fauchald, Ole Kristian, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID 
Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis, 19 EJIL 301 (2008), at 307). See also Legum, Barton, Trends 
and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, 19 Arb. Int’l 143 (2003), at 146-147. 
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In an earlier study, GUS VAN HARTEN observed that arbitral tribunals constituted 
for the settlement of investment disputes have adopted different interpretative 
approaches, which could be classified in four categories: commercial arbitration 
approach; public international law approach; investor (human) rights approach; 
and public law approach.66 While VAN HARTEN admits that a decision might 
adopt more than one approach, he argues that there is a general tendency in 
investment treaty arbitration in favor of a commercial arbitration approach.67 This 
approach could be characterized by the fact that it “treats investor and state 
essentially as equal disputing parties in a reciprocally consensual adjudication.”68 
For this reason, according to VAN HARTEN, arbitral tribunals adopting a 
commercial arbitration approach in investment disputes would base their decisions 
on the idea that “interpretation of the treaty should be based on the intent of the 
disputing parties, rather than the states parties.”69 The consequence of an 
inappropriate use of a commercial arbitration approach in investment disputes is 
that arbitral tribunals are likely to misinterpret and misapply the legal norms 
applicable to the disputes and, thus, render inconsistent decisions. 
2.3. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided in two chapters. The first chapter addresses the distinction 
between the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention and the consent of 
the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the Centre and how the application of 
the investment requirement was dealt with in ICSID practice. As will be shown in 
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this chapter, the interpretation of the ICSID Convention in accordance with the 
general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention supports the idea 
that the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention places an objective 
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Centre that may not waived by the will of the 
disputing parties. This idea was followed in most decisions of ICSID tribunals 
that had to decide on the fulfillment of the investment requirement. 
The second chapter of the thesis is dedicated to the question as to whether the 
ICSID Convention contains a jurisdictional requirement that allows ICSID 
tribunals to expand or to restrict the jurisdiction of the Centre based on 
contribution to the economic development of the host State. It will be 
demonstrated in this chapter that the fact that one of the main purposes of the 
ICSID Convention was to foster economic development through the flow of 
foreign investment into developing economies does not necessarily imply the 
existence of the economic development requirement. On the contrary, in 
accordance with the general rule of treaty interpretation codified in the Vienna 
Convention, constructions that go beyond the text of the treaty are not admitted. 
For this reason, the existence of the economic development requirement cannot be 
inferred without an express provision in the text of the ICSID Convention. This 
conclusion is also confirmed through the analysis of the subsequent practice of the 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention. 
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CHAPTER I – THE OBJECTIVENESS OF THE INVESTMENT 
REQUIREMENT OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
 
1. ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
The question as to the existence of the economic development requirement is 
directly related to the debate among ICSID tribunals and scholars on the role of 
the consent of the disputing parties in determining the content of the investment 
requirement and the relevance of the lack of a definition of the term “investment” 
in the ICSID Convention. Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, 
which governs the jurisdiction of the Centre to institute arbitral or conciliation 
proceedings: 
“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or 
any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”70 
In the absence of a definition of term “investment” in the ICSID Convention, two 
basic approaches were developed in ICSID practice: the so-called subjectivist 
theory, according to which the lack of a definition was intended to confer on the 
disputing parties the discretion to determine whether the dispute arises directly out 
of an investment; and the so-called objectivist theory, according to which the 
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 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 9. 
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investment requirement of the ICSID Convention contains an objective meaning 
that may not be waived by consent.71 
The subjectivist theory is primarily based on a statement made in the Report of the 
Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States (“Report of the Executive 
Directors”),72 a document prepared by the drafters of the ICSID Convention and 
which was submitted to States together with the final text of the ICSID 
Convention.73 According to paragraph 27 of the Report of the Executive 
Directors: 
“No attempt was made to define the term ‘investment’ given the 
essential requirement of consent by the parties, and the mechanism 
through which Contracting States can make known in advance, if they 
so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would not 
consider submitting to the Centre (Article 25(4)).”74 
According to the interpretation given by the subjectivist theory, paragraph 27 of 
the Report of the Executive Directors reflects a purported real intention of the 
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 In addition to the subjectivist and objectivist theories, it has been suggested the existence of a 
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drafters of the ICSID Convention to grant the disputing parties the discretion to 
define the content of the investment of the ICSID Convention.75 To the extent that 
the jurisdiction of the Centre is essentially based on the consent of the disputing 
parties and that it is up to the disputing parties to determine which disputes they 
wish to submit to the jurisdiction of the Centre, there was no need for the ICSID 
Convention to adopt a particular definition of investment. For this reason, the 
disputing parties have the discretion to determine whether or not a particular 
dispute arises out of an investment, without any material limitation.  
According to the subjectivist theory, therefore, in order to establish the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, the mere consent of the disputing parties would be 
enough, insofar as the consent implies an agreement on the content of the term 
“investment”. Consequently, the fulfillment of the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention is limited to assessing whether the dispute falls within the 
scope of the consent given by the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre.76 Whereas the parties had agreed on a specific definition of investment, 
the task of ICSID tribunals is to verify whether the dispute complies with the 
agreed definition.  
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This would occur especially in cases referred to ICISD arbitration pursuant to 
investment treaties or to the domestic investment law of the host State, given that, 
for the purposes of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, these instruments 
provide an offer of consent of the host State to which the foreign investor 
adheres.77 The investment treaty or domestic investment law, however, may place 
material limitations on the offer of consent of the host State and, thus, make the 
submission of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre contingent upon the 
compliance with the requirements set forth therein. In this sense, most investment 
treaties and domestic investment laws provide for a definition of investment, 
which places a limitation on their scope of application and, thus, defines the 
material scope of the offer of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre.78 In this 
case, an ICSID tribunal would only have jurisdiction to hear the claim pursued by 
the foreign investor, if the dispute complies with the definition of investment.  
To the extent that the definition of investment set forth in the investment treaty or 
in the domestic investment law of the host State constitutes an element of the 
consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre, the given definition of investment reflects 
the agreement of the disputing parties on the content of the term “investment”. 
Accordingly, if one follows the subjectivist theory, the definition of investment 
set forth in investment treaties or in the domestic investment law of the host State 
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would complement the ICSID Convention and define the content of its investment 
requirement. 
In opposition to the subjectivist theory, the objectivist theory advocates that the 
use of the term “investment” in the wording of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention was intended to place an objective limitation on the jurisdiction of the 
Centre.79 The objectivist theory is essentially based on the idea that consent alone 
is not enough to establish the jurisdiction of the Centre; in order to fall within the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention, the dispute has to comply with the 
requirements set forth in Article 25(1), which are distinct from the consent of the 
disputing parties. This idea finds support in paragraph 25 of the Report of the 
Executive Directors80 and in the wording of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.  
The jurisdictional requirements set forth in Article 25(1) are generally classified 
as ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione voluntatis requirements.81 The 
ratione materiae requirements place a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Centre 
based on the nature of the dispute. In order to fall within the jurisdictional scope 
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of the ICSID Convention, the dispute must have a legal character82 and arise 
directly out of an investment. Secondly, pursuant to the ratione personae 
requirements, which regulate the personal jurisdiction of the Centre, the dispute 
must be between a Contracting State or one designated State entity of a 
Contracting State83 and a national of another Contracting State.84 Finally, the 
Centre may only exercise jurisdiction upon the consent of the disputing parties.85 
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 The requirement that a dispute must have a legal character was envisaged to exclude from the 
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is legal or not. Thus, it is entirely possible to react to a breach of agreement by 
relying on moral standards, by invoking concepts of justice or by pointing to the 
lack of political and economic wisdom of such course of action. The dispute will 
only qualify as legal if legal remedies such as restitution or damages are sought and 
if legal rights based on, for example, treaties or legislation are claimed. 
Consequently, it is largely in the hands of the claimant to present the dispute in legal 
terms” (Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 104-105 – footnote excluded).  
See also Schreuer, Christoph, What is a Legal Dispute?, 6(1) TDM (2009). 
83
 In accordance with Article 25(3) of the ICSID Convention:  
“Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require 
the approval of that State unless that State notifies the Centre that no such approval 
is required” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 10). 
84
 The requirement that the investor party to the dispute must be a national of another Contracting 
States is due to the ICSID Convention’s general purpose of depolitization of investment disputes. 
By virtue of Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention:  
“No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international 
claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting 
State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this 
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and 
comply with the award rendered in such dispute” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 10).  
To the extent that only the Contracting States of the ICSID Convention are bound by its 
provisions, if the home State of the investor party to the dispute is not a Contracting State, it is not 
prevented from exercising diplomatic protection. See Broches, A., supra note 32, at 356; Schreuer, 
C., supra note 23, at 162-163, 286-288; Castro de Figueiredo, Roberto, ICSID and Non-Foreign 
Investment Disputes, 4(5) TDM (2007), at 11-12. 
 35 
The wording of Article 25(1) indicates that the ICSID Convention creates a 
jurisdictional framework based on cumulative and not alternative requirements. A 
                                                                                                                                     
The ICSID Convention, however, does not provide for any special criterion to determine who may 
be considered a national of another Contracting State; it only sets forth negative requirements. 
Pursuant to Article 25(2)(a) and (b) of the ICSID Convention:  
“‘National of another Contracting State’ means:  
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the 
State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such 
dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was 
registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but 
does not include any person who on either date also had the nationality of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute; and  
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than 
the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit 
such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the 
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, 
because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of 
another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention” (1 ICSID Reports 3 
(1993), at 9-10). 
It seems settled in customary international law and in ICSID practice that the nationality of natural 
persons must be determined in accordance with the municipal law of each State. In this sense, 
Article 1 of The Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws of April 12, 1930, provides that: 
“It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law 
shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with international 
conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised 
with regard to nationality” (24 AJIL Sup. 192 (1930), at 192).  
International tribunals, however, are not totally bound by municipal law. The acquisition of 
nationality may be disregarded in cases of lack of a genuine link between the natural person and 
the State (see Nottebohm, Judgment of April 6, 1955, ICJ Reports 4 (1955), at 23), as well as in 
cases of involuntary acquisition and withdrawal of nationality contrary to international law (see 
Hirsch, Moshe, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), at 75-76; 
Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 267, 272). See also Castro de Figueiredo, R., ibid., at 22-23, 
footnote 83.  
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legal dispute arising directly out of an investment will not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre unless the disputing parties are a Contracting State and a 
national of another Contracting State, even if the disputing parties have consented 
to the jurisdiction of the Centre. By the same token, a dispute between a 
Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State will also not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre unless it is a legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment. Accordingly, in the absence of any provision in the ICSID 
Convention providing otherwise, the fulfillment of one of the requirements set 
forth in Article 25(1) is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the Centre 
unless the other requirements are met; each requirement must be fulfilled 
independently from the others.  
For this reason, the idea that the consent of the disputing parties would be enough 
in order for the investment requirement to be fulfilled seems to be inconsistent 
with the wording of Article 25(1), to the extent that the consent and the 
investment requirements are two distinct conditions for the establishment of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. The fulfillment of one requirement does not imply the 
fulfillment of another. 
In addition, pursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, a treaty must be 
interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context.”86 The reference to the “context” of the treaty reflects 
one of the major principles of treaty interpretation that was named by GERALD 
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FITZMAURICE as the principle of integration.87 By virtue of this principle, the 
treaty must be read as a unity and its terms may not be interpreted as autonomous 
provisions, but as elements of a whole.88 As a consequence of the principle of 
integration, every term employed in the text of a treaty — which, in accordance 
with the principle of actuality, is the main source of the intention of the parties89 
— has a function in its context and may not be disregarded. In interpreting a treaty 
provision, it must be assumed that the parties intended to confer on each term an 
effective role in the treaty. For this reason, in accordance with the rule of non-
surplus, the interpreter of a treaty must give a meaning to every term employed in 
the text of a treaty and assume that there is no pleonasm in the text.90 
                                                 
87
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The rule of non-surplus may also be considered as a consequence of the principle of effectiveness. 
According to FITZMAURICE: 
“Treaties are to be interpreted with reference to their declared or apparent objects 
and purposes; and particular provisions are to be interpreted so as to give them their 
fullest weight and effect consistent with the normal sense of the words and with 
other parts of the text, in such a way that a reason and a meaning can be attributed 
to every part of the text” (Fitzmaurice, G. G., The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty 
Points, 33 BYIL 203 (1957), at 211 – emphasis added).  
See also Thirlway, Hugh, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-
1989: Part Three, 62 BYIL 1 (1991), at 44; Wälde, T., supra note 5, at 738-739; Orakhelashvili, 
A., supra note 30, at 422. 
In the separate opinion to the decision of the PCIJ rendered in the Lighthouses Case Between 
France and Greece, Judge ANZILOTTI asserted that “it is a fundamental rule in interpreting legal 
texts that one should not lightly admit that they contain superfluous words: the right course, 
whenever possible, is to seek for an interpretation which allows a reason and a meaning to every 
word in the text” (Judgment of March 17, 1934, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 62, at 31). 
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Accordingly, the interpretation given by the subjectivist theory is inconsistent 
with the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna, to the extent that, in 
violation of the rule of non-surplus, it makes the term “investment” a superfluous 
term in the wording of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, without any 
effective meaning. If one admits that the mere consent of the disputing parties is 
enough to establish the jurisdiction of the Centre, there would have been no need 
to employ the term “investment” in the wording of Article 25(1). 
                                                                                                                                     
In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, between the United States and United Kingdom, the 
arbitral tribunal constituted under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) 
observed that “it is a principle of interpretation that words in a document ought not to be 
considered as being without any meaning if there is not specific evidence to that purpose and the 
interpretation referred to would lead to the consequence, practically, of reading the words ‘bays, 
creeks and harbours’ out of the Treaty” (Award of September 7, 1910, 4 AJIL 948 (1910), at 982). 
The rule of non-surplus was also referred to in more than one occasion in the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, between the United Kingdom and Iran, the ICJ had to 
decide whether the Iranian declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ 
would confer on the ICJ jurisdiction to hear the claim submitted by the United Kingdom. Iran 
challenged the jurisdiction of the ICJ on the basis that the declaration would only confer 
jurisdiction in cases related to the application of treaties accepted by Iran after the date of 
ratification of the declaration. The United Kingdom, however, contested the interpretation of the 
declaration given by Iran on the ground that it would deprive some words of meaning. According 
to the United Kingdom, “a legal text should be interpreted in such a way that a reason and a 
meaning can be attributed to every word in the text” (Judgment of July 22, 1952, ICJ Reports 93 
(1952), at 105). In reply, the ICJ stated that:  
“It may be said that this principle should in general be applied when interpreting the 
text of a treaty. But the text of the Iranian Declaration is not a treaty text resulting 
from negotiations between two or more States. It is the result of unilateral drafting 
by the Government of Iran, which appears to have shown a particular degree of 
caution when drafting the text of the Declaration. It appears to have inserted, ex 
abundanti cautela, words which, strictly speaking, may seem to have been 
superfluous. This caution is explained by the special reasons which led the 
Government of Iran to draft the Declaration in a very restrictive manner” (ibid). 
While this statement of the ICJ is not conclusive as to the mandatory character of the rule of non-
surplus as a customary international law rule of treaty interpretation, in the advisory opinion given 
in the case concerning the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, based on the rule of non-surplus, the ICJ 
rejected the interpretation of a treaty according to which some terms of the treaty “would be left 
without significance” and “[t]he Court is unable to accept an interpretation which would have such 
a result” (Advisory Opinion of June 8, 1960, ICJ Reports 150 (1960), at 166). This statement of 
the ICJ indicates the mandatory character of the rule of non-surplus in the interpretation of treaties 
(see Haraszti, G., supra note 30, at 90) and, thus, applicable to the ICSID Convention as a rule of 
customary international law. 
The mandatory character of the rule of non-surplus was also confirmed by the WTO Appellate 
Body. In the United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline case, the 
Appellate Body noted that “[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the 
Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. 
An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or 
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility” (Report of the Appellate Body of April 29, 1996, 
35 ILM 605 (1996), at 627 – footnote excluded). 
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2. ARTICLE 1(2) OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
The idea that the disputing parties have the discretion to determine whether or not 
the dispute arises out of an investment seems also inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the ICSID Convention. If the investment requirement could be deemed 
fulfilled by the mere consent of the disputing parties, disputes arising out of 
ordinary commercial transactions and not related to an investment could be 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Centre.  
Pursuant to Article 1(2) of the ICSID Convention: 
“The purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for 
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between 
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”91 
Article 1(2) makes clear that the dispute settlement system created by the ICSID 
Convention was not designed to confer on the Centre jurisdiction over any type of 
dispute between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, 
but only over “investment disputes”. It is exactly for this reason that Article 25(1) 
sets forth, in addition to the consent of the disputing parties, requirements that aim 
at framing the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention in the light of its 
object and purpose.  
The ICSID Convention envisages the establishment of a dispute settlement 
mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes with a legal character and not 
every dispute between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting 
                                                 
91
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 4 – emphasis added. 
 40 
State. For this reason, one may not consider that the term “investment” as 
employed in the wording of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention does not have 
an objective meaning. On the contrary, the function of the investment requirement 
of the ICSID Convention is to place an objective limitation on the jurisdiction of 
the Centre with the aim of complying with the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention. 
3. ICSID INSTITUTION RULES AND ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES 
Another argument that has been suggested in favor of the objectiveness of the 
investment requirement is based on the subsequent practice pertaining to the 
ICSID Convention, as expressed in the Rules of Procedure for the Institution of 
Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings (“ICSID Institution Rules”) and in the 
Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration Of Proceedings by 
the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID Additional Facility Rules”).92  
The ICSID Institution Rules were adopted by the Administrative Council of the 
Centre — which, in accordance with Article 4(1) of the ICSID Convention, is the 
Centre’s plenary body, composed by one representative of each Contracting 
State93 — upon the express authority conferred on it by Article 6(1)(b) of the 
ICSID Convention.94 The purpose of the ICSID Institution Rules is to regulate the 
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 See Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 125. 
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 In accordance with Article 4(1) of the ICSID Convention;  
“The Administrative Council shall be composed of one representative of each 
Contracting State. An alternate may act as representative in case of his principal’s 
absence from a meeting or inability to act” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 5). 
94
 Article 6(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention provides that:  
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authority of the Secretary-General of the Centre for the institution of arbitral and 
conciliation procedures under the ICSID Convention. In accordance with Article 
36(1) of the ICSID Convention, requests for the institution of arbitral proceedings 
must be submitted to the Secretary-General.95 By virtue of the Article 36(3) of the 
ICSID Convention, the Secretary-General has the duty to register the request 
unless he or she considers that the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of 
the Centre.96 In exercising such authority, the Secretary-General must reach a 
decision in the light of the information contained in the request for arbitration. 
Pursuant to Article 36(2) of the ICSID Convention:  
“The request shall contain information concerning the issues in 
dispute, the identity of the parties and their consent to arbitration in 
accordance with the rules of procedure for the institution of 
conciliation and arbitration proceedings.”97 
Rule 2(1)(c) and (e) of the ICSID Institution Rules makes further clear that: 
“Rule 2 
Contents of the Request 
(1) The request shall: 
[…] 
                                                                                                                                     
“Without prejudice to the powers and functions vested in it by other provisions of 
this Convention, the Administrative Council shall:  
[…]  
(b) adopt the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and 
arbitration proceedings” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 5).  
95
 Article 36(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that “[a]ny Contracting State or any national of 
a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect 
in writing to the Secretary-General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party” (1 
ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 13). For conciliation proceedings, see Article 28(1) of the ICSID 
Convention (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 11). 
96
 See supra note 28. For conciliation proceedings, see Article 28(3) of the ICSID Convention (1 
ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 11). 
97
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 13. For conciliation proceedings, see Article 28(2) of the ICSID 
Convention (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 11). 
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(c) indicate the date of consent and the instruments in which it is 
recorded, including, if one party is a constituent subdivision or agency 
of a Contracting State, similar data on the approval of such consent by 
that State unless it had notified the Centre that no such approval is 
required; 
[…] 
(e) contain information concerning the issues in dispute 
indicating that there is, between the parties, a legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment; […].”98 
According to SCHREUER, Rule 2(1) “mandates that a request for conciliation or 
arbitration must indicate not only particulars concerning the parties’ consent (Rule 
2(1)(c)) but also, as a separate requirement, information concerning the issue in 
dispute indicating that there is a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment 
(Rule 2(1)(e)).”99 Rule 2(1) would, thus, make clear that the investment 
requirement set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention is distinct and 
must be fulfilled independently from the consent of the disputing parties to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.  
SCHREUER points out that the ICSID Institution Rules do not impose additional 
jurisdictional requirements and may not be used by an ICSID tribunal as an 
independent basis for declining jurisdiction over a dispute.100 Their purpose, 
according to SCHREUER, “is to enable the Secretary-General to decide whether a 
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request should be registered in accordance with Art. 36(3).”101 The ICSID 
Institution Rules are not part of or an annex to the ICSID Convention, nor were 
they designed to modify the provisions of the ICSID Convention, but they aim at 
implementing the ICSID dispute settlement system based on the interpretation 
made by the Administrative Council of Article 36(2) in the light of the 
jurisdictional requirements set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
SCHREUER also mentions the ICSID Additional Facility Rules as evidence of the 
objectiveness of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention.102 The 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules were created in order to allow the Secretary-
General of the Centre to administer certain proceedings that would fall outside the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention. They were first adopted by the 
Administrative Council of the Centre on September 27, 1978, for an initial term of 
five years. On September 26, 1984, the Administrative Council decided to 
continue the ICSID Additional Facility Rules indefinitely. The ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules aimed at meeting the concerns over the access to the dispute 
settlement facilities provided by the Centre, especially due to the small number of 
States participating in the ICSID Convention at the time it was adopted and to the 
uncertainties created by the imprecise meaning of the ratione materiae 
requirements set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.103  
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In sum, under Article 2 of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the Secretary-
General is authorized to administer arbitral and conciliation proceedings for the 
settlement of legal disputes that do not fulfill all of the jurisdictional requirements 
set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, and fact-finding 
proceedings,104 which operate outside the framework of the ICSID Convention.105 
In particular, Article 2(b) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules authorize the 
Secretary-General to administer “conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the 
settlement of legal disputes which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre 
because they do not arise directly out of an investment, provided that either the 
State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is a 
Contracting State.”106 Article 4(3) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
provides, however, that: 
“In the case of an application based on Article 2(b), the Secretary-
General shall give his approval only if he is satisfied (a) that the 
requirements of that provision are fulfilled, and (b) that the underlying 
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 Rule 2 of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules provides that: 
“Article 2 
Additional Facility 
The Secretariat of the Centre is hereby authorized to administer, subject to and in 
accordance with these Rules, proceedings between a State (or a constituent 
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 Idem – emphasis added. 
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transaction has features which distinguish it from an ordinary 
commercial transaction.”107  
Accordingly, although Article 2(b) authorizes the Secretary-General to administer 
disputes that do not arise directly out of an investment, Article 4(3) provides that 
disputes arising out of ordinary commercial transactions do not fall within the 
scope of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.108 In the comment to Article 4 to 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, it was stated that: 
“(iii) Paragraph (3): This provision guards against the use of the 
Additional Facility for disputes arising out of an ‘ordinary commercial 
transaction’. While the term is not defined, and hardly capable of 
precise definition, the Administrative Council in approving the 
provision recorded the following: ‘Economic transactions which (a) 
may or may not, depending on their terms,be regarded by the parties 
as investments for the purposes of the Convention, which (b) involve 
long-term relationships or the commitment of substantial resources on 
the part of either party, and which (c) are of special importance to the 
economy of the State party, can be clearly distinguished from ordinary 
commercial transactions. Examples of such transactions may be found 
in various forms of industrial cooperation agreements and major civil 
works contracts.’ 
 
(iv) Paragraph (4): The term ‘investment’ is not defined in the 
Convention and among the reasons for the proposal to establish the 
Additional Facility was the concern that a conciliation or arbitration 
agreement might be frustrated if a Commission or Tribunal declared 
itself incompetent on the ground that it considered the underlying 
transaction not to be an ‘investment’. The purpose of paragraph (4) is 
to avoid such frustration on the one hand and unnecessary failure to 
use the Convention on the other. Use of the authority given the 
Secretary-General by this paragraph would be appropriate in border-
line cases.”109 
The rationale behind Article 2(b) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules is that 
certain disputes, although not related to ordinary commercial transactions, might 
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not fall within the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention, to the extent that 
the transaction subject-matter of the dispute does not constitute an investment for 
the purposes of the ICSID Convention. The ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 
therefore, are based on the assumption the term “investment” set forth in Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention places an objective limitation on the jurisdiction 
of the Centre that may not be waived by the consent of the disputing parties.110 
Otherwise, if one admits that the consent of the disputing parties is enough in 
order for a dispute to fulfill the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, 
there would be no need to include the authorization contained in Article 2(b) of 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.  
Both ICSID Institution Rules and ICSID Additional Facility Rules demonstrate 
the understanding of the Administrative Council that the term “investment” as 
employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention has an objective meaning. 
The question, however, is what interpretative function these instruments have for 
the purposes of the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
As they constitute subsequent acts in the application of the ICSID Convention, the 
ICSID Institution Rules and ICSID Additional Facility Rules could possibly be 
used in the interpretation of the ICSID Convention in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) 
of the Vienna Convention. Pursuant to Article 31(3)(b), “[t]here shall be taken 
into account, together with the context […] any subsequent practice in the 
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application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation.”111  
Article 31(3)(b) does not qualify “subsequent practice” as State practice only. For 
this reason, it seems well settled that the practice of political organs of 
international organizations, such as the Administrative Council of the Centre, may 
be taken into account for the purposes of interpreting a treaty provision.112 
However, in order to meet the requirements of Article 31(3)(b), the subsequent 
acts of an international organization in the application of a treaty must establish 
“the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” 
Recourse to the subsequent practice of a political organ of an international 
organization in the interpretation of a treaty was made by the ICJ in the 
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations case. In this case, the General Assembly of the United Nations requested 
the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the question as to whether, pursuant to 
Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly could only 
decide on the admission of a new member upon a positive recommendation of the 
Security Council.113 In interpreting the Charter, the ICJ relied on the ordinary 
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meaning of the treaty and on the subsequent practice in the application of Article 
4 of the Charter as reflected in the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. 
In admitting the subsequent practice of a political organ of the United Nation in 
the interpretation of the Charter, the ICJ observed that: 
“The organs to which Article 4 entrusts the judgment of the 
Organization in matters of admission have consistently interpreted the 
text in the sense that the General Assembly can decide to admit only 
on the basis of a recommendation of the Security Council. In 
particular, the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly provide 
for consideration of the merits of an application and of the decision to 
be made upon it only ‘if the Security Council recommends the 
applicant State for membership’ (Article 125). The Rules merely state 
that if the Security Council has not recommended the admission, the 
General Assembly may send back the application to the Security 
Council for further consideration (Article 126). This last step has been 
taken several times: it was taken in Resolution 296 (IV), the very one 
that embodies this Request for an Opinion.”114  
The ICJ, thus, admitted the use of the Rules of Procedure of the General 
Assembly in the interpretation of the Charter on the basis that the authority to 
apply Article 4 of the Charter was expressly conferred on the General Assembly 
by the Members of the United Nations and they would, therefore, establish the 
agreement of the parties to the Charter.  
In this sense, the ICSID Institution Rule may be admitted in the interpretation of 
the ICSID Convention in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, 
once they were adopted by the Administrative Council of the Centre under the 
                                                                                                                                     
“Article 4 
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states 
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of 
the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations 
will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of 
the Security Council” (39 AJIL Sup. 190 (1945), at 192). 
114
 Advisory Opinion of March 3, 1950, ICJ Reports 4 (1950), at 9. 
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authority expressly conferred on it by Article 6(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention.115 
However, one might not have the same conclusion as regards the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules. 
Differently from the ICSID Institution Rules, in adopting the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, the Administrative Council was not exercising an express authority 
conferred on it by the ICSID Convention. Article 6(3) of the ICSID Convention 
provides that “[t]he Administrative Council shall also exercise such other powers 
and perform such other functions as it shall determine to be necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention.”116 As SCHREUER notes, 
“[s]ince the Additional Facility operates outside the Convention, it is difficult to 
argue that it is ‘necessary for the implementation of the provisions of [the] 
Convention.’”117 This raises the question as to whether the Administrative 
Council in adopting the ICSID Additional Facility Rules exceeded the authority 
conferred on it by the ICSID Convention.118  
Secondly, the adoption of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules in 1978 was a 
majority decision of the Administrative Council; certain Contracting States voted 
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against the ICSID Additional Facility Rules and a significant number of 
Contracting States abstained from voting. In fact, the resolution of the 
Administrative Council adopting the ICSID Additional Facility Rules was 
approved by a procedural majority and not by the majority of the Contracting 
States of the ICSID Convention. While twenty-five Contracting States voted in 
favor of the resolution, two Contracting States voted against it, twenty-four 
Contracting States abstained from voting and twenty Contracting States entitled to 
vote did not attend the annual meeting of the Administrative Council of 
September 27, 1978.119  
Accordingly, even if one considers that the relevant question is not whether the 
Administrative Council exceeded its authority, but the understanding on which the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules were based, the fact that the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules were not approved by all Contracting States’ representatives at the 
Administrative Council makes doubtful whether the interpretation of the ICSID 
Convention may be considered as establishing the agreement of all Contracting 
States of the ICSID Convention, as required by Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention.120 
The use of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules in the interpretation of the ICSID 
Convention is connected with a question that seems controversial in international 
law as to whether majority decisions of organs of international organizations may 
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be considered as evidence of subsequent practice in the interpretation of 
constitutive treaties.121 In the Certain Expenses of the United Nations case, Judge 
PERCY SPENDER, in his separate opinion, observed that: 
“[I]t is not evident on what ground a practice consistently followed by 
a majority of Member States not in fact accepted by other Member 
States could provide any criterion of interpretation which the Court 
could properly take into consideration in the discharge of its judicial 
function. The conduct of the majority in following the practice may be 
evidence against them and against those who in fact accept the 
practice as correctly interpreting a Charter provision, but could not, it 
seems to me, afford any in their favour to support an interpretation 
which by majority they have been able to assert.”122 
According to SPENDER, in interpreting the Charter of the United Nations, the acts 
of political organs of the organization may only be taken into consideration on the 
basis that such organs “are but the mechanisms through which the Members of the 
United Nations express their views and act.”123 SPENDER’s opinion was a reaction 
against the use of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council 
of the United Nations as evidence of subsequent practice, as the ICJ did in the 
case, without taking into account whether such resolutions were approved by a 
majority and not by all Member States.124  
On the other hand, Judge FITZMAURICE noted, in a separate opinion given in the 
same case, that “even if a majority vote cannot in the formal sense bind the 
minority, it can, if consistently exercised in a particular way, suffice to establish a 
                                                 
121
 See McGinley, Gerald P., Practice as a Guide to Treaty Interpretation, 9 Fletcher F. 211 
(1985), at 228-229; Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 6th ed., 2003), at 605, 664. 
122
 Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962, ICJ Reports 151 (1962), at 191-192. 
123
 Ibid., at 192. 
124
 See McGinley, G., supra note 121, at 215-216. 
 52 
settled practice which a tribunal can usefully and properly take account of.”125 In 
the case, FITZMAURICE attempted to rely on the practice of the organs of the 
United Nations, which he considered inconclusive, in order to confirm an 
interpretation that he had arrived at on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the Charter’s provisions alone. FITZMAURICE did not attempt, however, to 
use the subsequent practice as a primary source for the definition of the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the Charter, but as secondary source. This approach leads 
to the idea that the subsequent practice that does not meet the requirements of 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention — such as the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules — may be used, nevertheless, as a supplementary means of treaty 
interpretation pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention,126 which provides 
that: 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
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(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”127 
AMERASINGHE, however, advocates the use of majority decisions taken by organs 
of international organizations in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) based on the idea of 
“implied consent”. He argues that: 
“Since the parties to the constitution, whether they are original parties 
or become parties subsequently, have agreed at the time of becoming 
parties to the constitution to the mechanisms of decision-making by 
the organization taken under the constitution, even though they have 
voted against or may disagree with such decisions, as reflecting 
proper conduct on the part of the organization. Hence, that a member 
state is in an opposing minority and does not immediately agree to or 
opposes a decision creating practice may be of no consequence, 
because ultimately the member concerned have agreed, by implication 
and at the time it became a party to the constitutive treaty, to accept 
the decision as reflecting the will of the organization, even though it 
disagreed with it at the time it was made.”128 
While AMERASINGHE admits that the idea of implied consent does not apply in 
cases where the practice of the international organization is formed by a simple 
majority of votes with a substantial opposing minority,129 he does not exclude the 
applicability of such idea when the decision of the international organization is 
formed by a simple majority with a substantial number of member States 
abstaining from voting. In this sense, the understanding of the Administrative 
Council that led to the adoption of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules would be 
attributable to all Contracting States. However, the idea on which the rule of 
implied consent advocated by AMERASINGHE is based — the notion of the “will of 
the organization” — seems to be inconsistent with the requirements of the Vienna 
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Convention. Article 31(3)(b) entails the agreement of the parties to the 
constitutive treaty and not the will of the international organization.130 An 
international organization is not a party to its constitutive treaty and its practice 
does not have interpretative value on its own under the Vienna Convention, but 
may only be considered as subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(b) if it reflects the common understanding of its member States.131 For this 
reason, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, as the result of a majority decision, 
may be only be used as a supplementary means of treaty interpretation.132 
4. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT REQUIREMENT OF THE 
ICSID CONVENTION 
The objectiveness of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention can 
also be confirmed through the analysis of its drafting history. While the consent of 
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the disputing parties was one of the key requirements for the establishment of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, once the term “investment” was introduced in the draft 
texts of the ICSID Convention as a jurisdictional requirement, it was never 
suggested throughout the negotiations and drafting process of the ICSID 
Convention that the disputing parties would have the discretion to determine 
whether or not a dispute arises out of an investment. On the contrary, the 
investment requirement was deliberately introduced to place an objective 
limitation to the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
4.1. The Genesis of the ICSID Convention 
The idea behind the formulation of the ICSID Convention is closely linked with 
the experience of the IBRD in the settlement of disputes between foreign investors 
and host States. In more than one occasion, the IBRD was requested to assist in 
the mediation and conciliation of investment disputes and to act as an appointing-
authority in arbitral proceedings.133 Based on this experience, on August 28, 1961, 
the general counsel of the IBRD, ARON BROCHES, submitted to the executive 
directors of the IBRD a memorandum in which he pointed out that one of the 
main barriers for the promotion of foreign investment was the lack of suitable 
international conciliation and arbitration facilities for the settlement of investment 
disputes. According to BROCHES, recourse to local courts and to diplomatic 
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protection was not satisfactory and there was a need for the establishment of an 
institutional framework for the settlement of investment disputes.134 
BROCHES’ idea obtained support from the president of the IBRD at that time, 
EUGENE BLACK. In an address made to the Board of Governors of the IBRD, 
BLACK stated that: 
“[O]ur experience has confirmed my belief that a very useful 
contribution could be made by some sort of special forum for the 
conciliation or arbitration of these [investment] disputes. […] The fact 
that governments and private interests have turned to the Bank to 
provide this assistance indicates the lack of any other specific 
machinery for conciliation and arbitration which is regarded as 
adequate by investors and governments alike. I therefore intend to 
explore with other institutions, and with our member governments, 
whether something might not be done to promote the establishment of 
machinery of this kind.”135 
After preliminary discussions on the convenience of establishing such dispute 
settlement facilities136 — in which it was concluded that there was a general view 
that States would favor the establishment of an institutional framework —,137 the 
executive directors obtained a formal authorization by the Board of Governors of 
the IBRD: 
“[T]o consider the desirability and practicability of establishing 
institutional facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the settlement 
through conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between 
governments and private parties and, if they conclude that such action 
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would be advisable, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities 
for submission to governments.”138 
Upon the authorization conferred by the Board of Governors, the executive 
directors started further discussions on the feasibility of the ICSID Convention 
and its content.  
As mentioned before, one of the peculiarities of the ICSID Convention is that 
these discussions were not directly held by the Contracting States, but within the 
structure of the IBRD. The relevance of such peculiarity is that the opinions and 
possible agreements reached in the context of the discussions carried out by the 
executive directors did not necessarily represent the intention of the Member 
Governments of the IBRD. In formulating the provisions of the ICSID 
Convention, the executive directors, although appointed and elected by Member 
Governments, did not act under a mandate conferred on them by such States. On 
the contrary, the decisions taken by the executive directors in the formulation of 
the ICSID Convention expressed the view of the IBRD and not of the Member 
Governments.139 In this context, it should be remarked that, in accordance with the 
Articles of Agreement of the IBRD, the Member Governments of the IBRD did 
not have an equal representation in the board of executive directors.140 Several 
executive directors represented more than one Member Government, which did 
not form a homogenous group and whose opinion could differ. While the 
formulation of the ICSID Convention may be considered as being within the 
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purposes of the IBRD in promoting the flow of foreign investment,141 it was not 
within the mandate of the IBRD to conclude international treaties on behalf of its 
Member Governments.142 Consequently, when interpreting the provisions of the 
ICSID Convention, one should bear in mind that the documents pertaining to the 
drafting history of the ICSID Convention do not necessarily correspond to the 
intention of the Contracting States. 
4.2. First Discussions in the Committee of the Whole on Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 
The discussions on the formulation of the ICSID Convention were held in the 
Executive Directors’ Committee of the Whole on Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“Committee of the Whole”). The first deliberations were based on a 
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draft of the ICSID Convention, called “Working Paper”, submitted by BROCHES 
to the executive directors on June 5, 1962.143  
Although from the outset the ICSID Convention was designed for the 
establishment of facilities for the settlement of investment disputes,144 the 
Working Paper did not contain any reference to the term “investment”. Section 1 
of Article II of the Working Paper, which defined the scope of application of the 
ICSID Convention, provided that: 
“The provisions of this Article shall apply to any undertaking in 
writing to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration pursuant to the 
provisions of this Convention for the resolution of any existing or 
future dispute between a Contracting State and a national of another 
Contracting State.”145 
Furthermore, in accordance with Section 1(1) of Article IV of the Working Paper:  
“The jurisdiction of the Center shall be limited to disputes between 
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States and shall 
be based on consent.”146 
The explanation for the absence of any reference to the term “investment” in the 
first draft of the ICSID Convention was given by BROCHES in the comment to 
Section 1 of Article II of the Working Paper. According to BROCHES: 
“It will be noted that Section 1 contains no limitation as to the nature 
of the dispute. Although the Convention and the Center would be 
intended to be used primarily in connection with what are commonly 
referred as ‘investment disputes’, there is no need to write a limitation 
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to that effect into the Convention, since it is up to the parties to an 
undertaking to decide whether they want to bring it within the terms of 
the Convention. Moreover, it is difficult to define the term ‘investment 
dispute’ with the precision required to avoid disagreements arising as 
to the applicability of the Convention to a given undertaking. And 
uncertainty on this score would tend to undermine the primary 
objective of Article II, namely to give confidence that undertakings to 
have recourse to the conciliation or arbitration will be carried out.”147 
The first reactions in the Committee of the Whole against the wording of the 
provisions of the Working Paper were concerned with the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the Centre.148 It was suggested that some States would not wish to ratify the 
ICSID Convention without a precise definition of which disputes would fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre.149 In the light of these first reactions, in a 
memorandum of February 18, 1963, BROCHES observed that “[t]here is a general 
understanding, which could be recorded in a Preamble to the Convention, that the 
machinery created by the Convention and the rules laid down in the Convention 
are designed to deal primarily with investment disputes.”150  
As a consequence of these first discussions, the term “investment” was included in 
the First Preliminary Draft of August 9, 1963, and in the Preliminary Draft of 
October 15, 1963. Section 1 of Article II, the wording of which is identical in both 
drafts, provided that: 
“The jurisdiction of the Center shall be limited to proceedings for 
conciliation and arbitration with respect to any existing or future 
investment dispute of a legal character between a Contracting State 
and a national of another Contraction State (or that State when 
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subrogated in the rights of its national) and shall be based on the 
consent of the parties thereto.”151 
However, no definition of the term “investment” was included in the drafts of the 
ICSID Convention. According to the comment to Section 1 of Article II of First 
Preliminary Draft and of the Preliminary Draft: 
“No detailed definition of the category of disputes in respect of which 
the facilities of the Center would be available has been included in the 
Convention. Instead, the general understanding reflected in the 
Preamble, the use of term ‘investment dispute’, and the requirement 
that the dispute be of a legal character as distinct from political, 
economic or purely commercial disputes, were thought adequate to 
limit the scope of the Convention in this regard. Within those limits 
Contracting States would be free to determine in each particular case 
what disputes they would submit to the Center. To include a more 
precise definition would tend to open the door to frequent 
disagreements as to the applicability of the Convention to a particular 
undertaking, thus undermining the primary objective of this article 
viz., to give confidence that undertakings to have recourse to 
conciliation or arbitration will be carried out.”152 
The comment to the First Preliminary Draft and to the Preliminary Draft makes 
clear that, despite the absence of a definition of investment in the draft text of the 
ICSID Convention, the inclusion of the term “investment” was intended to place a 
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Centre based on the nature of the dispute. It 
also represents an unambiguous departure from the idea contained in the Working 
Paper to base the jurisdiction of the Centre exclusively on the consent of the 
disputing parties. For these reasons, it constitutes a persuasive argument against 
the idea that the real intention of the drafters of the ICSID Convention was to 
grant the disputing parties absolute freedom to determine whether the dispute 
arises out of an investment. 
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4.3. Discussions in the Regional Consultative Meetings 
The Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention served as the basis for the four 
regional consultative meetings held with legal experts appointed by the Member 
Governments of the IBRD in Addis Ababa,153 Santiago,154 Geneva155 and 
Bangkok.156 During these meetings, several representatives questioned the lack of 
a definition of the term “investment” in the Preliminary Draft.157 As noted by 
BROCHES, “some delegates felt that the term ‘investment’ should be defined, and 
as I have indicated to the members of this Board on earlier occasions, we shall 
probably in the end have to devise a suitable definition of investment, difficult 
though it may be.”158 
Another issue that arose during the regional consultative meetings, in parallel to 
the question as to whether the ICSID Convention should contain a definition of 
investment, concerned the determination of the types of investment disputes that 
would be covered by the jurisdiction of the Centre.159 Very often, the need for a 
definition of investment and the question as to whether the ICSID Convention 
should be limited to certain types of investment disputes were dealt with in the 
debates as a single problem. BROCHES, however, identified these issues as “two 
distinct lines of criticism regarding the category of dispute covered by the 
Convention.”160 Indeed, while these two topics — the definition of investment and 
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the determination of the types of investment disputes — stem from the same 
problem, the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention, and are linked with 
each other, they constitute two distinct questions. If the jurisdiction of the Centre 
is limited to the settlement of disputes arising out of investments, the 
determination of the types of disputes is contingent upon the meaning of the term 
“investment”. However, the limitation to certain types of investment disputes 
represents an additional limitation that could have been placed on the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention, distinct from the meaning of the 
term “investment”. For instance, the jurisdiction of the Centre could be limited to 
disputes arising out of investment agreements or out of investments made in 
accordance with investment promotion laws. These limitations could have been 
introduced in the text of the ICSID Convention regardless of the inclusion or not 
of a definition of investment. 
BROCHES observed that some delegations were concerned with the question as to 
“whether all ‘investment disputes of a legal character’ (assuming that term to be 
clear enough or, if necessary, clarified) should be within the jurisdiction of the 
Center, or whether some types or classes of disputes, although admittedly 
‘investment disputes of a legal character,’ should be excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Center even when the parties to such disputes wished to make 
use of the Center’s facilities.”161 BROCHES noted further that: 
“The following are typical examples of suggested exclusion: 
(i) The jurisdiction of the Center should be excluded in case of 
disputes arising out of investments made prior to the entry into force 
of the Convention or some other specified date; 
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(ii) The Center should not deal with any disputes other than 
those arising out of investment made pursuant to an investment 
agreement, with the host State or in response to special investment 
promotion legislation; 
(iii) Same as (ii) but with the additional restriction that there must 
have been agreement at the time the investment was made that 
recourse would be had to conciliation and/or arbitration pursuant to 
the Convention; 
(iv) There should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Center 
disputes regarding the legality of acts of expropriation or 
nationalization, as distinguished from disputes regarding the adequacy 
of the compensation to be paid;  
(v) No recourse should be had to the facilities established under 
the Convention until all local remedies, administrative as well as 
judicial, have been exhausted; 
(vi) Proceedings under the auspices of the Center should be 
limited to questions of ‘denial of justice’.”162 
It was clear, therefore, that these proposals were concerned with the types of 
investment disputes that would fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre and not 
with the need for a definition of investment in the text of the ICSID Convention. 
BROCHES demonstrated a strong opposition against the limitation of the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention to certain types of disputes. 
According to him, “since the jurisdiction of the Center is limited by the overriding 
condition of consent, the exclusions desired by one or the other delegation could 
be achieved by a refusal of consent in those cases in which in their view there was 
no proper case for use of the facilities of the Center.”163 
In his opinion, the Contracting States of the ICSID Convention would be free to 
determine which types of investment disputes they would submit to the 
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jurisdiction of the Centre. The only restriction to the types of investment disputes 
is that, in order to fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre, the dispute must be of 
a legal character, arise out of an investment and be between a Contracting State 
and a national of another Contracting State. According to BROCHES, the ICSID 
Convention should set forth the outer limits within which the disputing parties 
would be free to exercise the discretion to submit or not a dispute to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre: 
“The purpose of Section 1 is not to define the circumstances in which 
recourse to the facilities of the Center would in fact occur, but rather 
to indicate the outer limits within which the Center would have 
jurisdiction provided by the parties’ consent had been attained. 
Beyond these outer limits no use could be made of the facilities of the 
Center even with such consent. The question might be asked why, if 
consent is required and can be refused, the Convention need put any 
limit at all to the jurisdiction of the Center whether as to parties, 
subject-matter or otherwise. The answer to this question is that the 
jurisdiction of the Center should be limited in accordance with the 
purposes sought to be achieved by the Convention, that is, to provide 
new procedures for the settlement of investment disputes between 
States and private parties. […].”164  
The establishment of facilities for the settlement of investment disputes through 
the conclusion of the ICSID Convention was not intended and designed to create a 
system of compulsory jurisdiction. The mere participation in the ICSID 
Convention does not mean that a Contracting State and its nationals are bound to 
submit disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre. Consequently, a precise 
definition of the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention would not be 
needed. 
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4.4. Discussions in the Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment 
Disputes 
The discussions held in the four regional consultative meetings resulted in the new 
wording of the jurisdictional provisions employed in the First Draft of September 
11, 1964. Article 26(1) of the First Draft provided that: 
“The jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to all legal disputes 
between a Contracting State (or one of its political subdivisions or 
agencies) and a national and a national of another Contracting State, 
arising out of or in connection with any investment, which the parties 
to such disputes have consented to submit to it.”165 
However, differently from the previous drafts of the ICSID Convention, the First 
Draft contained a definition of investment. Pursuant to Article 30(i) of the First 
Draft, “‘investment’ means any contribution of money or other asset of economic 
value for an indefinite period or, if the period be defined, for not less than five 
years.”166 In order to conciliate the position of States that demanded a limitation 
on the types of investment disputes that would fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre, a new provision, which became Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention,167 
was included in the First Draft. In accordance with Article 29 of the First Draft: 
“Any Contracting State may at any time transmit to the Secretary-
General for purposes of information a statement indicating in general 
or specific terms the class or classes of dispute within the jurisdiction 
of the Center which it would in principle consider submitting to 
conciliation or arbitration pursuant to this Convention.”168 
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The regional consultative meetings also led the executive directors to conclude 
that the establishment of the Centre through an international treaty was 
desirable.169 For this reason, on September 10, 1964, a new resolution was 
approved by the Board of Governors, authorizing the executive directors: 
“[T]o formulate a convention establishing facilities and procedures 
which would be available on a voluntary basis for the settlement of 
investment disputes between contracting States and Nationals of other 
contracting States through conciliation and arbitration […] tak[ing] 
into account the views of member governments and […] keep[ing] in 
mind the desirability of arriving at a text which could be accepted by 
the largest possible number of governments.”170 
The need for a new resolution was due to the fact that it was thought that the text 
of the first resolution adopted by the Board of Governors171 was not clear as to 
whether the executive directors were authorized to formulate a final text of the 
ICSID Convention and submit it directly to the Member Governments of the 
IBRD for signature without prior approval of the Board of Governors.172  
As an alternative to a diplomatic conference, the Committee of the Whole decided 
to establish the Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes (“Legal 
Committee”) constituted by representatives of each Member Government of the 
IBRD.173 The purpose of the Legal Committee was “to provide the Executive 
Directors with technical advice as well as to enable member governments that are 
not represented by an Executive Director of their own nationality to participate 
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directly in the preparation of the convention.”174 The reason for the establishment 
of the Legal Committee was due to the fact that, during the regional consultative 
meeting held in Geneva, some representatives argued that the final draft of the 
ICSID Convention should have been submitted to a diplomatic conference.175 In 
particular, the representative of the Netherlands pointed out that the legal experts 
at the regional consultative meetings “were attending as guests of the World Bank 
rather than as national delegations, and were accordingly participating in their 
capacity as legal experts in order to explore all aspects of the draft Convention 
without in any way committing their governments to any specific stand.”176 
BROCHES, however, opposed to the idea of convening a diplomatic conference. He 
believed that a diplomatic conference would result in delays and could put at risk 
the attempt to conclude the ICSID Convention.177 
The initial idea was that the Legal Committee would be constituted in order to 
help the executive directors in the draft of the final text of the ICSID Convention. 
The members of the Legal Committee would not have been appointed by the 
Member Governments, but by the executive directors.178 However, due to the fact 
that the proposed Legal Committee could have been seen as an “intermediate 
solution […] between the process of consultation and that of a diplomatic 
conference,”179 each Member Government was invited to appoint one 
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representative.180 The task of the Legal Committee was to prepare a draft of the 
ICSID Convention to be submitted to the executive directors.181 
The discussions in the Legal Committee were based primarily on the First Draft of 
September 11, 1964,182 and on the comments to the First Draft made by the 
Member Governments.183 These comments demonstrated the lack of unanimity 
among Member Governments regarding the definition of investment and the 
determination of which types of investment disputes would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. Some States, such as the Republic of China, Thailand 
and Vietnam, considered that the jurisdictional scope of the Centre as defined in 
the First Draft was too broad. Their concerns, however, seemed to be related to 
definition of the types of investment disputes subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre and not to the definition of investment itself.184 Other States, such as South 
Africa and the United Kingdom, showed some disagreement with the definition of 
investment employed in the First Draft.185 In particular, the United Kingdom 
considered that: 
“[I]t is very difficult to define the word ‘investment’, and the result of 
including such a definition may be to create difficult for the 
arbitrators, when deciding whether they have jurisdiction in any 
particular case. For example, the parties might wish to arbitrate, and 
the arbitrators might consider that the particular dispute before them 
was an investment dispute, but nevertheless the latter might feel 
obliged to refuse to exercise jurisdiction because the facts did not 
come within the particular definition of ‘investment’ contained in the 
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convention. For this reason the United Kingdom would prefer to have 
no such definition in the convention.”186 
The concerns of the Member Governments echoed in the first discussions held in 
the Legal Committee. The representatives of the Member Governments were 
divided in two main groups. Apparently, from the documents pertaining to the 
discussions held in the Legal Committee, the representatives of Australia,187 
Austria,188 Ceylon,189 Republic of China,190 Germany,191 Guatemala,192 Iran,193 
Japan,194 Liberia,195 Niger,196 Spain197 and the United States198 disagreed with the 
definition of investment set forth in the First Draft, either because it was too broad 
or too narrow, but favored the inclusion of a definition. Other Member 
Governments’ representatives, such as New Zealand,199 Sweden200 and the United 
Kingdom,201 supported the exclusion of the definition of investment inserted in 
the First Draft. A third view was expressed by the representative of Portugal, 
SAPATEIRO, according to which, if the jurisdiction of the Centre was limited to 
certain types of investment disputes, there would be no need for a definition of 
investment.202 Due to these controversies, a working group on Article 26 of the 
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First Draft was established with the purpose of reaching an agreed solution for the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention.203 
The discussions held in the working group on Article 26 revealed that the most 
contentious point among its members was not the definition of investment, but the 
determination of which types of investment disputes would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.204 Several proposals were presented by members of the 
Legal Committee, either adopting a flexible formula or a narrow one, but very few 
proposals contained a definition of investment.205 The different proposals were 
merged into two main ones and submitted to the Legal Committee for 
deliberation. The first proposal was to maintain the text of Article 26 of the First 
Draft, including in its wording, if necessary, the rule contained in Article 29 of the 
First Draft (the first version of Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention). The 
second proposal, known as the “Spanish proposal”, restricted the jurisdictional 
scope of the ICSID Convention to certain types of investment disputes. According 
to this proposal, the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention would have 
been defined as follows: 
“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to the settlement of any 
legal dispute between a Contracting State and a National of another 
Contracting State which directly refers to an investment and has as its 
object 
(a) compliance with obligations arising out of a contract between 
that State and a National of another State; 
(b) compliance with guarantee obligation which a State may 
have given to specific investments; 
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(c) to determine the indemnity to be granted for acts taken by the 
State in violation of rights lawfully acquired by the National of the 
other State, provided however, that such acts do not result from 
(i) the correct application of the laws in force in the territories of 
the State at the time the investment was made or 
(ii) the correct application of laws of a general character enacted 
after that time which do not annul or reduce the benefits expressly 
recognized to the national investor. 
(2) Notwithstanding what is stated in paragraph (1) above any 
Contracting State may at the time of ratification or accession or at any 
time thereafter notify to the Centre the class or classes of investment 
disputes in respect of which it would in principle consider submitting 
or not submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. Such notification 
shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph (3). 
(3) The submission of any dispute to the Centre shall be in 
writing and shall state that both parties have consented. Consent may 
be given before or after the dispute has arisen.”206 
In addition to these proposals, a third proposal, known as the “British proposal”, 
sponsored by twenty-five States,207 was submitted to the Legal Committee with 
the following wording: 
“(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to investment 
disputes between a Contracting State and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdrew its consent unilaterally. 
(2) Any Contracting State may at the time of ratification or 
accession or at any time thereafter notify to the Centre the class or 
classes of investment disputes in respect of which it would in principle 
consider submitting or not submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
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Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by 
paragraph (1).”208 
With some amendments, the British proposal was approved by twenty-seven 
members of the Legal Committee against six votes,209 and became the wording of 
Article 25 of the Revised Draft of December 11, 1964: 
“(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any dispute of a 
legal character, arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute 
consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have 
given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 
[…] 
(3) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification or 
acceptance of this Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the 
Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not 
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. Such notification 
shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph (1).”210 
The Revised Draft did not contain any definition of investment. The first 
discussions held in the Legal Committee211 and the submission of some proposed 
definitions212 showed some disagreements with the definition of investment 
inserted in the First Draft of September 11, 1964. However, the documents 
pertaining to the work of the Legal Committee apparently demonstrate that the 
definition of investment was actually not subject to any further discussion among 
the representatives of the Member Governments. This might lead to the 
conclusion that the main concern of the States was not related to the definition of 
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investment, but to the determination of which types of investment disputes would 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre.213 That is, the concern of the States was 
whether the jurisdictional provisions of the ICSID Convention should have had a 
flexible wording or a list of matters that could be submitted to ICSID 
arbitration.214 This conclusion could be confirmed by the fact that neither the 
British proposal nor the Spanish proposal put forward a definition of investment. 
Other evidence of such conclusion may be found in the comment made by the 
representative of Egypt, LOKUR. According to him: 
“[I]n addition to the safeguard afforded by the requirement of consent, 
States ought to be able to define precisely the kind of disputes they 
could conceivably consent to submit to the Center and exclude 
disputes which could not under any circumstances be subject to 
arbitration. If this were done, there seemed to be no need to limit the 
jurisdiction of the Center to ‘legal disputes’ or to define the term 
‘investment’.”215 
In fact, the absence of any definition of investment in the text of the Revised Draft 
was the only possible solution that could conciliate the different positions as to the 
definition of investment contained in Article 30(i) of the First Draft. Some States 
argued that the definition was too broad; others considered it too narrow. But if 
the ICSID Convention did not have any definition of investment, the States that 
considered the definition of the First Draft too broad would not be bound by such 
definition and could adopt a narrower one for the purpose of consenting or not to 
the jurisdiction of the Centre. On the other hand, for the States that considered the 
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definition of the First Draft too narrow, the absence of a definition in the ICSID 
Convention would not limit the consent of such States to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre to a given definition. On the contrary, these States would be allowed to 
base their consent on the ordinary meaning of the term “investment” and not on a 
special meaning of the term, which would be the result if the ICSID Convention 
had contained a definition of investment. In any case, however, it was never 
suggested that the Contracting States of the ICSID Convention would be 
absolutely free to determine the content of the term “investment” and be allowed 
to give a definition that goes beyond the ordinary meaning of the term. States 
seemed to agree with the idea that the inclusion of the term “investment” in the 
text of the ICSID Convention was intended to define the outer limits of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. Consequently, the meaning of investment could be 
restricted by consent, but never expanded beyond its ordinary meaning. 
4.5. Final Discussions in the Committee of the Whole and the Report of the 
Executive Directors 
The Revised Draft prepared by the Legal Committee was submitted to the 
Committee of the Whole for the formulation of the final text of the ICSID 
Convention. During the discussions held in the Committee of the Whole, there 
were some disagreements among some executive directors regarding the wording 
of Article 25(1) of the Revised Draft.216 But these disagreements were in fact 
related to the determination of the types of investment disputes and not to the need 
for including a definition of investment. In particular, one executive director, 
LIEFTINCK, informed that: 
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“[H]e had been requested by the Israeli Government to express a 
strong preference for the ‘closed’ approach which sought to limit the 
jurisdiction of the Centre by a more or less precise definition of the 
disputes which could come before it, over the ‘open’ formula favored 
by the majority of the Legal Committee. The Netherlands and 
Yugoslavia, however, were more in favor of the ‘open’ formula, the 
position which he himself would support.”217 
Another executive director, MEJIA-PALACIO, “recalled that the Colombian 
Government was opposed to the use of the term ‘legal dispute’ as being too wide, 
and would prefer a more precise definition.”218 Only one executive director, 
OZAKI, requested that “some examples of what was meant by the term 
‘investment’”219 were included in the Report of the Executive Directors. In reply, 
BROCHES observed that: 
“[T]he staff had prepared a definition of ‘investment’ and had also 
brought to the attention of the Legal Committee a number of examples 
of definitions of that term taken from legislation and bilateral 
agreements. None of these had proved acceptable. The large majority 
had, moreover, agreed that while it might be difficult to define 
‘investment’, an investment was in fact readily recognizable. The 
Report would say that the Executive Directors did not think it 
necessary or desirable to attempt to define the term ‘investment’ given 
the essential requirement of consent of the parties and the fact that 
Contracting States could make known in advance within what limits 
they would consider making use of the facilities of the Centre. Thus 
each Contracting State could, in effect, write its own definition.”220 
After some technical changes in the wording,221 Article 25(1) of Revised Draft 
became the final text of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, with the 
following wording: 
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“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or 
any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”222 
No definition of the term “investment” was included. The reason for the lack of 
definition of investment in the ICSID Convention was given in paragraph 27 of 
the Report of the Executive Directors.  
While it is clear that there were several attempts to define the term “investment” 
during the drafting history of the ICSID Convention, the final wording of 
paragraph 27 of the Report of the Executive Directors was the solution reached in 
order to conciliate final disagreements in the Committee of the Whole. In fact, in 
the Draft Report of the Executive Directors of January 19, 1965, paragraph 27 of 
the final text of the Report of the Executive Directors had the following wording: 
“26. The Executive Directors did not think it necessary or 
desirable to attempt to define the term ‘investment’, given the 
essential requirement of consent by the parties, and the mechanism 
through which Contracting States can make known in advance, if they 
so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would not 
consider submitting to the Centre (Article 25(4)).”223 
Against this wording, however, one executive director, MEJIA-PALACIO, pointed 
out that: 
“[I]t would not be correct to say, as was done in paragraph 26 that 
‘The Executive Directors did not think it necessary or desirable to 
attempt to define the term ‘investment’ …..’ In his opinion, it was 
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difficult to define that term but he could not support the idea that a 
definition was unnecessary or undesirable.”224 
BROCHES suggested then to reword the sentence to what became the final wording 
of paragraph 27.225 In fact, when paragraph 27 states that “[n]o attempt was made 
to define the term ‘investment’,” it actually means that no attempt was made in the 
final text of the ICSID Convention and not that no attempt was made during the 
formulation of the ICSID Convention. 
5. ICSID PRACTICE 
5.1. The Early Practice 
The objectiveness of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention also 
finds support in ICSID practice. Since the conclusion of the ICSID Convention, 
the first writings showed a general understanding that the exclusion of a definition 
of investment from the final text of the ICSID Convention was intended to avoid 
any undesirable limitation that a definition might have caused and to grant the 
disputing parties a great margin of discretion to determine whether a dispute arises 
out of an investment.226 Most authors had the opinion that the discretion of the 
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disputing parties would not be unlimited and that disputes related to transactions 
that manifestly do not constitute an investment would not fall within the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention.227  
ARON BROCHES, who designed and conducted the drafting process of the ICSID 
Convention, in one of his first articles published after the conclusion of the ICSID 
Convention, noted that:  
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“During the negotiations several definitions of ‘investment’ were 
considered and rejected. It was felt in the end that a definition could 
be dispensed with ‘given the essential requirement of consent by the 
parties.’ This indicates that the requirement that the dispute must have 
arisen out of an ‘investment’ may be merged into the requirement of 
consent to jurisdiction. Presumably, the parties’ agreement that a 
dispute is an ‘investment dispute’ will be given great weight in any 
determination of the Centre’s jurisdiction, although it would not be 
controlling.”228  
The idea that the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention could be 
merged into the consent requirement could lead to the conclusion that according 
to BROCHES the term “investment” as employed in the wording of Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention would not have an objective meaning. BROCHES, however, 
clarified his position in a later publication. He observed that:  
“The fundamental condition is consent, ‘the cornerstone of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.’ But consent is not enough. The Centre is an 
institution of limited jurisdiction, limited by the character of the 
parties and the nature of the dispute.”229  
As regards the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention in particular, 
BROCHES explained that: 
“There is no shortage of definitions of investment. One finds them in 
economic literature, but more particularly in national legislation with 
respect to investment guarantees or incentives for investment, as well 
as in bilateral investment protection treaties between capital exporting 
and capital importing countries. 
On review, each of these definitions proved either inadequate from a 
technical point of view or, more significantly, unacceptable to the one 
or other country or group of countries because it did not coincide with 
their view of the type of transactions for which they would, in fact, be 
willing to accept the jurisdiction of the Centre. The latter type of 
objection reflected a confusion between absolute limits of jurisdiction, 
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to be established in the Convention, and the flexible limits within 
which cases would actually be submitted to the Centre’s jurisdiction, 
depending on the parties’ consent. 
In the end, the effort to devise a generally acceptable definition of the 
term ‘investment’ was given up ‘given the essential requirement of 
consent by the Parties.’ 
I believe that this was a wise decision, fully consonant with the 
consensual nature of the Convention, which leaves a large measure of 
discretion to the parties. It goes without saying, however — and I have 
made this remark before in another connection — that this discretion 
is not unlimited and cannot be exercised to the point of being clearly 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Convention.”230 
According to BROCHES, thus, while the exclusion of a definition of investment in 
the final text of the ICSID Convention was intended to grant a great margin of 
discretion, the disputing parties would not be absolutely free. The disputing 
parties could not waive the investment requirement in order to submit disputes 
that manifestly do not arise out of an investment. However, it was never made 
clear what the boundaries of such discretion would be. 
Especially due to the small number of cases referred to ICSID arbitration in the 
first years of the Centre, the fulfillment of the investment requirement of the 
ICISD Convention was not significantly assessed by ICSID tribunals. In fact, 
during this period, there was no reported case in which the jurisdiction of the 
Centre was challenged based on the allegation of non-fulfillment of the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. The very few early cases in 
which the compliance with the investment requirement was addressed resulted 
from the application of the Rule 42(4) of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings (“ICSID Arbitration Rules”).231 These cases were Alcoa 
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Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Jamaica (“Alcoa”), Kaiser Bauxite Company v. 
Jamaica (“Kaiser”), and Reynolds Jamaica Mines Limited and Reynolds Metals 
Company v. Jamaica (“Reynolds”) and Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v. 
Liberia (“LETCO”). 
The disputes referred to ICSID arbitration against Jamaica in Alcoa, Kaiser and 
Reynolds arose out of very similar facts. The claimants had entered into 
agreements with the Jamaican government for the production of bauxite in 
Jamaica, which contained a “no further tax” clause. After the enactment of new 
legislation providing for additional taxes on the production of bauxite, the 
claimants submitted their claims against the Jamaican government to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre pursuant to arbitration clauses contained in the 
agreements. Although the claimants initiated different proceedings, the Alcoa, 
Kaiser and Reynolds tribunals were composed by the same arbitrators. Once 
Jamaica failed to take part in the arbitral proceedings, the tribunals had to decide 
on the jurisdiction of the Centre and on their own competence by virtue of Rule 
42(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, and, thus, to decide whether the disputes 
arose out of an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention.  
In the decision on jurisdiction of July 6, 1975, rendered in Kaiser, while the 
tribunal recognized the weight of the consent of the disputing parties in 
determining whether the dispute arose out of an investment, it also assessed the 
compliance with the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention in light of 
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explanations” (1 ICSID Reports 157 (1993), at 173). 
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the objective elements of the activities carried out by the claimant in the host 
State: 
“The Tribunal finds that the dispute arises directly out of an 
investment. It is said in the Report of the Executive Directors of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
accompanying the Convention when submitted to Governments 
(hereafter called ED Report), para. 27, that no attempt was made to 
define the term ‘investment’ given the essential requirement of 
consent by the parties. It follows that the intention of the Convention 
was that the consent of the parties should be entitled to great weight in 
any determination of the Centre’s jurisdiction. Moreover, it seems 
clear to the Tribunal that a case like the present, in which a mining 
company has invested substantial amounts in a foreign State in 
reliance upon an agreement with that State, is among those 
contemplated by the Convention.”232 
The Kaiser tribunal considered that, pursuant to paragraph 27 of the Report of the 
Executive Directors, there was an intention to give “great weight” to the consent 
of the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the Centre in deciding whether the 
dispute arises out of an investment in the sense of the ICSID Convention. In the 
case, once the dispute was referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to an arbitration 
clause inserted in a contract, there was an implied agreement of the parties that 
disputes arising out of that contract would be related to an investment for the 
purposes of the ICSID Convention. Nonetheless, to the extent that the decision 
referred to the case as one of “those contemplated by the Convention,” it seems 
that, in the tribunal’s opinion, “great weight” would not mean that the discretion 
conferred on the parties is unlimited.  
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 Decision on Jurisdiction of July 6, 1975, 1 ICSID Reports 296 (1993), at 303. See also Alcoa, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of July 6, 1975 (excerpts), 4 Y.B. Com. Arb. 206 (1979), at 207. The 
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In LETCO, the dispute arose out of an alleged violation of a concession agreement 
entered into by the claimant and the Liberian government for the harvesting and 
processing of forest products in Liberia. Like in Alcoa, Kaiser and Reynolds, the 
dispute was also referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause 
contained in a contract entered into by the disputing parties. However, differently 
from the previous cases, the LETCO tribunal did not base its decision on the 
consent of the disputing parties in order to conclude whether the dispute fulfilled 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. On the contrary, in the 
award, the decision of the tribunal referred exclusively to the objective elements 
of the activities carried out by the claimant: 
“The Concession Agreement between the Government of Liberia and 
LETCO provides for an extensive outlay of capital by LETCO which 
was to be dedicated to the harvesting and processing of forest products 
in Liberia. The Agreement required LETCO to provide ‘all capital at 
such times and in such amounts as may be required for the economic 
and profitable development of this concession.’ (Article III(1)). The 
development of the concession required, among other things, 
harvesting of timber, the construction and maintenance of a sawmill, 
the payment of surface rents and stumpage taxes, facilities for its 
employees including a dispensary, health clinic, education, etc. 
LETCO claims to have paid out over $5 million in machinery and 
equipment alone from 1970 to 1982. Whether this figure is accurate or 
not is not of great import for the moment; the fact is that Liberia’s 
own documents indicate that LETCO paid out extensive amounts for 
the development of the Concession. There is, therefore, no doubt that, 
based on the Concession Agreement, amounts paid out to develop the 
Concession, as well as other undertakings, this legal dispute has arisen 
directly from an ‘investment’ as that term is used in the 
Convention.”233 
In addition to these cases, it has been reported that the ICSID Secretary-General, 
under the screening function conferred on him by Article 36(3) of the ICSID 
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Convention,234 refused the registration of a request for arbitration of a dispute 
arising out of a sale of goods in which the parties had consented to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre, in the case of Asian Express International PTE Ltd. v. Greater 
Colombo Economic Commission.235  
Based on the few practical application of the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention, most relevant writings published during this period favored the idea 
that the use of the term “investment” in the wording of Article 25(1) imposes 
objective limits236 and very few admitted a pure subjectivist view.237 However, the 
very few practical applications of the investment requirement in ICSID cases 
hindered the development of a clear understanding in ICSID practice as to the 
meaning of the term “investment” for the purposes of the ICSID Convention. 
                                                 
234
 See supra note 28.  
235
 See Tupman, Michael, Case Studies in the Jurisdiction of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 35 ICLQ 813 (1986), at 814, footnote 7; Hirsch, M., supra note 
84, at 59-60. 
236
 In one of the most relevant publication on the ICSID Convention of this period, Professor 
MOSHE HIRSCH noted that: 
“The ruling of the tribunal in the Alcoa case and the Secretary-General’s decision 
refusing registration of the request for arbitration in a case dealing with the sale of 
goods demonstrate the mixed relationship between the consensual and objective 
elements of the Centre’s jurisdiction. The lack of definition in the Convention and 
the statement in the Executive Director’s Report regarding the importance of the 
consent of the parties led to great weight being attached to the consent of the parties 
in examining the existence of the objective condition (‘investment’) dictated by the 
Convention. On the other hand, the Centre’s organs acted to limit the consensual 
latitude of the parties and stressed the objective bounds of the parties’ consent in this 
matter” (Hirsch, M., supra note 84, at 60). 
See also Schmidt, John T., Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa 
Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 17 Harv. Int’l L. J. 90 (1976), at 98-100; 
Tupman, M., supra note 235, at 813, 815-816, 833-834; Rand, William, Hornick, Robert N., and 
Friedland, Paul, ICSID’s Emerging Jurisprudence: The Scope of ICSID’s Jurisdiction, 19 NYU J. 
Int’l L. & Pol. 33 (1986-1987), at 35-38; Lamm, Carolyn B., Jurisdiction of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 6 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 462 (1991), at 474-475; 
MacKenzie, Gregory W., ICSID Arbitration as a Strategy for Levelling the Playing Field Between 
International Non-Governmental Organizations and Host States, 19 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 
197 (1993), at 222-225; Nathan, Kathigamar V. S. K., Submissions to the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in Breach of the Convention, 12 J. Int’l Arb. 27 (1995), at 37-40. 
237
 See Sutherland, P. F., The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 28 
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5.2. The Current Practice: ICSID Arbitration and Investment Treaties 
The scarcity of cases referred to ICSID arbitration observed in the first three 
decades of the existence of the Centre ended with the extraordinary proliferation 
of investment treaties in the 1990s. In addition to substantive rules of foreign 
investment protection and treatment, most investment treaties give investors the 
possibility of submitting disputes against host States to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre.238 Soon, disputes referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to arbitration 
clauses contained in contracts concluded between the disputing parties became the 
exception.239 ICSID practice initiated a new era in its history and the role of the 
Centre in the settlement of disputes between foreign investors and host States 
achieved its climax.  
But the increase in the number of cases referred to ICSID arbitration led to the 
emergence of new questions in ICSID practice, especially as regards the content 
of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. If during the early ICSID 
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practice there was no reported case in which the jurisdiction of the Centre was 
challenged based on the allegation of non-fulfillment of the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention, in this new era it has become usual for host 
States to argue that the Centre does not have jurisdiction over claims pursued by 
foreign investors on the ground that the dispute does not arise out of an 
investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention. There are two main reasons 
that may explain this new situation faced by ICSID tribunals. 
The first reason is related to a phenomenon that was labeled by JAN PAULSSON as 
“arbitration without privity”.240 According to PAULSSON, investment treaties and 
domestic investment laws containing a general offer of consent to arbitration 
introduced a new idea that clashed with the traditional concept of arbitration. 
Whereas arbitral proceedings are traditionally initiated pursuant to an arbitration 
clause contained in a contract entered into by the disputing parties, in the case of 
investment treaties and domestic investment laws, the host State and the foreign 
investor are not necessarily in a contractual relationship.241 On the contrary, when 
the host State makes the offer of consent, the identity of the claimant and exactly 
which disputes will be referred to arbitration are not known. This phenomenon 
had immediate consequences to the behavior of States in arbitral proceedings 
initiated under the ICSID Convention. 
If a claim is referred to ICSID arbitration by virtue of an arbitration clause 
contained in a contract concluded between the investor and the State, there is no 
difficulty to conclude that the State agreed that eventual disputes arising out of 
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that contract are related to an investment for the purposes of the ICSID 
Convention. If the State consents to the jurisdiction of the Centre, it does so on the 
assumption that eventual disputes will meet the requirements set forth in Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention.242 While the consent of the disputing parties does 
not preclude ICSID tribunals from assessing the compliance with the 
jurisdictional requirements set forth in the ICSID Convention, one could argue 
that the State is estopped from arguing that the transaction or activity envisaged in 
the contract is not an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention.243 
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily apply to cases referred to ICSID 
arbitration pursuant to investment treaties. When a State enters into an investment 
treaty providing for the submission of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre, it 
is unlikely that such State is aware of all potential claims that eventually will be 
brought before an ICSID tribunal. In this case, a host State may argue that it had 
not foreseen the possibility of submission of a specific dispute to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre and that the claim pursued by the foreign investor does not meet all 
the jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID Convention. 
Secondly, differently from the ICSID Convention, most investment treaties 
contain a definition of investment. The problem is that the definitions set forth in 
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such treaties are extremely broad.244 Usual definitions contained in investment 
treaties such as “any asset” or “claims to money” could qualify any ordinary 
commercial transaction as an investment.245 Consequently, a dispute arising out of 
a transaction or activity that would not fall within the ordinary meaning of the 
term “investment” could be referred to ICSID arbitration if such dispute complies 
with the definition of investment contained in the investment treaty. The host 
State may argue, accordingly, that, despite agreeing on a definition of investment 
in the investment treaty, the dispute arises out of a transaction or activity that is 
not contemplated by the ICSID Convention.  
In this context, the debate on the question as to whether the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention has an objective or subjective meaning 
gained relevance, to the extent that, when confronted with the definition of 
investment set forth in an investment treaty, ICSID tribunals were forced to decide 
whether or not the investment treaty could complement the ICSID Convention, or 
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whether the definition extrapolates the objective limits of the jurisdiction of the 
Centre.  
When a foreign investor submits a claim against the host State pursuant to an 
investment treaty, the content of the treaty, including the definition of investment 
contained therein, forms an arbitration agreement between the disputing parties. 
For this reason, the treaty’s definition of investment represents the agreement of 
the disputing parties on the meaning of investment. Consequently, if one admits 
the idea that the term “investment” as employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention does not have an objective meaning, the definition of investment 
contained in the investment treaty would fill the gap created by the lack of 
definition in the ICSID Convention. In this case, the assessment of the fulfillment 
of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention would be limited to 
verifying the compliance of the dispute with the definition of investment 
contained in the investment treaty. On the other hand, if the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention contains an objective meaning, the 
fulfillment of such requirement would have to be assessed independently from the 
definition of investment set forth in the investment treaty. In this case, the 
compliance with the treaty’s definition of investment is an element of the consent 
given by the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the Centre and it is distinct 
from the other jurisdictional requirements set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. 
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5.2.1. The Fedax and CSOB Decisions 
The case of Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela (“Fedax”) was the first ICSID arbitration in 
which the jurisdiction of the Centre over an investment treaty claim was 
challenged on the ground of non-fulfillment of the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention.246 The dispute, referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to the 
Venezuela-Netherlands BIT,247 arose out of the non-payment of promissory notes 
issued by Venezuela and acquired by the claimant by way of endorsement. 
Venezuela challenged the jurisdiction of the Centre on the ground that the 
acquisition by endorsement of promissory notes, as a loan, would not constitute an 
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investment for the purposes both of the ICSID Convention and of the BIT. 
Venezuela, however, did not base its arguments on a potential contradiction of the 
definition of investment set forth in the BIT with the content of the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention. Nevertheless, in its decision on 
jurisdiction, the Fedax tribunal considered the fulfillment of the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention independently from the definition of 
investment contained in the BIT. While the tribunal admitted that, based on 
paragraph 27 of the Report of the Executive Directors, the lack of definition in the 
ICSID Convention was intended “to leave any definition of the ‘investment’ to the 
consent of the parties,”248 the tribunal assessed whether a loan could be considered 
an investment within its ordinary meaning in accordance with the drafting history 
and practice of the ICSID Convention: 
“In light of the above, distinguished commentators of the Convention 
have concluded that ‘a broad approach to the interpretation of this 
term in Article 25 is warranted,’ that it ‘is within the sole discretion of 
each Contracting State to determine the type of investment disputes 
that it considers arbitrable in the context of ICSID,’ or that the parties 
‘thus have a large measure of discretion to determine for themselves 
whether their transaction constitutes an investment for the purposes of 
the Convention.’ Within this broad framework for the definition of 
investment under the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal also notes that a 
number of transactions have been identified as qualifying as 
investments in given circumstances. It has also been noted by 
commentators of the Convention, and during the history of its 
negotiation, that jurisdiction over loans, suppliers’ credits, outstanding 
payments, ownership of shares and construction contracts, among 
other aspects, was left to the discretion of the parties.”249 
While the Fedax tribunal recognized the large measure of discretion conferred on 
the parties by the ICSID Convention, it did not consider that such discretion 
would be unlimited. In the decision, the concern of the tribunal was whether a 
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loan could qualify as an investment within its ordinary meaning, as an objective 
requirement and independent from the definition of investment set forth in BIT.250 
The tribunal noted that “under both ICSID and the Additional Facility Rules the 
investment in question, even if indirect, should be distinguishable from an 
ordinary commercial transaction.”251 The fact that the tribunal admitted that 
ordinary commercial transactions would not fall within the jurisdictional scope of 
the ICSID Convention implies the existence of objective limits that may not be 
waived by the consent of the disputing parties to the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
The decision, however, did not directly answer the question as to why the term 
“investment” would have an objective meaning.  
In Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia (“CSOB”), referred to ICSID 
arbitration in accordance with the Czech Republic-Slovakia BIT,252 the 
jurisdiction of the Centre over the dispute was also challenged on the ground of 
non-fulfillment of the investment requirement. Like in Fedax, the CSOB dispute 
arose out of a loan. However, differently from what was alleged in Fedax, 
Slovakia expressly argued that the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention could not be fulfilled through the definition of investment set forth in 
the BIT. The tribunal, although recognized the presumption created by the consent 
of the parties, agreed with Slovakia and observed that, in order to establish the 
jurisdiction of the Centre in an investment treaty claim, the investment 
                                                 
250
 Ibid., at 1384. 
251
 Ibid., at 1384 – footnotes excluded. 
252
 Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech 
Republic Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of November 23, 
1992. Although the CSOB tribunal concluded that it was uncertain whether the BIT was in force at 
the time the dispute was submitted to ICSID arbitration, the tribunal considered that the reference 
to the BIT made in the agreement entered into by the disputing parties had the effect of 
incorporating the dispute resolution provisions of the BIT into the agreement (see Decision on 
Jurisdiction of May 24, 1999, 14 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 251 (1999), at 266, 271). 
 94 
requirement of the ICSID Convention must be fulfilled independently from the 
definition contained in the BIT and, consequently, independently from the consent 
of the disputing parties:  
“It follows that an important element in determining whether a dispute 
qualifies as an investment under the Convention in any given case is 
the specific consent given by the Parties. The Parties’ acceptance of 
the Centre’s jurisdiction with respect to the rights and obligations 
arising out of their agreement therefore creates a strong presumption 
that they considered their transaction to be an investment within the 
meaning of the ICSID Convention.  
[…] 
The Slovak Republic is correct in pointing out, however, that an 
agreement of the parties describing their transaction as an investment 
is not, as such, conclusive in resolving the question whether the 
dispute involves an investment under Article 25(1) of the Convention. 
The concept of an investment as spelled out in that provision is 
objective in nature in that the parties may agree on a more precise or 
restrictive definition of their acceptance of the Centre’s jurisdiction, 
but they may not choose to submit disputes to the Centre that are not 
related to an investment. A two-fold test must therefore be applied in 
determining whether this Tribunal has the competence to consider the 
merits of the claim: whether the dispute arises out of an investment 
within the meaning of the Convention and, if so, whether the dispute 
relates to an investment as defined in the Parties’ consent to ICSID 
arbitration, in their reference to the BIT and the pertinent definitions 
contained in Article 1 of the BIT.”253 
The CSOB tribunal based its decision on the assumption that the term 
“investment” as employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention places 
objective limits on the consent of the disputing parties. According to the decision, 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention is “objective in nature” and, 
for this reason, it cannot be overridden by consent. The CSOB decision viewed the 
definition of investment set forth in the BIT as an element of the consent of the 
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disputing parties, distinct from the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention. 
The Fedax and CSOB decisions demonstrated a trend towards the recognition of 
an objectiveness of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention.254 
However, the decisions did not expressly define the content of the term 
“investment” for the purposes of the ICSID Convention. In Fedax, the tribunal 
referred to “certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and return, assumption 
of risk, a substantial commitment and a significance for the host State’s 
development” as the “basic feature of an investment.”255 The tribunal, however, 
did not refer to these features of the term “investment” as elements pertaining to 
an existing notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention. 
Likewise, the CSOB tribunal, although it referred to basic elements of the ordinary 
meaning of investment, asserted that “these elements of the suggested definition, 
while they tend as a rule to be present in most investments, are not a formal 
prerequisite for the finding that a transaction constitutes an investment as that 
concept is understood under the Convention.”256 The Fedax and CSOB decisions, 
nonetheless, seem to have influenced recent ICSID writings.257 
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5.2.2. The Salini Test 
While the Fedax and CSOB decisions recognized the objectiveness of investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention, it was only in the case of Salini Costruttori 
S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco (“Salini”) that the elements of the notion 
of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention were expressly listed 
by an ICSID tribunal. The Salini case, submitted to ICSID arbitration pursuant to 
the Italy-Morocco BIT,258 arose out of a contract for the construction of a highway 
in Morocco, entered into by the claimants and a State-owned company. Morocco 
argued that the Centre would not have jurisdiction over the dispute, to the extent 
that the matter was related to the non-performance of a service contract, which 
could not qualify as an investment. In assessing whether the dispute fulfilled the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, the Salini tribunal noted that: 
                                                                                                                                     
See also Shihata, Ibrahim F.I., and Parra, Antonio, The Experience of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 299 (1999), at 307-308; Smutny, Abby 
Cohen, Arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1(1) 
TDM (2004); Rubins, N., supra note 79, at 288-289; Dolzer, R., supra note 244, at 266; Endicott, 
M., supra note 43, at 391-393; Baltag, Crina M., The Risk of Investment under the ICSID 
Convention, 3(5) TDM (2006); Yala, F., supra note 76, at 117; Waibel, Michael, Opening 
Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AJIL 711 (2007), 718-719; Ben 
Hamida, W., supra note 44, at 290; Schlemmer, Engela C., Investment, Investor, Nationality, and 
Shareholders in The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 47 (Muchlinski, Peter, 
Ortino, Federico, and Schreuer, Christoph, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 62-65; 
Reinisch, August, and Malintoppi, Loretta, Methods of Dispute Resolution in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law 691 (Muchlinski, Peter, Ortino, Federico, and 
Schreuer, Christoph, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 700; Williams, David A. R.., 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility in The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 868 
(Muchlinski, Peter, Ortino, Federico, and Schreuer, Christoph, eds., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), at 872; Dugan, C. F., Wallace Jr., D., Rubins, N. and Sabahi, B., supra note 75, at 
258; Manciaux, S., supra note 59, at 3-5; Douglas, Z., supra note 55, at 164-165; Salacuse, 
Jeswald W., The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 158-159; 
Yannaca-Small, K., supra note 244, at 248-251; Mortenson, Julian Davis, The Meaning of 
“Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 Harv. Int’l 
L. J. 257 (2010), at 315-318; Bjorklund, Andrea K., The Emerging Civilization of Investment 
Arbitration, in Building the Civilization of Arbitration 247 (Carbonneau, Thomas E., and 
Sinopole, Angelica M., eds., London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2010), at 258-259; 
García-Bolívar, O. E., supra note 45, at 150-151. 
258
 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the 
Italian Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments of July 18, 
1990. 
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“The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: 
contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a 
participation in the risks of the transaction […]. In reading the 
Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State of the investment as an additional 
condition. 
In reality, these various elements may be interdependent. Thus, the 
risk of the transaction may depend on the contributions and the 
duration of performance of the contract. As a result, these various 
criteria should be assessed globally even if, for the sake of reasoning, 
the Tribunal considers them individually here.”259 
The Salini decision launched the so-called Salini test, according to which in order 
for the dispute to comply with the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention, the transaction or activity out of which the dispute arises must (i) 
represent a commitment, (ii) be subject to risk, (iii) have a certain duration and 
(iv) contribute to the economic development of the host State.  
The elements of the Salini test seem to be primarily based on the description of 
the notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention made by 
Professor CHRISTOPH SCHREUER. In an article published in 1996, SCHREUER 
described the elements of the notion of investment as follows: 
“It would not be realistic to attempt yet another definition of 
‘investment’ on the basis of ICSID’s experience. But it seems possible 
to identify certain features that are typical to most of the operations in 
question. The first such feature is that the projects have a certain 
duration. Even though some break down at an early stage, the 
expectation of a longer term relationship is clearly there. The second 
feature is a certain regularity of profit and return. A one-time lump 
sum agreement, while not impossible, would be untypical. Even where 
no profits are ever made, the expectation of return is present. The third 
feature is the assumption of risk usually by both sides. Risk is in part a 
function of duration and expectation of profit. The fourth typical 
feature is that the commitment is substantial. This aspect was very 
much on the drafters’ minds although it did not find entry into the 
                                                 
259
 Decision on Jurisdiction of July 23, 2001, 42 ILM 609 (2003), at 622. 
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Convention […]. A contract with an individual consultant would be 
untypical. The fifth feature is the operation’s significance for the host 
State’s development. This is not necessarily characteristic of 
investments in general. But the wording of the Preamble and the 
Executive Directors’ Report […] suggest that development is part of 
the Convention’s object and purpose. These features should not 
necessarily be understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely as 
typical characteristics of investments under the Convention.”260 
Undoubtedly, SCHREUER’s elements of the notion of investment had a tremendous 
impact on ICSID decisions on the fulfillment of the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention and became, so far, the prevailing view in ICSID practice.  
The Salini test was followed by the ICSID tribunals in the cases of Joy Mining 
Machinery Limited v. Egypt (“Joy Mining”),261 Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. – 
DIPENTA v. Algeria (“L.E.S.I. – DIPENTA”),262 Bayindir Insaat Turzin Ticaret 
Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Pakistan (“Bayindir”),263 Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging 
International N.V. v. Egypt (“Jan de Nul”),264 L.E.S.I., S.p.A. and Astaldi, S.p.A. v. 
Algeria (“L.E.S.I – Astaldi”),265 Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Egypt 
(“Helnan”),266 Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh (“Saipem”),267 Malaysian Historical 
Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia (“MHS”),268 Ioaniss Kardassopoulos v. Georgia 
(“Kardassopoulos”),269 OKO Pankki Oyl, VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG and 
                                                 
260
 Schreuer, C., supra note 38, at 372 – footnotes excluded, emphasis in the original. 
261
 See Award of August 6, 2004, 19 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 486 (2004). 
262
 See Award of January 10, 2005, 19 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 426 (2004). 
263
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of November 14, 2005, 18(1) World Trade and Arb. Materials 163 
(2006). 
264
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of June 16, 2006, 18(4) World Trade and Arb. Materials 305 
(2006). 
265
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of July 12, 2006, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LESIAlgeria.pdf>, (last visited on December 1, 2008). 
266
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of October 17, 2006, available at 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC773_En&caseId=C64>, (last visited on June 1, 2010). 
267
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of March 21, 2007, 22 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 100 (2007). 
268
 See Award of May 28, 2007, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MHS-
jurisdiction.pdf>, (last visited on December 1, 2008). 
269
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of July 6, 2007, 19(5) World Trade and Arb. Materials 31 (2007). 
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Sampo Bank Plc v. Estonia (“OKO Pankki”),270 Noble Energy Inc, and 
MachalaPower Cia Ltda v. Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad 
(“Noble Energy”),271 Víctor Pey Casado and Fundación Presidente Allende v. 
Chile (“Pey Casado”),272 RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada (“RSM 
Grenada”),273 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic (“Phoenix”),274 Toto 
Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Lebanon (“Toto”),275 Saba Fakes v. Turkey 
(“Fakes”),276 Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM SA v. 
Senegal (“Millicom”),277 Nations Energy Inc., Electric Machinery Enterprises Inc. 
and Jaime Jurado v. Panama (“Nations Energy”),278 RSM Production 
Corporation v. Central African Republic (“RSM Central African Republic”),279 
Malicorp Limited v. Egypt (“Malicorp”),280 by the ad hoc committee in the case of 
Patrick Mitchell v. Congo (“Mitchell”).281 The Salini test was also applied by non-
ICSID tribunals in the cases of Romak S.A. v. Uzbekistan282 and Alps Finance and 
Trade AG v. Slovakia (“AFT”),283 and in a State-State arbitration involving Italy 
                                                 
270
 See Award of November 19, 2007 (excerpts), 22 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 469 (2007). 
271
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of March 5, 2008, 20(3) World Trade and Arb. Materials 261 
(2008). 
272
 See Award of May 8, 2008, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PeyLAUDO.pdf>, 
(last visited on December 1, 2008). 
273
 See supra note 242. 
274
 See supra note 34. 
275
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of September 11, 2009, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/TotoJurisdiction.pdf>, (last visited on October 1, 2009). 
276
 See supra note 34. 
277
 See supra note 34. 
278
 See Award of November 24, 2010, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NationsResourcesVPanama_Award.pdf>, (last visited on 
January 12, 2011). 
279
 See Decision on Jurisdiction of December 7, 2010, available at 
<http://italaw.com/documents/RSMv.CentralAfricanRepublicDecision7Dec2010.pdf>, (last visited 
on May 6, 2012). 
280
 See Award of February 7, 2011, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MalicorpvEgyptAward_7Feb2011.pdf>, (last visited on 
February 9, 2011). 
281
 See Decision on Annulment of November 1, 2006, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf>, (last visited on December 1, 2008). 
282
 See Award of November 26, 2009, 22(1) World Trade and Arb. Materials 195 (2010). 
283
 See Award of March 5, 2011, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AFTvSlovakRepublic_5Mar2011_Part1.pdf> and at 
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and Cuba.284 Some of these tribunals, relying on SCHREUER’s description of the 
notion of investment, added a fifth element to the Salini test based on the 
regularity of profits. These decisions constitute an overwhelming majority of the 
decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals in which the fulfillment of the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention was addressed.285 
                                                                                                                                     
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AFTvSlovakRepublic_5Mar2011_Part2.pdf>, (last visited on 
April 21, 2011). It has been reported that another non-ICSID tribunal applied the Salini test in the 
case of Pren Nreka v. Czech Republic in the Award of February 5, 2007 (see Yannaca-Small, K., 
supra note 244, at 257; Cabrol, Emmanuelle, Pren Nreka v. Czech Republic and The Notion of 
Investment Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Does “Investment” Really Mean “Every Kind of 
Asset”?, in Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2009-2010 217 (Karl P. Sauvant, 
ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). The decision of the tribunal, however, has not 
been made public yet. 
In the case of White Industries Australia Limited v. India, however, an UNCITRAL tribunal, 
constituted under the Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments of February 6, 1999, expressly 
rejected the application of the Salini test outside the ICSID Convention: 
“As regards the so-called ‘Salini Test’ for what constitutes an investment, this test 
was developed in order to determine whether an ‘investment’ had been made for the 
purposes of the ICSID Convention. The cases cited by India in support of these 
requirements were also ICSID decisions. 
The present case, however, is not subject to the ICSID Convention. Consequently, 
the so-called Salini Test, and Douglas’s interpretation of it, are simply not applicable 
here. Moreover, it is widely accepted that the ‘double-check’ (namely, of proving 
that there is an ‘investment’ for the purposes of the relevant BIT and that that there 
is an ‘investment’ in accordance with the ICSID Convention, imposes a higher 
standard than simply resolving whether there is an ‘investment’ for the purposes of a 
particular BIT” (Award of November 30, 2011, available at 
<http://italaw.com/documents/WhiteIndustriesv.IndiaAward.pdf>, (last visited on 
February 21, 2012, at paras. 7.4.8-7.4.9 – emphasis in the original). 
284
 See Interim Award of March 15, 2005, available at 
<http://italaw.com/documents/Italy_v_Cuba_InterimAward_15Mar2005.pdf>, (last visited on 
January, 2012), at para. 81. 
285
 This does not mean, however, that an ICSID tribunal that adopts an objectivist approach is 
required to follow the Salini test. See Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Venezuela 
(“Autopista”), Decision on Jurisdiction of September 27, 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 419 (2004), at 
439-440; Zhinvali Development Limited v. Georgia, supra note 34, at 102; SGS Société Générale 
de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction of August 6, 2003, 18 ICSID Rev. – 
FILJ 307 (2003), at 347; Tokios Tokéles v. Ukraine, supra note 34, at 231-234; Enron 
Corporation, Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina (“Enron”), Decision on Jurisdiction of January 14, 
2004, 11 ICSID Reports 269 (2007), at 281-282; Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, Award of July 
24, 2008, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Biwateraward.pdf>, (last visited on 
December 1, 2008), at paras. 310-318; ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management 
Limited v. Hungary, Award of October 2, 2006, 18(6) World Trade and Arb. Materials 285 (2006), 
at 347; African Holding Company of America, Inc and Société Africaine de Construction au 
Congo S.A.R.L. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Award of July 29, 2008, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AfricanHoldingCompanyAward.pdf>, (last visited on December 
1, 2008), at paras. 74-84; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill 
S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, Decision on Jurisdiction of September 24, 2008, 48 
ILM 51 (2009), at 70; Bureau Veritas, supra note 34, at para. 94; Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & 
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The premise of the Salini test is founded on the idea that the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention has an objective meaning and it must be 
fulfilled independently from the disputing parties’ agreed definition of investment. 
The Salini test, therefore, follows the approach adopted in the CSOB decision — 
the so-called “double keyhole approach”286 —, according to which in cases 
referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to an investment treaty containing a 
definition of investment, the dispute has to fulfill a double test: it must fall within 
the treaty’s definition of investment and comply with the notion of investment 
within the meaning of the ICSID Convention in order to establish the jurisdiction 
of the Centre. As the Salini tribunal observed: 
“The protection of investments is the basis for the option of choosing 
the forum stipulated in Article 8.2 of the Bilateral Treaty. This Article, 
therefore, seeks to define the investments that come under the 
protection of the Bilateral Treaty. 
However, insofar as the option of jurisdiction has been exercised in 
favour of ICSID, the rights in dispute must also constitute an 
investment pursuant to Article 25 of the Washington Convention. The 
Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, is of the opinion that its jurisdiction 
depends upon the existence of an investment within the meaning of 
the Bilateral Treaty as well as that of the Convention, in accordance 
with the case law.”287 
                                                                                                                                     
Engineers v. Albania (“Pantechnicki”), Award of July 28, 2009, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PantechnikiAward.pdf>, (last visited on August 21, 2009), at 
para. 48; Inmaris, supra note 34, at 1072-1073; Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex 
International, Inc. v. Ukraine, Award of December 1, 2010, 50 ILM 292 (2011), at 300-301; 
Abaclat, Decision on Jurisdiction of August 4, 2011, available at 
<http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf>, (last visited on October 27, 
2011), at paras. 343-351. 
In the case of Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine (“Alpha”), while the tribunal did not follow 
the Salini test in order to decide whether the dispute met the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention, it assessed the existence of the elements of the Salini test “given that the parties have 
spent considerable time arguing about whether Claimant’s investment meets the Salini criteria” 
(Award of November 8, 2010, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Alphav.UkraineAward.pdf>, (last visited on November 11, 
2010), at para. 316). 
286
 See Dolzer, R., and Schreuer, C., supra note 41, at 61-62. 
287
 Supra note 259, at 619-620. Similarly, in Bayindir the tribunal asserted that:  
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The objectivist premise on which the Salini test is based was further discussed by 
subsequent ICSID tribunals. In Joy Mining, the tribunal pointed out that the 
absence of a definition of investment in the ICSID Convention does not mean that 
the term “investment” as employed in its Article 25(1) lacks an objective 
meaning. According to the tribunal, if the consent of the disputing parties could 
override the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, the term 
“investment” would be meaningless: 
                                                                                                                                     
“It is common ground between the parties that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is 
further contingent upon the existence of an ‘investment’ within the meaning of 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention (be it as an independent requirement or as a 
specification of the concept of investment under the BIT)” (supra note 263, at 197).  
In MHS, the sole arbitrator pointed out that “[f]or jurisdiction to be established, the Claimant must 
show that the Contract falls within the definition of “investment” as found under Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention (“Article 25(1)”), as well as the definition of “investment” as contained in 
the BIT. This two-stage approach is recognized in the ICSID jurisprudence cited by the Parties in 
this case” (supra note 268, at para. 43 – footnote excluded). In Mitchell, the ad hoc committee 
observed that: 
“In accordance with Article 25(1) of the Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre 
depends upon the existence of a dispute ‘arising directly out of an investment.’ 
Reference to this article at the outset is unavoidable; this is what the Arbitral 
Tribunal also did, and then went on to observe and recall that there is no definition 
of investment contained in the Convention. Indeed, in the case at hand the question 
is not so much one of determining whether there is an ‘arising directly out of’ 
relationship, but rather whether there is an ‘investment.’ In the opinion of the ad hoc 
Committee, in view of the absence in the Convention of an explicit definition of the 
concept of investment, it is in the parties’ agreement or in the applicable investment 
treaty that one should look for such definition, whether it is broad or less broad. In 
doing so, the fact that a State has not made use of the notification option provided 
for under Article 25(4) of the Convention may not be understood to mean that that 
State has taken a certain position regarding the very concept of investment. It is then 
necessary to verify the conformity of the concept of investment as set out in the 
parties’ agreement or in the BIT with the concept of investment in the Washington 
Convention, as this latter results from the interpretation of the Convention in 
accordance with Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as 
well as from ICSID case law, to the extent the latter may contribute to defining the 
concept. Indeed, such concept of investment should prevail over any other 
‘definition’ of investment in the parties’ agreement or in the BIT, as it is obvious 
that the special and privileged arrangements established by the Washington 
Convention can be applied only to the type of investment which the Contracting 
States to that Convention envisaged” (supra note 281, at para. 25). 
In Phoenix, the tribunal, referring to the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention noted 
that it could not “agree with the general statement of the Claimant proffered during the Hearing to 
the effect that ‘it was the intent of the convention’s drafters to leave to the parties the discretion to 
define for themselves what disputes they were willing to submit to ICSID.’ There is nothing like a 
total discretion, even if the definition developed by ICSID case law is quite broad and 
encompassing. There are indeed some basic criteria and parties are not free to decide in BITs that 
anything – like a sale of goods or a dowry for example – is an investment” (supra note 34, at 757 – 
footnote excluded). 
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“The fact that the Convention has not defined the term investment 
does not mean, however, that anything consented to by the parties 
might qualify as an investment under the Convention. The Convention 
itself, in resorting to the concept of investment in connection with 
jurisdiction, establishes a framework to this effect: jurisdiction cannot 
be based on something different or entirely unrelated. In other words, 
it means that there is a limit to the freedom with which the parties may 
define an investment if they wish to engage the jurisdiction of ICSID 
tribunals. 
The parties to a dispute cannot by contract or treaty define as 
investment, for the purpose of ICSID jurisdiction, something which 
does not satisfy the objective requirements of Article 25 of the 
Convention. Otherwise Article 25 and its reliance on the concept of 
investment, even if not specifically defined, would be turned into a 
meaningless provision.”288 
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 Supra note 261, at 499. Similarly, in Pey Casado, the tribunal considered that: 
“[T]here is a definition of investment in accordance with the ICSID Convention and 
it is not enough to indicate the presence of some of the typical ‘characteristics’ of an 
investment in order to comply with this objective requirement of the jurisdiction of 
the Centre. Such an interpretation would deprive of meaning certain terms of Article 
25 of the ICSID Convention, which would not be consistent with the requirement of 
interpreting the terms of the Convention conferring on them an effective meaning 
(free translation of the Spanish original: “Este Tribunal considera, por su parte, que 
sí existe una definición de inversión de acuerdo al Convenio CIADI y que no basta 
con señalar la presencia de algunas de las ‘características’ habituales de una 
inversión para satisfacer esta condición objetiva de la competencia del Centro. Una 
interpretación de este tipo significaría privar de sentido alguno a ciertos términos del 
artículo 25 del Convenio CIADI, lo cual no sería compatible con la exigencia de 
interpretar los términos del Convenio confiriéndoles un efecto útil” (supra note 272, 
at para 232 – emphasis in the original)). 
In his dissenting opinion to the decision on jurisdiction rendered in the case of Abaclat and 
Others v. Argentina (“Abaclat”), Professor GEORGES ABI-SAAB argued that: 
“This opinion does not withstand scrutiny. That the ICSID Convention does not 
provide an express definition of investment does not automatically imply that the 
definition is totally left to the BITs. This is because words have an intrinsic 
meaning, hence a limited and limiting one, however large and vague it may be 
(although there is always a penumbra around the limits which provides the margin of 
interpretation). Without limits, words would be meaningless, because 
undistinguishable from one another. The intrinsic meaning of a word, which is its 
‘ordinary’ meaning, is further specified by the way it is used and the context in 
which it is used; and if it figures in a treaty, by the object and purpose of the treaty. 
[…] 
Differently put, the term ‘investment’ in article 25/1 of the ICSID Convention, 
whilst flexible enough, is not infinitely elastic. It leaves much latitude and a wide 
margin of interpretation and further specification to States in their BITs; but not to 
the point of rendering it totally vacuous, without any legal effect. In other words, the 
term has a hard-core that cannot be waived even by agreement of States parties to a 
BIT” (Dissenting Opinion of October 28, 2011, to the Decision on Jurisdiction of 
August 4, 2011, available at 
<http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.pdf>, (last visited on 
January 4, 2012), at paras. 40 and 46 – footnotes excluded). 
See also Fakes, supra note 34, at paras. 108-109. 
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In the decision rendered in LESI – DIPENTA, which is materially identical to the 
decision rendered in L.E.S.I – Astaldi, the tribunal relied on the “objective” of the 
ICSID Convention to conclude that: 
“In deciding whether this case deals with an ‘investment’ within the 
meaning of Article 25.1 of the Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal 
considered the following elements: 
(i) The Convention offers no definition of investment, although 
that notion is central to the functioning of the applicable regime (see 
Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention, §27). It is not up 
to the Arbitral Tribunal to take a general position on this matter, but 
rather to decide whether, and under what conditions, a construction 
contract can fulfill the conditions of an investment within the meaning 
of the Convention. 
[…] 
(iv) It would seem consistent with the objective of the 
Convention that a contract, in order to be considered an investment 
within the meaning of the provision, should fulfill the following three 
conditions:  
a) the contracting party has made contributions in the host country;  
b) those contributions had a certain duration; and  
c) they involved some risks for the contributor.”289 
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 Unofficial translation, available at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp>, (last visited 
on December 1, 2008), of the French original:  
“Pour décider si l’on se trouve en présence d’un ‘investissement’ au sens de l’article 
25.1 de la Convention, le Tribunal arbitral retient les éléments suivants: 
(i) La Convention ne propose aucune définition de la notion 
d’investissement, pourtant essentielle au fonctionnement du régime applicable (voir 
Rapport des administrateurs sur la Convention, §27). Il n’appartient pas au Tribunal 
arbitral de prendre à ce sujet des positions générales mais de décider si, et le cas 
échéant, à quelles conditions un contrat de construction peut remplir les conditions 
d’un investissement au sens de la Convention. 
[...] 
(iv) Or, il paraît conforme à l’objectif auquel répond la Convention qu’un 
contrat, pour constituer un investissement au sens de la disposition, remplisse les 
trois conditions suivantes ; il faut  
a) que le contractant ait effectué un apport dans le pays concerné,  
b) que cet apport porte sur une certaine durée, et  
c) qu’il comporte pour celui qui le fait un certain risque” (supra note 262, at 449-
450).  
See also L.E.S.I – Astaldi, supra note 265, at para. 72.  
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5.2.3 The MCI Decision 
While ICSID practice shows that most decisions on the fulfillment of the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention recognized its objectiveness, 
some ICSID tribunals considered that a dispute would comply with the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention if it falls within the definition of investment 
set forth in the investment treaty. These decisions were based on the idea that the 
real intention behind the lack of a definition of the term “investment” in the 
ICSID Convention was to grant the disputing parties the discretion to determine 
the content of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention.290 This 
                                                                                                                                     
In Autopista, while the tribunal considered that the ICSID Convention confers on the disputing 
parties the “greatest latitude” to define the term “investment”, it observed that such freedom is not 
unlimited. The tribunal based its decision on the idea that the definition of investment agreed by 
the parties may not be inconsistent with the “purposes” of the ICSID Convention and deprive the 
term “investment” of its “objective significance”: 
“However essential, consent in and of itself is not sufficient to ensure access to the 
Centre. Indeed, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides for additional objective 
requirements which must be met in addition to consent. […]. 
The Convention does not contain any definition of these objective requirements. The 
drafters of the Convention deliberately chose not to define the terms ‘legal dispute’ 
‘investment’, ‘nationality’ and ‘foreign control’. In reliance on the consensual nature 
of the Convention, they preferred giving the parties the greatest latitude to define 
these terms themselves, provided that the criteria agreed upon by the parties are 
reasonable and not totally inconsistent with the purposes of the Convention […]. 
As a result, to determine whether these objective requirements are met in a given 
case, one needs to refer to the parties’ own understanding or definition. As long as 
the criteria chosen by the parties to define these requirements are reasonable, i.e. as 
long as the requirements are not deprived of their objective significance, there is no 
reason to discard the parties’ choice” (supra note 285, at 439-440). 
Likewise, in Enron, the tribunal asserted that:  
“As the ICSID Convention did not attempt to define ‘investment’, this task was left 
largely to the parties to bilateral investment treaties or other expressions of consent. 
It has been aptly commented that there is, however, a limit to this discretion of the 
parties because they could not validly define as investment in connection with the 
Convention something absurd or entirely incompatible with its object and purpose” 
(supra note 285, at 281 – footnote excluded). 
290
 See Lanco International Inc. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of December 8, 1998, 40 
ILM 457 (2001), at 472-473; Philippe Gruslin v. Malaysia, Award of November 27, 2000, 5 
ICSID Reports 483 (2002), at 492; Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, Award of September 16, 
2003, 44 ILM 404 (2005), at 424; Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of 
December 8, 2003, 43 ILM 262 (2004), at 275; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, Award of 
September 11, 2007, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Pakerings.pdf>, (last visited on 
December 1, 2008), at paras. 249-254; Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Liability of January 14, 2010, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemirev.Ukraine2010.pdf>, (last visited on April 6, 2010), at 
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paras. 46-47, 51-55; ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v. Jordan, Award of 
May 18, 2010, 22(5) World Trade and Arb. Materials 945 (2010), at 990. 
In F-W Oil Interests, Inc. v. Trinidad and Tobago, the tribunal considered that: 
“As is so well known that it needs no further demonstration, the term ‘investment’, 
crucial though it is to the operation of the Centre, is not further defined within the 
ICSID Convention, but instead was left, quite deliberately, to be given its content 
through the particular agreements reached between Contracting States, and between 
them and investors. The answer is therefore to be sought in the present case in the 
terms of the BIT” (Award of March 3, 2006, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/FWOilAward.pdf>, (last visited on November 1, 
2009), at para. 104 – footnotes excluded). 
While this assertion is clearly based on a subjectivist premise, the tribunal pointed out in a footnote 
that “the Parties’ freedom in that respect is not absolute” (idem). The decision on the fulfillment of 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, nevertheless, was exclusively based on the 
definition of investment contained in the BIT upon which the dispute was referred to ICSID 
arbitration, and there was no attempt in the decision to identify the limits placed on the freedom of 
the disputing parties.  
In Noble Energy, referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a 
contract entered into by the disputing parties, even though the tribunal expressly followed the 
Salini test, its decision relied on a contractual provision whereby the parties agreed that disputes 
arising out of the contract fulfill the jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID Convention, 
including the investment requirement: 
“It is common ground that the ICSID Convention contains no definition of the term 
‘investment’. The Tribunal concurs with earlier ICSID decisions which, subject to 
minor variations, have relied on the so–called ‘Salini test’. Such test identifies the 
following elements as indicative of an ‘investment’ for purposes of the ICSID 
Convention: (i) a contribution, (ii) a certain duration over which the project is 
implemented, (iii) a sharing of operational risks, and (iv) a contribution to the host 
State's development, being understood that these elements may be closely 
interrelated, should be examined in their totality and will normally depend on the 
circumstances of each case. 
[…] 
In addition, the Tribunal notes that Clause 11(c) of the Investment Agreement refers 
to the Concession Contract. Clause 22.2.2.4 of that contract provides that ‘[t]he 
Parties recognize and agree that for the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention, 
any dispute is and shall be regarded as a legal dispute directly arising from an 
investment between a contractual state and a national of another contractual state’” 
(supra note 271, at 300-301). 
In AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Hungary, referred to ICSID 
arbitration pursuant to the ECT, the tribunal concluded that the dispute arose out of activities and 
transactions that “qualify as investments in accordance with Article 1(6) of the ECT and Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention” (Award of September 23, 2010, 50 ILM 186 (2011), at 198), giving the 
idea that the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention is distinct from the investment 
requirement of the ECT. In assessing the existence of an investment, however, the tribunal relied 
exclusively on the definition of investment contained in the ECT, implying a subjectivist approach 
towards the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention (ibid., at 224, footnote 16). 
In GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to the 
Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine on the Promotion and Mutual 
Protection of Investments of February 15, 1993, the tribunal seemed divided in the decision 
concerning the nature of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. The tribunal 
acknowledged the existing controversy between the objective and subjective approaches towards 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, but considered that it was not required to 
take a position in this matter, given that the application of different criteria would lead to the same 
conclusion (see Award of March 31, 2011, 23(4) World Trade and Arb. Materials 881 (2011), at 
907-909). In the decision, the tribunal relied mostly on the definition of investment contained in 
the BIT in order to assess the existence of an investment, but also made reference to the objective 
nature of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention “in deference to the view of some, 
outlined above, that Article 25 places a limit on the State Parties’ ability to define ‘investment’ in 
their BIT for the purposes of ICSID jurisdiction” (ibid., at 910), indicating that the approach taken 
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purported real intention of the Contracting States would have been expressed in 
paragraph 27 of the Report of the Executive Directors, which states that “[n]o 
attempt was made to define the term ‘investment’ given the essential requirement 
of consent by the parties.” 291 
The most significant decision in favor of the subjectivist theory was rendered in 
the case of MCI Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Ecuador (“MCI”), 
referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to the Ecuador-United States BIT292 due to 
the alleged expropriation by the Ecuadorian government of investments made in 
electricity generation. Ecuador argued that the Centre would lack jurisdiction over 
the dispute, to the extent that, among other grounds, the dispute would not fulfill 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. Relying essentially on the 
elements of the notion of investment listed in the Salini test, Ecuador argued that 
the definition of investment contained in the BIT could not modify the content of 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. The tribunal, however, 
based on the assumption that the lack of a definition in the ICSID Convention was 
intended to grant the disputing parties the discretion to determine whether the 
dispute arises out of an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, 
concluded that the definition of investment set forth in the BIT could complement 
the ICSID Convention. This assumption, according to the tribunal, would be 
founded on paragraph 27 of the Report of the Executive Directors: 
                                                                                                                                     
in the decision towards the nature of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention was not 
unanimous among the members of the tribunal. At least one member of the tribunal, Professor 
BRIGITTE STERN, acted as an arbitrator in cases where the decision on the fulfillment of the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention followed the Salini test (see Phoenix, supra note 
34; RSM Central African Republic, supra note 279). See also Fellenbaum, Joshua, GEA v. Ukraine 
and the Battle of Treaty Interpretation Principles Over the Salini Test, 27 Arb. Int’l 249 (2011). 
291
 1 ICSID Reports 23 (1993), at 28. 
292
 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment of August 27, 1993. 
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“From a simple reading of Article 25(1), the Tribunal recognizes that 
the ICSID Convention does not define the term ‘investment’. The 
Tribunal notes that numerous arbitral precedents confirm the 
statement in the Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank 
that the Convention does not define the term ‘investments’ because it 
wants to leave the parties free to decide what class of disputes they 
would submit to the ICSID. 
The BIT indicates in its Article 1 which investments are to be 
protected under it. Thus, the BIT complements Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention, for purposes of defining the Competence of the 
Tribunal with respect to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment.”293 
According to this interpretation of paragraph 27 of the Report of the Executive 
Directors, if the “essential requirement” is the consent of the disputing parties, 
when such consent exists, there is no need to impose additional restrictions on the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. 
But the use of the Report of the Executive Directors in the interpretation of the 
ICSID Convention raises the question — which does not seem to have been 
debated in ICSID practice — as to its nature and interpretative function for the 
purposes of the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
This question arises out of the fact that the ICSID Convention was not formulated 
by its Contracting States, but by the members of the internal organs of the IBRD, 
and out of the fact that the Report of the Executive Directors was not produced by 
the Contracting States. Secondly, although the Report of the Executive Directors 
accompanied the final text of the ICSID Convention, due to the absence of any 
reference to it in the text of the ICSID Convention, the Report of the Executive 
Directors may not be considered as part of or an annex to the ICSID Convention.  
                                                 
293
 Supra note 34, at paras. 159-160 – footnote excluded. 
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As the Report of the Executive Directors was produced in connection with the 
conclusion of the ICSID Convention, one could argue nonetheless that it could 
qualify as an element of the context of the ICSID Convention in the sense of 
Article 31(2)(a) or (b) of the Vienna Convention. In accordance with Article 
31(2)(a) and (b): 
“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.”294 
But while the Report of the Executive Directors provides for the interpretation of 
the main provisions of the ICSID Convention, the first difficulty in using it in the 
sense of Article 31(2)(a) or (b) is that it was not made by “all the parties” nor “by 
one or more parties” to the ICSID Convention. In accordance with Article 2(1)(g) 
of the Vienna Convention, “‘party’ means a State which has consented to be 
bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.”295 To the extent that the 
Report of the Executive Directors was not made by the Contracting States of the 
ICSID Convention, but by the members of the Board of Executive Directors of the 
IBRD, it may not qualify as an element of the context of the ICSID Convention 
for the purposes of Article 31(2)(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention.296  
                                                 
294
 8 ILM 679 (1969), at 692. 
295
 Ibid., at 681. 
296
 See Linderfalk, U., supra note 88, at 135, 148; Gardiner, R., supra note 112, at 212. 
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Moreover, due to the fact that the ICSID Convention was not formulated directly 
by its Contracting States, the use of the Report of the Executive Directors in the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention even as a document pertaining to the 
formulation of the ICSID Convention in the sense of Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention is doubtful. While Article 32 does not list exhaustively the 
supplementary means of interpretation, one could argue that, since the purpose of 
relying on preparatory work is to elucidate the intention of the parties to the 
treaty,297 the Report of the Executive Directors could not be used in the search of 
the intention of the parties due to the fact that it was not produced by the 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention.  
This idea raises the question, which seems unsettled in international law, as to 
whether documents produced in connection with the conclusion of a treaty not 
formulated by its parties may be included within the notion of preparatory 
work,298 a term that has been described as “somewhat ambiguous and 
confusing.”299  
                                                 
297
 See McNair, Arnold, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), at 423. 
298
 As observed by SHABTAI ROSENNE: 
“A special problem arises when part of the preparatory work was undertaken in a 
subsidiary organ composed of individuals not representing States, known technically 
in United Nations practice as experts, for instance the International Law 
Commission. Although many of these records are normally published, the fact that 
draft treaty articles were not produced through a process of inter-governmental 
negotiation may throw some doubt on how far those records can throw light on the 
intentions of the States whose plenipotentiaries, acting under instructions, negotiated 
the final instrument, even if the text is identical in all respects with the text produced 
by the expert body. But this is a theoretical matter which, although it might assume 
importance in a hotly contested issue of interpretation, ought not to influence the 
careful preparation of the legislative history of an international instrument. It is 
interesting to note that, although the United Nations has in recent years cut back on 
the production of records of many subsidiary bodies, it has been careful to maintain 
records of treaty-drafting organs” (Rosenne, Shabtai, Practice and Methods of 
International Law (London: Oceana Publications, Inc.,1984), at 42). 
See also Klabbers, Jan, International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux 
Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?, 50 Netherlands Int’l L. R. 267 (2003), at 276-279; 
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According to GYÖRGY HARASZTI, “the notion of travaux préparatoires embraces 
only material which in the one way or the other may throw light on the joint 
intention of the parties, i.e. material which owes its existence to the joint activities 
of the parties or at least to their agreement.”300 This definition would, thus, 
exclude documents produced in the formulation of a treaty not negotiated and 
drafted by its parties. This position would deprive the Report of the Executive 
Directors of any value for the purposes of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
Other authors, however, advocate a more flexible concept of preparatory work. 
For instance, ULF LINDERFALK argues that:  
“When appliers wish to establish the legally correct meaning of a 
treaty provision, and for that purpose use the preparatory work of the 
treaty, they always do so on the basis of a specific communicative 
assumption. This assumption may be stated as follows: the parties to 
the treaty expressed themselves in such a way that the provision 
interpreted logically coheres with the preparatory work of the treaty, 
insofar and to the extent that, by using the preparatory work of the 
treaty, good reasons can be provided showing a concordance to exist, 
between the parties to the treaty, with regard to its norm content. 
Considering this, ‘the preparatory work of the treaty’ cannot be 
                                                                                                                                     
Linderfalk, U., supra note 88, at 242; Aust, Anthony, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2007), at 246; Sbolci, L., supra note 126, at 
151-152. 
299
 Mehrish, Brijesh Narain, Travaux Preparatoires as an Element in the Interpretation of 
Treaties, 11 Indian J. Int’l L. 39 (1971), at 62. According to HERSCH LAUTERPACHT: 
“‘Preparatory work’ in relation to treaties may be understood in two meanings: (1) It 
may refer to the various written instruments emanating from or recording the 
declarations of the views of the negotiators of the treaty. Such preparatory work 
includes diplomatic correspondence by means of which the treaty is negotiated when 
no special conference has been convened for the purpose. It includes, in other cases, 
the negotiations preceding the conference; the original and successive drafts of the 
treaty; the negotiations at the conference and its committees as recorded in the 
minutes or otherwise; the instructions issued to delegates. (2) It may refer to the 
expression of opinion of Governments or authoritative members or committees of 
legislative bodies during the process of obtaining parliamentary approval of the 
treaty” (Lauterpacht, Hersch, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the 
Interpretation of Treaties, 48 Harv. L. R. 549 (1953), at 552, footnote 3).  
See also Orakhelashvili, A., supra note 30, at 383-384. 
300
 Haraszti, G., supra note 30, at 122. See also Sbolci, L., supra note 126, at 154. 
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confined to only those representations, which emanate directly from 
the negotiating states.”301 
LINDERFALK, however, observes that “if a representation emanates from an 
individual acting in the capacity of an expert, and not of a state representative, that 
representation cannot unreservedly be said to establish a concordance of the treaty 
parties.”302 
In this sense, one could argue that the fact that the Report of the Executive 
Directors was submitted together with the final text of the ICSID Convention to 
the Member Governments of the IBRD and it appeared in official publications of 
the ICSID Convention, it could be considered as the authoritative interpretation of 
the ICSID Convention,303 once the States that became parties to the ICSID 
Convention did so on the basis of the explanations given in the Report of the 
Executive Directors. In addition, one could argue that, although the idea of 
creating a document that would supplement the text of the ICSID Convention 
emerged in the very beginning of its formulation,304 the Report of the Executive 
Directors was only produced after representatives of States participated in the 
draft of the ICSID Convention. For this reason, the Report of the Executive 
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 Linderfalk, U., supra note 88, at 242.  
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 Idem. 
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 According to PAUL SZASZ:  
“Concurrently with their approval of the Convention, the Executive Directors of the 
World Bank adopted a ‘Report on the Convention …,’ which they submitted to the 
governments of the members of the Bank together with the text of the Convention 
itself. That Report, which still accompanies the Convention in the official 
publications of the Bank and the Centre, was designed to provide an authoritative 
elucidation of many of the more important provisions of the Convention. Thus the 
Report not only reflects the understanding of the body responsible for the final text 
of the Convention, but it is also an explanation that was available to (and therefore 
could not simply be disregarded by) the government of each Contracting State 
before it decided to sign and to ratify that instrument” (Szasz, Paul C., A Practical 
Guide to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1 Cornell Int’l L. 
J. 1 (1968), at 8 – footnote excluded). 
304
 History of the ICSID Convention, supra note 73, at 58-59. 
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Directors could materially reflect the opinion of those States that participated in 
the final stage of the formulation of the ICSID Convention. Indeed, as will be seen 
next, the absence of a definition of investment in the final text of the ICSID 
Convention was the result of the debate held by representatives of States in the 
formulation of the ICSID Convention.305 
On the other hand, even if one considers that the content of the Report of the 
Executive Directors could materially reflect the understanding of the Contracting 
States and, thus, qualify as a preparatory work of the ICSID Convention, it is not 
clear that paragraph 27 of the Report of the Executive Directors meant that the 
lack of a definition of the term “investment” in the final text of the ICSID 
Convention was intended to confer on the disputing parties discretion to 
determine the content of the investment requirement. While paragraph 27 
apparently supports this idea, paragraph 25 of the Report of the Executive 
Directors seems to contradict it. According to paragraph 25: 
“While consent of the parties is an essential prerequisite for the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, consent alone will not suffice to bring a 
dispute within its jurisdiction. In keeping with the purpose of the 
Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre is further limited by 
reference to the nature of the dispute and the parties thereto.”306 
Paragraph 25 states, thus, that the consent of the disputing parties alone is not 
sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the Centre, which is contingent upon the 
compliance with the additional requirements set forth in Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention. Paragraph 25 makes clear that the fulfillment of the ratione 
materiae and ratione personae requirements is distinct from the consent of the 
                                                 
305
 See infra at pp. 75 et seq. 
306
 1 ICSID Reports 23 (1993), at 28. 
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disputing parties, an interpretation consistent with the wording of the Article 25(1) 
of the ICSID Convention. In this sense, to the extent that the reference to “the 
nature of the dispute” does not refer exclusively to the requirement that the 
dispute must be of a legal character, but also covers the requirement that the 
dispute must arise out of an investment,307 paragraph 25 gives an unequivocal 
support to the objectiveness of the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention. Consequently, if one considers correct the interpretation given by the 
subjectivist theory to paragraph 27, there would be a contradiction between the 
two paragraphs of the Report of the Executive Directors.  
As seen before, the discussions pertaining to the formulation of the ICSID 
Convention suggest that paragraph 27 was concerned with the practical 
consequences of the lack of a definition of investment in the final text of the 
ICSID Convention and it was a message to those States that feared that the 
absence of a definition of investment in the final text of the ICSID Convention 
would make the jurisdiction of the Centre too broad and vague. The absence of a 
definition was seen as a solution that was reached in order to conciliate the 
different views expressed by the representatives of States at the Legal Committee. 
Some States considered that the definition of investment contained in the First 
Draft of the ICSID Convention of September 11, 1964, was too broad; other 
States considered it too narrow. However, once the jurisdiction of the Centre is 
contingent upon the consent of the disputing parties, the States that considered the 
mere reference to “investment” too vague could adopt a narrow definition of 
investment as an element of their consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre. For the 
States that considered the definition of investment set forth in the First Draft too 
                                                 
307
 See Broches, A., supra note 32, at 340-341; Manciaux, S., supra note 59, at 4. 
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narrow, its exclusion from the final text of the ICSID Convention would allow 
them to submit to the jurisdiction of the Centre disputes that would comply with 
the ordinary meaning of investment. As BROCHES noted, an investment was 
thought to be something “readily recognizable”.308 Accordingly, there would be 
no need to include a definition and, therefore, to give a special meaning to the 
term “investment”, if the ordinary meaning of investment was considered flexible 
enough to confer on the parties a great measure of discretion. 
Properly understood, what was meant in paragraph 27 of the Report of the 
Executive Directors is that the absence of a definition of investment does not 
prevent Contracting States from restricting the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID 
Convention giving their consent only to disputes arising out of certain types of 
investments and through the mechanism set forth in Articles 25(4) of the ICSID 
Convention,309 if such Contracting States consider that the mere reference to 
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 See supra at p. 76. 
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 Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention provides that:  
“Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of 
this Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of 
disputes which it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to all 
Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by 
paragraph (1)” (1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 10). 
As Article 25(4) has been construed, notifications made by Contracting States pursuant to this 
provision are made for the purposes of information only and do not affect the jurisdiction of the 
Centre (see Schreuer, C., Malintoppi, L., Reinisch, A., and Sinclair, A., supra note 39, at 345-347). 
As stated in paragraph 31 of the Report of the Executive Directors: 
“While no conciliation or arbitration proceedings could be brought against a 
Contracting State without its consent and while no Contracting State is under any 
obligation to give its consent to such proceedings, it was nevertheless felt that 
adherence to the Convention might be interpreted as holding out an expectation that 
Contracting States would give favorable consideration to requests by investors for 
the submission of a dispute to the Centre. It was pointed out in that connection that 
there might be classes of investment disputes which governments would consider 
unsuitable for submission to the Centre or which, under their own law, they were not 
permitted to submit to the Centre. In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding on 
this score, Article 25(4) expressly permits Contracting States to make known to the 
Centre in advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or 
would not consider submitting to the Centre. The provision makes clear that a 
statement by a Contracting State that it would consider submitting a certain class of 
dispute to the Centre would serve for purposes of information only and would not 
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“investment” in Article 25(1) makes the jurisdiction of the Centre undesirably 
broad.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The interpretation of the ICSID Convention in the light of general rule of treaty 
interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention leads to the conclusion that the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention has an objective meaning. The 
wording of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention indicates that the jurisdictional 
requirements of the Centre are cumulative and not alternative. In order to establish 
the jurisdiction of the Centre over a dispute, each requirement set forth in Article 
                                                                                                                                     
constitute the consent required to give the Centre jurisdiction. Of course, a statement 
excluding certain classes of disputes from consideration would not constitute a 
reservation to the Convention” (1 ICSID Reports 23 (1993), at 29). 
See PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Turkey, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of June 4, 2004, 19(3) World Trade and Arb. Materials 204 (2007), at 
244-245; Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, Decision on Jurisdiction of June 19, 2009, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/TzaYapShum-DecisiononJurisdiction_000.pdf>, (last visited on 
March 7, 2011), at para. 165; Murphy Exploration and Production Company International v. 
Ecuador, Award of December 15, 2010, 23(2) World Trade and Arb. Materials 439 (2011), at 453-
456. 
In Fedax and CSOB, however, the tribunals considered that the notification made under Article 
25(4) of the ICSID Convention has some legal effect. The Fedax tribunal pointed out that the 
notification might be relevant in limiting the agreement on the definition of the term “investment” 
contained in the investment treaty: 
“The Tribunal has also undertaken a close examination of other provisions of the 
Agreement which are related to the definition of an investment, including Article 5 
of the Agreement, under which the Contracting Parties guarantee the transfer of 
payments related to an investment, including the transfer of interests (Article 5(a)) 
and funds for the reimbursement of loans (Article 5(d)). The conclusion that the 
definition of ‘investment’ and the meaning of ‘titles to money’ under the Agreement 
include loans and related credit transactions is thus reinforced. It must also be noted 
that the Republic of Venezuela has not exercised its right under Article 25(4) of the 
ICSID Convention to notify the Centre of any class or classes of disputes it would or 
would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. This provision 
allows Contracting States to put investors on notice as to what class of disputes they 
would or would not consider consenting to within the broad meaning of investment 
under the Convention” (supra note 248, at 1385).  
In CSOB, the tribunal admitted that the notification made under Article 25(4) may affect the 
jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention: 
“It is worth noting, in this connection, that a Contracting State that wishes to limit 
the scope of the Centre’s jurisdiction can do so by making the declaration provided 
for in Article 25(4) of the Convention. The Slovak Republic has not made such a 
declaration and has, therefore, submitted itself broadly to the full scope of the 
subject matter jurisdiction governed by the Convention” (supra note 252, at 273). 
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25(1) must be met independently from the fulfillment of the other requirements. 
This interpretation, which is supported by the subsequent practice of the 
Administrative Council, complies with the object and purpose of the Centre, 
which was created in order to provide facilities for the settlement of investment 
disputes and not of any dispute between a Contracting State and a national of 
another Contracting State.  
The idea that the drafters of the ICSID Convention intended to grant the disputing 
parties discretion to determine the content of the investment requirement is based 
on a misinterpretation of the interpretative value of the Report of the Executive 
Directors. And even if the Report of the Executive Directors could be used as an 
authoritative interpretation, the analysis of the drafting history of the ICSID 
Convention demonstrates the non-existence of the supported real intention to 
grant the disputing parties absolute discretion to determine whether a dispute 
arises out of an investment. The idea of not including in the text of the ICSID 
Convention a jurisdictional requirement based on the existence of an investment 
was given up in the very beginning of its drafting history. In addition, there is no 
indication that the exclusion of the definition of investment in the final text of the 
ICSID Convention was meant to give the disputing parties the alleged absolute 
freedom. While the term “investment” itself confers on the disputing parties a 
great margin of discretion, the Centre has no jurisdiction to institute arbitral and 
conciliation proceedings for the settlement of disputes that arise out of something 
that cannot be defined as an investment.  
The objectiveness of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention also 
finds support in the practice of ICSID tribunals. Most decisions on the fulfillment 
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of investment requirement of the ICSID Convention followed the so-called Salini 
test, which is based on the idea that the ICSID Convention contains a notion of 
investment that may not be modified by the consent of the disputing parties to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.  
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CHAPTER II –ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS AN ELEMENT OF THE 
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENT OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
 
1. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENT 
The first reference to development as an element of the notion of investment was 
made in the Fedax case. As seen before, the question that arose in this case was 
whether the acquisition of promissory notes by way of endorsement could qualify 
as an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention and of the 
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT.310 While the tribunal concluded that the promissory 
notes, as a loan, were not merely ordinary commercial transactions and qualified 
as an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention and the Netherlands-
Venezuela BIT, it noted in addition that the acquisition of the promissory notes 
was not a short-term volatile investment and served the public interest of the host 
State. Based on SCHREUER’S description of the features of investment, the Fedax 
tribunal pointed out that: 
“The status of the promissory notes under the Law of Public Credit is 
also important as evidence that the type of investment involved is not 
merely a short-term, occasional financial arrangement, such as could 
happen with investments that come in for quick gains and leave 
immediately thereafter  i.e. ‘volatile capital’. The basic features of 
an investment have been described as involving a certain duration, a 
certain regularity of profit and return, assumption of risk, a substantial 
commitment and a significance for the host State’s development. The 
duration of the investment in this case meets the requirement of the 
Law as to contracts needing to extend beyond the fiscal year in which 
they are made. The regularity of profit and return is also met by the 
scheduling of interest payments through a period of several years. The 
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amount of capital committed is also relatively substantial. Risk is also 
involved as has been explained. And most importantly, there is clearly 
a significant relationship between the transaction and the development 
of the host State, as specifically required under the Law for issuing the 
pertinent financial instrument. It follows that, given the particular 
facts of the case, the transaction meets the basic features of an 
investment.”311 
The decision is not clear, however, as to whether the absence of a significant 
relationship between the promissory notes and the development of the host State 
would affect the jurisdiction of the Centre. The reference to the basic features of 
the notion of investment listed by SCHREUER was an additional element of the 
reasoning of the tribunal in order to distinguish the promissory notes from an 
ordinary commercial transaction; it was not used as a condition upon which the 
transaction subject-matter of the dispute would qualify as an investment within 
the meaning of the ICSID Convention. In this sense, the reference to 
“development” was made as an element that could be applied in order to classify 
the transaction as something different from an ordinary commercial transaction.  
Differently from the Fedax case, in the CSOB case the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State was expressly referred to as a criterion to 
qualify as an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention a transaction 
that, according to the tribunal, could not be considered as an investment within its 
ordinary meaning: 
“It is common ground that the Convention does not define the term 
‘investment’ and that various proposals to define it during the drafting 
negotiations failed. This fact is reflected in the Report of the 
Executive Directors of the World Bank, which noted that: 
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27. No attempt was made to define the term ‘investment’ 
given the essential requirements of consent by the parties, 
and the mechanisms through which Contracting States can 
make known in advance, if they so desire, the classes of 
disputes which they would or would not consider submitting 
to the Centre (Article 25(4)). 
This statement also indicates that investment as a concept should be 
interpreted broadly because the drafters of the Convention did not 
impose any restrictions on its meaning. Support for a liberal 
interpretation of the question whether a particular transaction 
constitutes an investment is also found in the first paragraph of the 
Preamble to the Convention, which declares that ‘the Contracting 
States [are] considering the need for international cooperation for 
economic development, and the role of private international 
investment therein.’ This language permits an inference that an 
international transaction which contributes to cooperation designed 
to promote the economic development of a Contracting State may be 
deemed to be an investment as that term is understood in the 
Convention.”312 
Similarly to the Fedax case, in CSOB the dispute arose out of a loan.313 While the 
CSOB tribunal indicated that ordinary loans are not investments, it considered that 
a loan could qualify as an investment within the meaning of the ICSID 
Convention if the loan represented a substantial contribution to the economic 
development of the host State: 
“The Slovak Republic submits that loans as such do not qualify as 
investments under Article 25(1) of the Convention, nor under Article 
1 of the BIT. It contends further that the loan in the instant case is not 
an investment because it did not involve a transfer of resources in the 
territory of the Slovak Republic. As to the first point, the Tribunal 
considers that the broad meaning which must be given to the notion of 
an investment under Article 25(1) of the Convention is opposed to the 
conclusion that a transaction is not an investment merely because, as 
a matter of law, it is a loan. This is so, if only because under certain 
circumstances a loan may contribute substantially to a State’s 
economic development. In this connection, Claimant correctly points 
out that other ICSID Tribunals have affirmed their competence to deal 
with the merits of claims based on loan agreements. 
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[…] 
In the Tribunal’s view, the basic and ultimate goal of the 
Consolidation Agreement was to ensure a continuing and expanding 
activity of CSOB in both Republics. This undertaking involved a 
significant contribution by CSOB to the economic development of the 
Slovak Republic; it qualified CSOB as an investor and the entire 
process as an investment in the Slovak Republic within the meaning of 
the Convention. This is evident from the fact that CSOB’s 
undertakings include the spending or outlays of resources in the 
Slovak Republic in response to the need for the development of the 
Republic’s banking infrastructure.”314 
Accordingly, the economic development requirement was applied in the CSOB 
decision in order to expand the notion of investment within the meaning of the 
ICSID Convention rather than placing a limitation on the jurisdiction of the 
Centre. The tribunal considered that, while the transaction was not an investment 
within its ordinary meaning, it could be considered as an investment for the 
purposes of the ICSID Convention given its contribution to the economic 
development of the host State. The economic development requirement, 
accordingly, was used as a subsidiary criterion for the tribunal to determine 
whether the dispute complied with the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention.315 
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In the Salini decision, however, the contribution to the economic development of 
the host State was referred to as an additional condition for a dispute to fulfill the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention: 
“The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: 
contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a 
participation in the risks of the transaction […]. In reading the 
Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State of the investment as an additional 
condition.”316 
In the decision, the Salini tribunal made a clear distinction between the first three 
elements of the notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention 
— contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a 
participation in the risks of the transaction —, which would be inferred from the 
meaning of the term “investment”, and the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State, which would be found in the Preamble of the 
ICSID Convention. This distinction was also made by the tribunal when it noted 
that the first three elements of the notion of investment would be interdependent 
and should be assessed globally, and did not make any reference to the 
contribution to the economic development as an interdependent element: 
                                                                                                                                     
supplemented, and sometimes superseded, by new forms of association between 
States and foreign investors, such as profit-sharing, service and management 
contracts, contracts for the sale and erection of industrial plants, turn-key contracts, 
international leasing arrangements, and agreements for the transfer of know-how and 
technology. Direct investment in the traditional form of contribution of capital and 
acquisition of title over national resources, to the extent that it is still acceptable to 
developing nations, accounts only for a decreasing percentage of the arrangements 
concluded by States and investors for economic development purposes. An 
economic concept of investment has increasingly replaced the traditional notion of 
investment in capital; the notion of investment today is directly related to the 
expected contribution that an association between a foreign party and a State make 
to the economy of the State concerned” (Delaume, G. R., ICSID Arbitration: 
Practical Considerations, supra note 226, at 117). 
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“In reality, these various elements may be interdependent. Thus, the 
risks of the transaction may depend on the contributions and the 
duration of performance of the contract. As a result, these various 
criteria should be assessed globally even if, for the sake of reasoning, 
the Tribunal considers individually here.”317 
As a condition that must be fulfilled independently from the other elements of the 
notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention, the Salini 
tribunal indicated that, differently from the CSOB decision, the economic 
development requirement was intended to place a limitation on the jurisdiction of 
the Centre and not to expand the meaning of the term “investment” for the 
purposes of the ICSID Convention. According to this approach, an investment 
would not comply with the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention if it 
does not contribute to the economic development of the host State, even if the 
transaction or activity subject-matter of the dispute qualifies as an investment 
within its ordinary meaning.  
The idea that the jurisdiction of the Centre is limited to disputes arising out of 
investments that contribute to the economic development of the host State seems 
to be directly influenced by the opinion of Professor SCHREUER. According to 
SCHREUER: 
“The only possible indication of an objective meaning that can be 
gleaned from the Convention is contained in the Preamble’s first 
sentence, which speaks of ‘the need for international co-operation for 
economic development and the role of private international investment 
therein.’ This declared purpose of the Convention is confirmed by the 
Report of the Executive Directors which points out that the 
Convention was ‘prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership 
between countries in the cause of economic development.’ Therefore, 
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it may be argued that the Convention’s object and purpose indicate 
that there should be some positive impact on development.”318 
In the first edition of his work, SCHREUER did not explain whether the reference to 
“economic development” in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention would amount 
to a requirement that limits the jurisdiction of the Centre to disputes arising out of 
investments that contribute to the economic development of the host State; or 
whether such reference would have the purpose of expanding the meaning of the 
term “investment”, as employed in the ICSID Convention, in order to include 
transactions or activities that normally could not be considered as an investment 
within its ordinary meaning.  
In the second edition of his commentary on the ICSID Convention, SCHREUER 
explained, however, that, although the Preamble of the ICSID Convention could 
allow the inference of such element, “it does not necessarily follow that an 
activity that does not contribute to the host State’s development cannot be an 
investment in the sense of Art. 25 and is hence outside the Centre’s 
jurisdiction.”319 According to him: 
“A test that turns on the contribution to the host State’s development 
should be treated with particular care. The reference in the 
Convention’s Preamble indicates that economic development is 
among the Convention’s object and purpose. This would support the 
proposition that an international transaction that is designed to 
promote the host State’s development enjoys the presumption of being 
an investment. But it does not follow that an activity that does not 
obviously contribute to economic development must be excluded from 
the Convention’s protection.”320 
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The use of the economic development requirement to either expand or restrict the 
jurisdiction of the Centre is linked to the question as to whether the elements of 
the notion of investment listed in the Salini test are mere typical characteristics of 
investment (typical features approach) or whether they constitute mandatory 
requirements (jurisdictional approach).321 If they were considered as mandatory 
requirements, the lack of contribution to the economic development of the host 
State by the investment out of which the dispute arises would leave the dispute 
outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. But if those elements were mere typical 
characteristics, the contribution to the economic development of the host State 
could be applied as a subsidiary element to qualify as an investment a transaction 
or activity that fails to meet the other elements of the Salini test.  
According to SCHREUER, whose description of the notion of investment had a 
decisive influence on the Salini test, the elements “should not necessarily be 
understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely as typical characteristics of 
investments under the Convention.”322 This approach is consistent with 
SCHREUER’S position that the lack of contribution to the economic development of 
the host State would not result in the exclusion of the dispute from the jurisdiction 
of the Centre.  
In Salini, once the tribunal concluded that all elements were met, the arbitrators 
were not required to explain what the consequences would be if one or more of 
such elements were missing and whether the Centre would lack jurisdiction over a 
dispute if the elements of the notion of investment were not all fulfilled. Several 
                                                 
321
 See Dugan, C. F., Wallace Jr., D., Rubins, N. and Sabahi, B., supra note 75, at 265-266; 
Gaillard, E., supra note 54, at 407; Stern, B., supra note 56, at 535-538. 
322
 Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 140. 
 127 
ICSID tribunals that followed the Salini test considered, however, that the 
elements of the notion of investment constitute mandatory requirements and are 
not mere typical features. In Joy Mining, the tribunal stated that:  
“Summarizing the elements that an activity must have in order to 
qualify as an investment, both the ICSID decisions mentioned above 
and the commentators thereon have indicated that the project in 
question should have a certain duration, a regularity of profit and 
return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment and that it should 
constitute a significant contribution to the host State’s development. 
To what extent these criteria are met is of course specific to each 
particular case as they will normally depend on the circumstances of 
each case.”323  
In the decisions rendered in L.E.S.I. – DIPENTA and L.E.S.I. – Astaldi, the 
tribunals referred to the elements of the notion of investment as “conditions”.324 
Likewise, the Bayindir tribunal considered the elements of the notion of 
investment as “conditions”,325 and when it analyzed the presence of each element, 
the tribunal observed that the project “must constitute a substantial commitment 
on the side of the investor,”326 “must have a certain duration,”327 “should not only 
provide profit but also imply an element of risk,”328 and “must represent a 
significant contribution to the host State’s development.”329 In Helnan, the 
tribunal referred to the elements of the notion of investment as “requirements”.330 
In Pey Casado, the tribunal asserted that “it is not enough to indicate the presence 
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of some of the typical ‘characteristics’ of an investment in order to comply with 
this objective requirement of the jurisdiction of the Centre.”331 
On the other hand, in Noble Energy, the tribunal asserted that the elements of the 
notion of investment listed in the Salini test would be “indicative of an 
‘investment’ for purposes of the ICSID Convention […] being understood that 
these elements may be closely interrelated, should be examined in their totality 
and will normally depend on the circumstances of each case.”332 Similarly, in 
RSM Grenada, the tribunal pointed out that these elements are “benchmarks or 
yardsticks to help a tribunal in assessing the existence of an investment” and 
“need not be met cumulatively.”333 Likewise, in Phoenix, the tribunal seemed to 
have considered the elements of the Salini test as typical features and not as 
mandatory requirements: 
“The Tribunal wants to emphasize that an extensive scrutiny of all 
these requirements is not always necessary, as they are most often 
fulfilled on their face, ‘overlapping’ or implicitly contained in others, 
and that they have to be analyzed with due consideration of all 
circumstances.”334 
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In the case of Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and others v. 
Ukraine (“Inmaris”), while the tribunal did not apply the Salini test, it noted that: 
“The Salini test may be useful in the event that a tribunal were 
concerned that a BIT or contract definition of investment was so broad 
that it might appear to capture a transaction that would not normally 
be characterized as an investment under any reasonable definition. 
These elements could be useful in identifying such aberrations. 
Indeed, of late a number of tribunals and ad hoc committees have 
expressed the view that these elements should be viewed as non-
binding, non-exclusive means of identifying (rather than defining) 
investments that are consistent with the ICSID Convention.”335 
In MHS, the sole arbitrator — whose award was subsequently annulled by an ad 
hoc committee on the ground of manifest excess of powers336 — considered that 
the dichotomy between the typical features approach and the jurisdictional 
approach is “likely to be academic” and that “it is unlikely that any difference in 
juristic analysis would make any significant difference to the ultimate finding of 
the tribunal.”337 According to the MHS award, the use of the typical features 
approach or of the jurisdictional approach would be just a matter of emphasis 
employed by the tribunal while deciding whether the dispute fulfills the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. If the typical features are 
clearly present or clearly missing, or the objection to the jurisdiction based on the 
non-fulfillment of the investment requirement is weak, the tribunal would rely on 
the jurisdictional approach. On the other hand, if the presence of the typical 
features is not clear, but an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the 
dispute is related to an investment, the tribunal would follow the typical features 
approach. According to the sole arbitrator in MHS: 
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“The classical Salini hallmarks are not a punch list of items which, if 
completely checked off, will automatically lead to a conclusion that 
there is an ‘investment’. If any of these hallmarks are absent, the 
tribunal will hesitate (and probably decline) to make a finding of 
‘investment’. However, even if they are all present, a tribunal will still 
examine the nature and degree of their presence in order to determine 
whether, on a holistic assessment, it is satisfied that there is an ICSID 
‘investment’.”338 
This view seems to be based on the idea that the elements of the notion of 
investment proposed by the Salini test are normally found in typical investments, 
but would not be necessarily present in all types of investments, and their primary 
purpose is to differentiate investments from ordinary commercial transactions. 
This view would also apply to the economic development requirement, which 
would be used as a distinctive element of an investment and not to exclude from 
the jurisdiction of the Centre disputes that arise out of investments that do not 
contribute to the economic development of the host State.  
In his decision, the sole arbitrator considered that “a tribunal ought to interpret the 
word ‘investment’ so as to encourage, facilitate and to promote cross-border 
economic cooperation and development”339 and that “the term ‘investment’ should 
be interpreted as an activity which promotes some form of positive economic 
development for the host State.”340 While these assertions might suggest that the 
contribution to the economic development of the host State was applied to place a 
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Centre, the reliance on the economic 
development requirement was used by the MHS sole arbitrator in order to expand 
the meaning of investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention.  
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In the MHS case, referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to the Malaysia-United 
Kingdom BIT,341 the sole arbitrator had to decide whether a contract entered into 
by the disputing parties for the location and salvage of the cargo of a British 
vessel sank in Malaysia in the nineteenth century could qualify as an investment 
for the purposes of the ICSID Convention. In assessing the fulfillment of the 
elements set forth in the Salini test other than the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State, the sole arbitrator was not convinced that the 
activities carried out by the claimant could be differentiated from an ordinary 
commercial transaction. He pointed out that “the Claimant can only superficially 
satisfy the so-called classical Salini features of investment [regularity of profit and 
returns, contributions, duration and assumption of risks], in the qualitative sense 
envisaged under established ICSID practice and jurisprudence.”342 For this reason, 
“consideration of the remaining hallmarks of ‘investment’ [the economic 
development requirement] will assume greater significance on the particular facts 
of the case.”343 The sole arbitrator noted in addition that: 
“The Tribunal considers that the weight of the authorities cited above 
swings in favour of requiring a significant contribution to be made to 
the host State’s economy. […]. Taking into account the entire factual 
matrix of the case, this feature may be of considerable, even decisive, 
importance. This is due in part to the Tribunal’s findings that the 
other features of ‘investment,’ such as risk and duration of contract, 
only appear to be superficially satisfied on the facts of this case, and 
not in the qualitative sense envisaged under ICSID practice and 
jurisprudence. The Tribunal is therefore left only with the 
contributions made by the Claimant, and has to determine whether 
these contributions would represent a significant contribution to the 
host State’s economic development.  
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In unusual situations such as the present case, where many of the 
typical hallmarks of ‘investment’ are not decisive or appear to be only 
superficially satisfied, the analysis of the remaining relevant hallmarks 
of ‘investment’ will assume considerable importance. The Tribunal 
therefore considers that, on the present facts, for it to constitute an 
‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention, the Contract must have 
made a significant contribution to the economic development of the 
Respondent.”344  
The approach followed in the MHS decision viewed the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State as a subsidiary element that could qualify 
as an investment a transaction or activity that failed to meet the other elements of 
the Salini test. In this sense, similar to the CSOB decision, the reliance on the 
economic development requirement was used in order to expand the meaning of 
the term “investment” for the purposes of the ICSID Convention and not to create 
an additional condition for the establishment of the jurisdiction of the Centre.   
Similar approach was also followed in the Mitchell case, which was referred to 
ICSID arbitration pursuant to the Democratic Republic of Congo-United States 
BIT345 due to the seizure by military forces of a law firm owned by a national of 
the United States in Congo. After the original ICSID tribunal decided that the 
dispute was within the jurisdiction of the Centre and awarded compensation in 
favor of the claimant,346 Congo submitted an application for annulment of the 
award in accordance with Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention,347 arguing, 
among other grounds, that the original tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers 
and failed to state reasons when it decided that the dispute fulfilled the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention. In particular, Congo argued that the 
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dispute did not arise out of an investment for the purposes of the ICSID 
Convention, to the extent that the law firm of the claimant did not contribute to 
the economic development of the host State. 
In the decision on annulment, the Mitchell ad hoc committee considered that “the 
existence of a contribution to the economic development of the host State as an 
essential — although not sufficient — characteristic or unquestionable criterion of 
the investment.”348 This indicates that the ad hoc committee viewed the 
contribution to the economic development of the host State as a restrictive 
requirement. If the contribution to the economic development of the host State is 
“essential”, a dispute that fails to meet such requirement would be outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. And if it is “not sufficient”, even if a transaction or 
activity contributed to the economic development of the host State, the dispute 
would not fulfill the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention unless such 
transaction or activity qualifies as an investment within the ordinary meaning of 
the term. In the decision, however, the Mitchell ad hoc committee seems also to 
support the view that the economic development requirement could be applied, as 
a subsidiary element, in order to qualify as an investment a transaction or activity 
that could not be qualified as investment in accordance with its ordinary meaning: 
“As a legal consulting firm is a somewhat uncommon operation from 
the standpoint of the concept of investment, in the opinion of the ad 
hoc Committee it is necessary for the contribution to the economic 
development or at least the interests of the State, in this case the DRC, 
to be somehow present in the operation. If this were the case, 
qualifying the Claimant as an investor and his services as an 
investment would be possible; furthermore, it would be necessary for 
the Award to indicate that, through his know-how, the Claimant had 
concretely assisted the DRC, for example by providing it with legal 
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services in a regular manner or by specifically bringing investors. It 
does appear, according to the statements of both parties, that some 
U.S. investors had indeed consulted the ‘Mitchell & Associates’ firm. 
However, the Award itself is actually mute on this issue. The vague 
indication set forth in para. 47 of the Award, to the effect that the 
Arbitral Tribunal had received ample information about the activities 
exercised by Mr. Mitchell, including in particular the declarations 
made by former clients of the firm, the agreements concluded with 
former associates, and income statements, fail to fill this gap. The 
same holds true as regards the passing reference made in para. 71 of 
the Award with respect to the loss of clients, according to which 
‘many clients had been asking the firm for counseling in relation to 
requests to be presented to State authorities.’”349  
Accordingly, while the Mitchell ad hoc committee initially suggested that, 
consistent with the Salini decision, the contribution to the economic development 
of the host State was restrictive requirement for the establishment of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, it also indicated that the economic development 
requirement could be used as a subsidiary criterion for a dispute to comply with 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. 
The contribution to the economic development of the host was also adopted as a 
restrictive requirement in the dissenting opinions to the decision on annulment 
that set aside the MHS award and to the decision on jurisdiction rendered in the 
case of Abaclat and Others v. Argentina (“Abaclat”), in which the majority of the 
tribunal decided that a dispute arising out of sovereign debt instruments acquired 
in the secondary market qualified as investment for the purposes of the ICSID 
Convention.350 
In the dissenting opinion to the MHS decision on annulment, Judge MOHAMED 
SHAHABUDDEEN asserted that “economic development is a condition of an ICSID 
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investment”351 and that “[t]he outer limits in this case included a requirement that 
an investment must contribute to the economic development of the host State.”352 
In addition, SHAHABUDDEEN noted that, if the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State was not a condition for the establishment of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, “there is nothing to separate an ICSID investment from 
any other kind of investment; in the result, an ICSID arbitration would be 
indistinguishable from any other kind of arbitration (and there are several) 
concerning an investment dispute.”353  
Similar understanding was sustained by Professor ABI-SAAB in his dissenting 
opinion to the Abaclat decision on jurisdiction. In the case, referred to ICSID 
arbitration pursuant to Argentina-Italy BIT,354 the jurisdiction of the Centre was 
challenged, among other grounds, based on the argument that the transaction out 
of which the dispute arose — the acquisition of bonds issued by Argentina — did 
not fulfilled the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. Dissenting 
from the majority of the tribunal, Professor ABI-SAAB considered that “[t]he 
investment that the Convention seeks to encourage by providing it with an 
international procedural guarantee is that which contributes to the economic 
development of the host country.”355 
These decisions show that two different approaches towards the economic 
development requirement were followed in ICSID practice, which can be named 
                                                 
351
 Dissenting Opinion to the Decision on Annulment of April 16, 2009, 48 ILM 1105 (2009), at 
1105 – emphasis added. 
352
 Idem – emphasis added. 
353
 Ibid., at 1108. 
354
 Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Italy on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments of 22 May 22, 1990. 
355
 Dissenting Opinion to the Decision on Jurisdiction of August 4, 2011, supra note 288, at para. 
50 – emphasis added. 
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as the CSOB approach (or subsidiary approach) and the Salini approach (or 
restrictive approach). The CSOB approach considers the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State as a subsidiary criterion for a dispute to 
fulfill the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. Pursuant to this 
approach, if dispute arises out of a transaction or activity that does not constitute 
an investment in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, the dispute 
may nevertheless fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre if such transaction or 
activity contributed to the economic development of the host State. The Salini 
approach views the contribution to the economic development of the host State as 
a condition for the fulfillment of the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention; even if the dispute arises out of an investment, such dispute would 
fall outside the jurisdiction of the Centre if the investment did not contribute to the 
economic development of the host State. 
But while different, the two approaches have in common the idea that the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention contains an element — the 
contribution to the economic development of the host State — that dissociates the 
meaning of the term “investment” as employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention from its ordinary meaning. The first three elements listed by the 
Salini test — commitment, risk and duration — are meant to reflect the ordinary 
meaning of the term “investment”;356 this is not the case of the economic 
                                                 
356
 In Fakes, the tribunal argued that: 
“Second, the present Tribunal considers that the criteria of (i) a contribution, (ii) a 
certain duration, and (iii) an element of risk, are both necessary and sufficient to 
define an investment within the framework of the ICSID Convention. In the 
Tribunal’s opinion, this approach reflects an objective definition of ‘investment’ that 
embodies specific criteria corresponding to the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘investment’, without doing violence either to the text or the object and purpose of 
the ICSID Convention. These three criteria derive from the ordinary meaning of the 
word ‘investment’, be it in the context of a complex international transaction or that 
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development requirement.357 For the CSOB approach, the investment requirement 
of the ICSID Convention encompasses transactions or activities that, while they 
are not investments within its ordinary meaning, contribute to the economic 
development of the host State. For the Salini approach, it is not enough for a 
transaction or activity to be an investment in order to comply with the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention; it must be an investment that contributes to 
the economic development of the host State. Accordingly, both approaches are 
based on the assumption that the term “investment” as employed in Article 25(1) 
of the ICSID Convention has a special meaning that is inferred from the first 
recital of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, which states that the ICSID 
Convention was concluded “[c]onsidering the need for international cooperation 
for economic development, and the role of private international investment 
therein.”358 
2. THE PREAMBLE OF THE ICSID CONVENTION  
The CSOB tribunal was the first ICSID tribunal to establish a link between the 
Preamble and the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. The tribunal 
asserted that the Preamble “permits an inference that an international transaction 
which contributes to cooperation designed to promote the economic development 
of a Contracting State may be deemed to be an investment as that term is 
                                                                                                                                     
of the education of one’s child: in both instances, one is required to contribute a 
certain amount of funds or know-how, one cannot harvest the benefits of such 
contribution instantaneously, and one runs the risk that no benefits would be reaped 
at all, as a project might never be completed or a child might not be up to his 
parents’ hopes or expectations” (supra note 34, at para. 110).  
357
 See Dugan, C. F., Wallace Jr., D., Rubins, N. and Sabahi, B., supra note 75, at 266. 
358
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 4. 
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understood in the Convention.”359 In Salini, the tribunal observed that “[i]n 
reading the Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State of the investment as an additional condition.”360 
Likewise, the Mitchell ad hoc committee asserted that “[t]he Preamble of the 
Washington Convention sets forth a number of basic principles as to its purpose 
and aims, which imbue the individual provisions of the Convention, including 
Article 25, which makes it needless to mention that the Convention was 
concluded under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development itself.”361 In MHS, the sole arbitrator noted that: 
“The Tribunal considers that, taking a teleological approach to the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention, a tribunal ought to interpret 
the word ‘investment’ so as to encourage, facilitate and to promote 
cross-border economic cooperation and development. Support for 
such an approach can be found in the Preamble to the ICSID 
Convention (‘Considering the need for international cooperation for 
economic development . . . .’) and the Report of the Executive 
Directors on the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of other States (‘the Report of the 
Executive Directors’) dated March 18, 1965, at Paragraph 9, which 
points out that the idea of ICSID was ‘prompted by the desire to 
strengthen the partnership between countries in the cause of economic 
development.’”362 
In the dissenting opinion to the MHS decision on annulment, Judge MOHAMED 
SHAHABUDDEEN considered that “[t]he need for a contribution to the economic 
                                                 
359
 Supra note 252, at 273. 
360
 Supra note 259, at 622. In Bureau Veritas, while the tribunal did not apply the economic 
development requirement, it noted that: 
“The parties cannot adopt a definition of ‘investment’ that relates to activities that 
manifestly fall outside the scope of what the drafters of the ICSID Convention 
intended. The meaning of ‘investment’ is subject to objective appreciation, having 
regard to the objectives of the ICSID Convention, which seeks to promote 
international cooperation for economic development and the role of private 
international investment (see the preamble to the ICSID Convention)” (supra note 
34, at para. 78). 
361
 Supra note 281, at para. 28. 
362
 Supra note 268, at para. 66 – emphasis in the original. 
 139 
development of the host State is consistent with both the formative documents of 
ICSID and with case law.”363 Based on the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, 
SHAHABUDDEEN concluded that “the purpose of the ICSID settlement mechanism 
was to resolve disputes which might arise in connection with ‘such investment,’ 
that is to say, any ‘investment’ concerning ‘international cooperation for 
economic development.’”364 In addition, SHAHABUDDEEN pointed out that the 
close relationship between the Centre and the IBRD would confirm the idea that 
the ICSID Convention was envisaged to stimulate the economic development of 
States: 
“The fifth preambular paragraph of the ICSID Convention states: 
‘Desiring to establish such facilities under the auspices of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.’ 
Development may indeed be widely construed, but its contents, 
however wide, must be capable of being regarded as contributing to 
the purpose of the development in view. Development of what? The 
reference to ‘Reconstruction and Development’ leaves no reasonable 
doubt that it was the development of States which was being spoken 
of.”365 
Similar approach was taken by Professor ABI-SAAB in his dissenting opinion to 
the decision on jurisdiction rendered in the Abaclat case. According to ABI-SAAB: 
“It is most significant that the ICSID Convention was elaborated and 
the Centre established on the initiative and within the framework of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; an 
institution which concentrated its activities since the early sixties 
almost exclusively to the second facet of its mandate according to its 
title, i.e. the ‘development’ of the less developed countries. 
The Preamble of the Convention clearly reveals its ‘developmental’ 
object and purpose, as a means of encouraging ‘international 
                                                 
363
 Dissenting Opinion to the Decision on Annulment of April 16, 2009, 48 ILM 1105 (2009), at 
1106. 
364
 Ibid., at 1107. 
365
 Idem. 
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cooperation for development, and the role of private international 
investment therein’; and this by making available ‘facilities for 
international conciliation or arbitration’, besides the national courts of 
host States, to settle potential disputes arising from such investments 
between private foreign investors and those States. 
The investment that the Convention seeks to encourage by providing it 
with an international procedural guarantee is that which contributes to 
the economic development of the host country, i.e. to the expansion of 
its productive capacity, a contribution that presupposes a commitment 
to this task not only of economic resources, but also in terms of 
duration in time and the taking of risk, with the expectation of reaping 
profits and/or revenue in return.”366 
In the cases of Joy Mining,367 Bayindir,368 Jan de Nul,369 Helnan,370 Saipem,371 
Kardassopoulos,372 Oko Pankki,373 Noble Energy,374 RSM Grenada,375 Toto,376 
Millicom,377 Nations Energy378 and Malicorp,379 the existence of the economic 
development requirement was also admitted, but the tribunals based their 
reasoning solely on previous decisions.380 
                                                 
366
 Dissenting Opinion to the Decision on Jurisdiction of August 4, 2011, supra note 288, at paras. 
48-50. 
367
 See supra note 261, at 500. 
368
 See supra note 263, at 199. 
369
 See supra note 264, at 334-335. 
370
 See supra note 265, at para. 77. 
371
 See supra note 267, at 127. 
372
 See supra note 269, at 66. 
373
 See supra note 270, at 477-478. 
374
 See supra note 271, at 300. 
375
 See supra note 242, at para. 240. 
376
 See supra note 275, at paras. 69 and 86. 
377
 See supra note 34, at para. 80. 
378
 See supra note 278, at para. 429. 
379
 See supra note 280, at para. 109. 
380
 It is generally considered in ICSID practice that previous decisions may serve as guidance and 
are often observed and followed As noted in Saipem:  
“The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, 
it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of 
international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has 
a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes 
that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual 
case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of 
investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of 
States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law” (supra note 267, at 118 – 
footnotes excluded). 
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See also AES Corporation v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of April 26, 2005, 12 ICSID 
Reports 308 (2007), at 317-318; El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of April 27, 2006, 21 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 488 (2006), at 505; Jan de Nul, supra note 
264, at 328; Bureau Veritas, supra note 34, at para. 58; Caratube International Oil Company LLP 
v. Kazakhstan (“Caratube”), Decision on Provisional Measures of July 31, 2009, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CaratubeDecisiononProvisionalMeasures.PDF>, (last visited on 
April 22, 2011), at paras. 69-73; Bayindir, Award of August 27, 2009, available at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf>, (last visited on September 4, 2009), at 
para. 145; Burlington, supra note 34, at para. 100; Duke Peru, supra note 34, at para. 88. See also 
Paulsson, Jan, The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration, in Arbitration Under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues 699 (Yannaca-Small, Katia, ed., New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); Gill, Judith, Is There a Special Role for Precedent in Investment 
Arbitration?, 25 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 87 (2010); Reed, Lucy, The De Facto Precedent Regime in 
Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case Management, 25 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 95 (2010). 
Subsequent ICSID tribunals are not bound, however, by previous decisions. In the dispute 
settlement system established under the ICSID Convention, decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals 
are not binding except between the parties to the dispute. See Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 1082; 
Baltag, C., supra note 75, at 4-5; McLachlan, C., Shore, L. and Weiniger, M., supra note 79, at 70-
76; Schill, Stephan W., The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 291; Salacuse, J., supra note 257, at 155-156. 
On the other hand, in accordance with the general rule of treaty interpretation embodied in the 
Vienna Convention, decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals do not have interpretative value. As 
discussed before, Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention provides that the interpretation of 
treaties must take into account the subsequent practice pertaining to the application of the treaty 
which establishes the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty provisions. While 
Article 31(3)(b) does not qualify the subsequent practice as State practice only, it requires, 
nonetheless, that the practice must establish the agreement of parties on the meaning of a treaty 
provision. For this reason, the practice of organs of international organizations pertaining to the 
application of their constituent treaties may also be considered in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) (see 
supra at pp. 46 et seq.). However, the interpretation given by ICSID tribunals does not seem to 
meet such requirement. While ICSID tribunals are vested, pursuant to Article 41(2) of the ICSID 
Convention, with the authority to interpret the meaning of the jurisdictional requirements set forth 
in Article 25(1) (see supra at pp. 9 et seq.), Contracting States do not participate in the decision-
making process of ICSID tribunals and members of ICSID tribunals do not exercise their 
adjudicatory function as representatives of the Contracting States. The authority conferred on 
ICSID tribunals is to apply the provisions of the ICSID Convention to a particular case and not to 
give an authoritative and abstract interpretation of its provisions. Likewise, once the decisions 
rendered by ICSID tribunals do not qualify as a source of the intention of the Contracting States of 
the ICSID Convention, they may not be used in the interpretation of the ICSID Convention in the 
sense of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
In Caratube, however, the tribunal suggested that previous decisions rendered by ICSID tribunal 
could be relied on as a supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the basis of Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ: 
“On the other hand, Article 32 VCLT permits recourse, as supplementary means of 
interpretation, not only to a treaty’s ‘preparatory work’ and the ‘circumstances of its 
conclusion’, but indicates by the word ‘including’ that, beyond the two means 
expressly mentioned, other supplementary means of interpretation may be applied in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 VCLT. 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that 
judicial decisions and awards are applicable for the interpretation of public 
international law as ‘subsidiary means’. Therefore, these legal materials can also be 
understood to constitute ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ in the sense of 
Article 32 VCLT” (ibid., at para. 71).  
Similarly, in AFT, where a non-ICSID tribunal applied the Salini test, the tribunal justified its 
position on the idea that the decisions that followed the Salini test contributed to the development 
of a “common ground” in international law of what an investment is: 
“A more than abundant number of cases have contributed to elucidate the notion of 
investment under the ICSID Convention and, more in general, international 
customary law. It is now common ground the necessary conditions or characteristics 
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On the other hand, not all ICSID tribunals that followed the Salini test admitted 
the existence of the economic development requirement. In L.E.S.I. – DIPENTA, 
the tribunal asserted that “it is not necessary that the investment contribute more 
specifically to the host country’s economic development, something that is 
difficult to ascertain and that is implicitly covered by the other three criteria.”381 
Similar approach was followed in Phoenix and in RSM Central African Republic. 
In Phoenix, the tribunal pointed out that “the contribution of an international 
                                                                                                                                     
to be satisfied for attributing the qualify of ‘investment’ to a contractual relationship 
include: (a) a capital contribution to the host-State by the private contracting arty, 
(b) a significant duration over which the project is implemented and (c) a sharing of 
operational risks inherent to the contribution together with long-term commitments. 
This is not the case here, the Assignment Contract being far from satisfying, even in 
part, the above characteristics” (supra note 283, at para. 241 – footnote excluded). 
Under Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ, however, judicial decisions are classified “as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” (39 AJIL Sup. 190 (1945), at 223 – 
emphasis added), but not for the establishment of rules of law. See Paulsson, Jan, International 
Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law, 3(5) 
TDM (2006); Gill, J., ibid., at 91. 
Similarly, under the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), in the 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body rejected the idea that panel 
reports adopted by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 
(“GATT 1947”) could constitute subsequent practice in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention. Among other arguments, the Appellate Body observed that:  
“Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often 
considered by subsequent panels.  They create legitimate expectations among WTO 
Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to 
any dispute.  However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the 
particular dispute between the parties to that dispute. In short, their character and 
their legal status have not been changed by the coming into force of the WTO 
Agreement” (Report of the Appellate Body of October 4, 1996, available at 
<www.wto.org>, (last visited on February 1, 2009), at 13 – footnote excluded, 
emphasis in the original). 
381
 Unofficial translation (supra note 268, at para. 13) of the French original: 
“Il ne paraît en revanche pas nécessaire qu’il réponde en plus spécialement à la 
promotion économique du pays, une condition de toute façon difficile à établir et 
implicitement couverte par les trois éléments retenus” (supra note 262, at 450).  
See also L.E.S.I. – Astaldi, supra note 265, at para. 72. 
Similarly, in Alpha, the tribunal noted that: 
“The Tribunal is particularly reluctant to apply a test that seeks to assess an 
investment’s contribution to a country’s economic development. Should a tribunal 
find it necessary to check whether a transaction falls outside any reasonable 
understanding of ‘investment’, the criteria of resources, duration, and risk would 
seem fully to serve that objective. The contribution-to-development criterion, on the 
other hand, would appear instead to reflect the consequences of the other criteria and 
brings little independent content to the inquiry. At the same time, the criterion 
invites a tribunal to engage in a post hoc evaluation of the business, economic, 
financial and/or policy assessments that prompted the claimant’s activities. It would 
not be appropriate for such a form of second-guessing to drive a tribunal’s 
jurisdictional analysis” (supra note 285, at para. 312 – footnote excluded). 
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investment to the development of the host State is impossible to ascertain — the 
more so as there are highly diverging views on what constitutes 
‘development’.”382 Likewise, in RSM Central African Republic, the tribunal noted 
that: 
“However, as noted above, the Tribunal wishes to make certain 
inflections in the Salini criteria because it believes that the real 
criterion of contribution to development is too subjective and should 
be replaced by the criterion of the contribution the economy, itself 
considered presumed included in the other three criteria. The Tribunal 
follows the tribunals that have expressed skepticism about this fourth 
criterion, such as the tribunal in LESI SpA v. Algeria […].”383 
While the concern of these decisions was focused on the question as to whether it 
would be feasible for an ICSID tribunal to assess the compliance with the 
economic development requirement and not as to meaning and effect of the 
reference to “economic development” in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, 
the possibility of an ICSID tribunal relying on the Preamble in order to justify the 
existence of the economic development requirement was expressly rejected in the 
cases of Pey Casado and Fakes. In Pey Casado, the tribunal observed that: 
                                                 
382
 Supra note 34, at 759 – emphasis in the original. The Phoenix tribunal considered, nevertheless, 
that:  
“A less ambitious approach should therefore be adopted, centered on the 
contribution of an international investment to the economy of the host State, which is 
indeed normally inherent in the mere concept of investment as shaped by the 
elements of contribution/duration/risk, and should therefore in principle be 
presumed” (idem – emphasis in the original).  
This requirement, however, does not entail the contribution to the economic development of the 
host State, but it is based on the idea that, in order for a dispute to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre, it must arise out of an investment which aims at creating an economic activity in the host 
State. 
See also RSM Central African Republic, supra note 279, at para. 56. 
383
 Free translation of the French original: 
“Cependant, comme indiqué précédemment, le Tribunal souhaite apporter certaines 
inflexions aux critères Salini, car il estime qu’en réalité le critère de la contribution 
au développement est trop subjectif et qu’il doit être remplacé par le critère de la 
contribution à l’économie, lui-même considéré comme présumé inclus dans les trois 
autres critères. Le Tribunal suit en cela d’autres tribunaux qui ont manifesté leur 
scepticisme à l’égard de ce quatrième critère, comme par exemple le tribunal dans 
l’affaire LESI SpA c. Algérie […]” (supra note 279, at para. 56). 
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“The requirement of contribution to the development of the host State 
is difficult to ascertain and it is in its opinion a question of the merits 
of the dispute and not a question of the competence of the tribunal. 
The fact that an investment may be useful or not for the host State 
does not disqualify it as an investment. It is true that the preamble of 
the ICSID Convention mentions the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State. Nevertheless, such reference is a 
consequence and not a requirement of the investment: protecting 
investments, the Convention favors the development of the host State. 
This does not mean that the development of the host State is a 
constitutive element of the notion of investment. For this reason, as 
some arbitral tribunals have pointed out, this fourth element is in fact 
included in the first three elements.”384 
In the same way, in Fakes, the tribunal concluded that: 
“The Tribunal is not convinced, on the other hand, that a contribution 
to the host State’s economic development constitutes a criterion of an 
investment within the framework of the ICSID Convention. Those 
tribunals that have considered this element as a separate requirement 
for the definition of an investment, such as the Salini Tribunal, have 
mainly relied on the preamble to the ICSID Convention to support 
their conclusions. The present Tribunal observes that while the 
preamble refers to the ‘need for international cooperation for 
economic development,’ it would be excessive to attribute to this 
reference a meaning and function that is not obviously apparent from 
its wording. In the Tribunal’s opinion, while the economic 
development of a host State is one of the proclaimed objectives of the 
ICSID Convention, this objective is not in and of itself an independent 
criterion for the definition of an investment. The promotion and 
protection of investments in host States is expected to contribute to 
their economic development. Such development is an expected 
consequence, not a separate requirement, of the investment projects 
carried out by a number of investors in the aggregate. Taken in 
isolation, certain individual investments might be useful to the State 
and to the investor itself; certain might not. Certain investments 
                                                 
384
 Free translation of the Spanish original: 
“La exigencia de una contribución al desarrollo del Estado receptor, difícil de 
establecer, es en su opinión más una cuestión de fondo del litigio que de 
competencia del Centro. Una inversión puede resultar o no útil para el Estado 
receptor sin dejar por ello de ser una inversión. Es cierto que el preámbulo del 
Convenio CIADI menciona la contribución al desarrollo económico del Estado 
receptor. Sin embargo, dicha referencia se presenta como una consecuencia, no 
como un requisito de la inversión: al proteger las inversiones, el Convenio favorece 
el desarrollo del Estado receptor. Ello no significa que el desarrollo del Estado 
receptor sea un elemento constitutivo de la noción de inversión. Es por esta razón, 
como han señalado algunos tribunales de arbitraje, que este cuarto elemento está en 
realidad englobado en los tres primeros” (supra note 272, at para. 232). 
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expected to be fruitful may turn out to be economic disasters. They do 
not fall, for that reason alone, outside the ambit of the concept of 
investment.”385 
These two decisions opposed the idea that the reference to “economic 
development” in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention would be sufficient to 
justify the existence of the economic development requirement. While not 
denying that economic development was one of the goals of the ICSID 
Convention, the Pey Casado and Fakes decisions considered that this would not 
be enough to create an element of the notion of investment within the meaning of 
the ICSID Convention that restricts the jurisdiction of the Centre to disputes that 
arise out of investments that contribute to the economic development of the host 
State. 
2.1. The Normative Function of the Preamble  
It is well settled in international law that the preamble is part of the treaty and it 
must be used in the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty as evidence of its 
object and purpose.386 In this sense, Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention 
provides that “[t]he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes.”387 
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 Supra note 34, at para. 111 – emphasis in the original. 
386
 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, at 221. See also Sinclair, I., 
supra note 34, at 127-128; Gardiner, R., supra note 112, at 196-197. 
387
 8 ILM 679 (1969), at 692 – emphasis added. As observed by Judge WEERAMANTRY in the 
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 case: 
“An obvious internal source of reference is the preamble to the treaty. The preamble 
is a principal and natural source from which indications can be gathered of a treaty’s 
objects and purposes even though the preamble does not contain substantive 
provisions. Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention sets this out specifically when it 
states that context, for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty, shall comprise in 
addition to the text, the preamble and certain other materials. The jurisprudence of 
this Court also indicates, as in the case concerning Rights of Nations of the United 
States of America in Morocco and the Asylum (Colombia/Peru) case, that the Court 
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Therefore, the Preamble of the ICSID Convention constitutes part of the context 
in which the term “investment” set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention 
is employed and, for this reason, it must be considered in the interpretation of the 
notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention. 
But while it is uncontested that the preamble is part of the treaty, it seems 
generally considered that the preamble does not have a normative function; it 
would merely indicate the object and purpose of the treaty.388 Nonetheless, the 
comparison of the language employed in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention 
with the wording of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention may lead to the 
conclusion that, in stating the general purpose of the ICSID Convention for the 
establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism, it was intended to confer on the 
Preamble a normative function in the delineation of the jurisdictional scope of the 
ICSID Convention. It may be said, accordingly, that, despite the general idea that 
a preamble of a treaty does not have a normative function, some parts of the 
Preamble of the ICSID Convention introduces rules pertaining to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre. For instance, the seventh recital of the Preamble, which declares 
“that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or 
approval of this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under any 
                                                                                                                                     
has made substantial use of it for interpretational purposes. In the former case, a 
possible interpretation of the Madrid Convention was rejected for its lack of 
conformity with the preamble’s specific formulation of the purposes of the 
Convention. In the latter case the Court used the objects of the Havana Convention, 
as indicated in its preamble, to interpret Article 2 of the Convention. Important 
international arbitrations have likewise resorted to the preamble to a treaty as guides 
to its interpretation” (Dissenting Opinion to the Judgment of November 12, 1991, 
supra note 34, at 142 – footnotes excluded). 
388
 According to FITZMAURICE, “[t]he preamble to a treaty (which does not and should not have 
direct operative force) has effect as indicating the general purposes and spirit of the treaty, in the 
light of which the interpretation to be given to particular provisions may be considered” (supra 
note 87, at 10). See also Treviranus, Hans-Dietrich, Preamble, III EPIL 1097 (1997), at 1098. 
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obligation to submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration,”389 has a 
clear normative content. 
The intention of conferring a normative function on the Preamble of the ICSID 
Convention can be confirmed by the drafting history of the ICSID Convention. 
The first version of the Preamble appeared in the First Preliminary Draft of 
August 3, 1963,390 as a consequence of the discussions among the executive 
directors of IBRD regarding the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention. As 
seen before, the first draft of the ICSID Convention — the Working Paper of June 
5, 1962 — did not make any reference to “investment” and did not contain any 
jurisdictional requirement based on the nature of the dispute. Some executive 
directors, however, feared that some States would not be willing to participate in 
the ICSID Convention unless additional requirements were introduced in order to 
clearly define the jurisdiction of the Centre.391 In the context of these discussions, 
the idea of introducing such limitations in a preamble was suggested by one of the 
executive directors, GARLAND. According to him, a “reconciliation of the 
differing positions might be achieved by inserting a limitation in a preamble, 
which would have the practical effect of limiting the scope of the convention to 
industrial disputes; this might be preferable to a definition of ‘industrial dispute’ 
in the body of the convention.”392 BROCHES accepted this idea. In a working paper 
submitted to the executive directors, BROCHES concluded that: 
                                                 
389
 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 4. 
390
 See History of the ICSID Convention, supra note 73, at 19. The Working Paper did not contain 
a preamble. According to BROCHES, the preamble “had been omitted from the draft under 
discussion because the draft was really a working paper” (History of the ICSID Convention, supra 
note 73, at 65). 
391
 See supra at pp. 58 et seq. 
392
 History of the ICSID Convention, supra note 73, at 61. 
 148 
“There is a general understanding, which could be recorded in a 
Preamble to the Convention, that the machinery created by the 
Convention and the rules laid down in the Convention are designed to 
deal primarily with investment disputes. It is also generally 
understood that the scope of the Convention should be limited to legal 
disputes as distinguished from political or commercial disputes, and 
this could also be suitably expressed in a Preamble. Once this 
intention is expressed, there seems to be no need to go further and 
give a precise definition of the disputes for which the services of the 
Center would be available. To give a precise definition of investment 
dispute would be extremely difficult. More seriously, it might lead to 
undesirable jurisdictional controversies in cases where parties have 
agreed to submit a dispute to conciliation or arbitration under the 
auspices of the Center, and one of the parties later refuses to carry out 
the agreement claiming that the dispute is of a kind outside the defined 
scope of the Convention. If the Convention established compulsory 
arbitration or conciliation, there would clearly be need for defining the 
scope of the obligation. But the Convention does not by itself establish 
any obligation except to abide by agreements freely made. It has been 
argued, however, that since the very existence of the Convention 
implies a danger of pressure being exercised on host governments by 
investors to have recourse to the services of the Center, the scope of 
activity of the Center should be closely defined in the Convention so 
as at least to limit the range of situation within which this pressure 
could be exercised. Even assuming that such a danger exists at all, and 
this may well be questioned, the Preamble would serve to limit this 
‘danger’ to the field of investment disputes.”393 
Given the need of introducing additional jurisdictional requirements in the text of 
the ICSID Convention, the first version of the Preamble was inserted in the First 
Preliminary Draft of August 3, 1963, with the following wording: 
“The Contracting States 
1. CONSIDERING the need for international cooperation for 
economic development, and the role of foreign investment therein; 
2. BEARING IN MIND the possibility that disputes may arise 
from time to time in connection with such investment between 
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States, and the 
need for settlement thereof in a spirit of mutual confidence, with due 
respect for the principle of equal rights of States in the exercise of 
their sovereignty in accordance with international law; 
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3. RECOGNIZING that while such disputes would usually be 
subject to national legal processes (without prejudice to the right of 
any State to espouse a claim of one of its nationals in accordance with 
international law), other methods of settlement of such disputes may 
be appropriate in certain cases; 
4. ATTACHING PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE to the 
establishment of facilities for international conciliation or arbitration 
to which Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States 
may submit such disputes if they so desire; 
5. RECOGNIZING an undertaking to submit such disputes to 
conciliation or to arbitration through such facilities as may be 
established as a legal obligation to be carried out in good faith, which 
requires in particular that due consideration be given to any 
recommendation of conciliators, and that any arbitral award be 
complied with; and 
6. DECLARING that no Contracting State shall by the mere 
fact of its acceptance of this Convention be required to have recourse 
to conciliation or arbitration in any particular case, in the absence of a 
specific undertaking to that effect, 
HAVE AGREED as follows:”394 
The comment to Section 1 of Article II of the First Preliminary Draft, which 
defined the jurisdiction of the Centre, suggested a direct link between the 
Preamble and jurisdiction of the Centre: 
“No detailed definition of the category of disputes in respect of which 
the facilities of the Center would be available has been included in the 
Convention. Instead, the general understanding reflected in the 
Preamble, the use of the term ‘investment dispute’, and the 
requirement that the dispute be of a legal character distinct from 
political, economic or purely commercial disputes, were thought 
adequate to limit the scope of the Convention in this regard. Within 
those limits Contracting States would be free to determine in advance 
in each particular case what disputes they would submit to the Center. 
To include a more precise definition would tend to open the door to 
frequent disagreements as to the applicability of the Convention to a 
particular undertaking, thus undermining the primary objective of this 
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Article viz., to give confidence that undertakings to have recourse to 
conciliation or arbitration will be carried out.”395 
This comment, thus, confirms the idea that can be inferred from the text of the 
ICSID Convention that the Preamble was intended to have a normative function. 
Nevertheless, the fact that it was intended to confer a normative function of the 
Preamble of the ICSID Convention does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that the ICSID Convention contains a requirement that expands or restricts the 
jurisdiction of the Centre based on the contribution to the economic development 
of the host State. Undoubtedly, economic development through the flow of 
foreign investments was one of the main purposes of the ICSID Convention.396 
However, the first recital of the Preamble does not expressly allow ICSID 
tribunals to deny the jurisdiction of the Centre because the dispute arises out of an 
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investment that do not contribute to the economic development of host States.397 
Likewise, the first recital of the Preamble does not extend the jurisdiction of the 
Centre to disputes arising out of transactions or activities that, although are not 
investments within the ordinary meaning of the term, contributed to the economic 
development of the host State.  
Accordingly, the first recital of the Preamble alone would not be sufficient in 
order for an ICSID tribunal to justify the existence of the economic development 
requirement. As a consequence of the rule of expressio unius est exclusion 
alterius,398 it must be assumed that the requirements set forth in Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention are exhaustive and ICSID tribunals may not rely on 
grounds not expressed in the ICSID Convention to deny the jurisdiction of the 
Centre. This assumption also advocates against the idea that the existence of the 
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economic development could be justified based on the application of the doctrine 
of implied powers to the ICSID Convention.  
The doctrine of implied powers, developed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion 
function, has been used in the interpretation of constitutive treaties in order to 
determine the powers of international organizations. According to this doctrine, 
which derives from the rule of necessary implication,399 an international 
organization would be deemed to have any power necessary for the fulfillment of 
its functions and purposes.400 In this sense, one could argue that, in light of the 
ICSID Convention’s declared purpose of promoting economic development, an 
ICSID tribunal would have the implied power to deny the jurisdiction of the 
Centre over a dispute that arises out of an investment that does not contribute to 
the economic development of the host State. 
The doctrine of implied powers was first used by the ICJ in the interpretation of 
the Charter of the United Nations in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations case.401 In this case, which arose out of the murder 
of United Nations’ agents in Israel, the ICJ had to give an advisory opinion, upon 
the request of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the questions as to 
whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an international claim 
against governments for the reparation of damages caused by injuries suffered by 
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its agents during the performance of their duties; and as to how such capacity 
could reconcile with the rights of the State of the national who suffered the 
injuries. In relation to the question as to whether the United Nations could bring 
an international claim, the ICJ concluded that, although the Charter did not 
expressly confer international personality on the United Nations, such 
international personality could be inferred by necessary implication. In this sense, 
the ICJ decided that: 
“In the opinion of the Court, the Organization was intended to 
exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions 
and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession 
of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to 
operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type 
of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions 
of its founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must be 
acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, 
with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the 
competence required to enable those functions to be effectively 
discharged. 
[…] 
[…]. Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and 
duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an 
entity such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes and 
functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and 
developed in practice. The functions of the Organization are of such a 
character that they could not be effectively discharged if they involved 
the concurrent action, on the international plane, of fifty-eight or more 
Foreign Offices, and the Court concludes that the Members have 
endowed the Organization with capacity to bring international claims 
when necessitated by the discharge of its functions.” 402 
In addition, the ICJ concluded that the United Nations had the capacity to bring an 
international claim on behalf of its agents against a State for injuries suffered 
during the performance of their duties, even though such power was not expressly 
conferred on the organization by its constitutive treaty. The ICJ based its decision 
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on the idea that an international organization must have all the powers necessary 
for the performance of its duties. According to the ICJ: 
“The Charter does not expressly confer upon the Organization the 
capacity to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused to the 
victim or to persons entitled through him. The Court must therefore 
begin by enquiring whether the provisions of the Charter concerning 
the functions of the Organization, and the part played by its agents in 
the performance of those functions, imply for the Organization power 
to afford its agents the limited protection that would consist in the 
bringing of a claim on their behalf for reparation for damage suffered 
in such circumstances. Under international law, the Organization must 
be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided 
in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being 
essential to the performance of its duties.”403 
In the Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal case, the ICJ also based its decision on the doctrine of 
implied powers. In this case, the question that the ICJ had to answer was whether 
the General Assembly of the United Nations could refuse the payment of 
compensation awards rendered by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in 
favor of the organization’s former employees. In giving its advisory opinion, the 
ICJ had to decide whether the General Assembly had the authority to establish an 
administrative tribunal for adjudication of disputes between the United Nations 
and its employees. The ICJ concluded that, despite the lack of an express 
provision in the Charter, the establishment of an administrative tribunal was 
essential to ensure the performance of the United Nations’ duties by its 
employees: 
“In these circumstances, the Court finds that the power to establish a 
tribunal, to do justice as between the Organization and the staff 
members, was essential to ensure the efficient working of the 
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Secretariat, and to give effect to the paramount consideration of 
securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. 
Capacity to do this arises by necessary intendment out of the 
Charter.”404 
In the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case, 
upon the request of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), the ICJ was asked 
whether the use of nuclear weapon in armed conflict would be contrary to 
international law. The ICJ, however, refused to give the advisory opinion 
requested, to the extent it considered that the matter would fall outside the 
competence of the WHO. According to the ICJ, while the WHO has the authority 
to deal with the effects of the use of nuclear weapons, it would not have the 
power, as a specialized agency, to discuss the legality of such weapons. The 
authority to discuss the legality of the use of nuclear weapon could not be inferred 
by necessary implication: 
“The powers conferred on international organizations are normally the 
subject of an express statement in their constituent instruments. 
Nevertheless, the necessities of international life may point to the need 
for powers which are not expressly provided for in the basic 
instruments which govern their activities. It is generally accepted that 
international organizations can exercise such powers, known as 
‘implied’ powers. […]. 
In the opinion of the Court, to ascribe to the WHO the competence to 
address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons — even in view of 
their health and environmental effects — would be tantamount to 
disregarding the principle of speciality; for such competence could not 
be deemed a necessary implication of the Constitution of the 
Organization in the light of the purposes assigned to it by its member 
States.”405 
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The decisions of the ICJ show that certain powers of international organizations 
not expressly conferred by their constitutive treaties may be inferred by 
implication. The doctrine of implied powers, however, is not unlimited. 
According to the ICJ, it must be demonstrated (i) that such implied power derives 
from a purpose intended by the parties to the treaty; and (ii) that the fulfillment of 
such purpose would be impaired if the international organization does not exercise 
the implied power. Accordingly, in order to justify the existence of an implied 
power, it must be proved that the international organization will not be able to 
fulfill its purpose and functions unless such power is granted. While there is a 
degree of subjectivity in the question as to whether the exercise of an authority not 
expressly conferred is effectively necessary, the doctrine of implied powers 
creates a presumption against the implication of any authority. At the same time 
that the ICJ admitted the application of the doctrine of implied powers, it also 
reaffirmed that international organizations are governed by the principle of 
speciality. For this reason, the lack of an express provision in the constitutive 
treaty may be evidence of the intention of the member States not to grant such 
implied authority.406 
In light of the decisions of the ICJ, it does not seem possible to justify the 
existence of the economic development requirement by the application of the 
doctrine of implied powers. Although the establishment of the Centre was 
intended to promote economic development through the flow of foreign 
investment into developing economies,407 the ICSID Convention does not confer 
on the Centre any positive obligation towards the economic development of its 
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Contracting States. In fact, the purpose of the ICSID Convention was to create a 
favorable climate for the flow of foreign investment by fulfilling the lack of 
adequate facilities for the settlement of investment disputes in an international 
forum. It is not the function of the Centre to effectively take measures intended to 
foster the economic development of its Contracting States. It is the existence of 
the Centre that was intended to promote the economic development of the 
Contracting States and not its actions. For this reason, the fulfillment of the 
purposes envisaged by the ICSID Convention would not be impaired by the 
absence of the authority of an ICSID tribunal to deny the jurisdiction of the Centre 
over a dispute that arises out of an investment that does not contribute to the 
economic development of the host State. On the contrary, the purpose of the 
ICSID Convention to create a favorable climate for the flow of foreign investment 
may be achieved independently from this requirement.408 
2.2. The Interpretation of the Term “Investment” in the Light of the 
Object and Purpose of the ICSID Convention 
In the absence of an express provision in the text of the ICSID Convention, the 
decisions that admitted the existence of the economic development requirement, 
either to expand or to restrict the jurisdiction of the Centre, were based on the idea 
that the contribution to the economic development of the host State constitutes an 
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element of the notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention. 
According to this construction, the economic development requirement would not 
be an autonomous jurisdictional requirement, but an element of the meaning of the 
term “investment” for the purposes of the ICSID Convention. This is the essence 
of the economic development requirement according to both approaches. For the 
CSOB approach, even if a transaction or activity is not an investment within its 
ordinary meaning, such transaction or activity may be nonetheless considered as 
an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention if it contributes to the 
economic development of the host State. For the Salini approach, even if a 
transaction or activity is an investment within its ordinary meaning, such 
transaction or activity is not an investment within for the purposes of the ICSID 
Convention unless it contributes to the economic development of the host State. In 
both approaches, this element of the notion of the investment would find support 
in one of the main objectives and purposes of the ICSID Convention, namely the 
economic development through the flow of foreign investments into developing 
countries. 
The problem of this construction of the investment requirement, however, is that it 
assumes that the Contracting States, despite the lack of a definition of investment 
in the ICSID Convention, intended to confer a special meaning on the term 
“investment”. In extending the jurisdiction of the Centre to disputes that arise out 
of a transaction or activity that it is not an investment within its ordinary meaning, 
the CSOB approach considers that, for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, the 
meaning of the term “investment” is wider than its ordinary meaning. Likewise, if 
for the Salini approach it is not enough for a transaction or activity to qualify as an 
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investment within its ordinary meaning, but it must contribute to the economic 
development of the host State in order to fulfill the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention, the elements of the notion of investment within the meaning 
of ICSID Convention are not exclusively based on the ordinary meaning of the 
term “investment”. And, for both approaches, the source of the intention to confer 
this special meaning on the term “investment” would be found in the first recital 
of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, which indicates that the contribution to 
economic development is within the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention.  
The opinion of SCHREUER on the meaning of the term “investment”, which served 
as the basis for the Salini test,409 is clear in the sense that the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State constitutes a special feature of the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention and not an element of the term 
“investment” within its ordinary meaning. According to SCHREUER, the economic 
development requirement “is not necessarily characteristic of investments in 
general. But the wording of the Preamble and the Executive Directors’ Report 
[…] suggest that development is part of the Convention’s object and purpose.”410 
This construction of the ICSID Convention, however, is inconsistent with the 
general rule of treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention. 
The Vienna Convention settled a dispute over the existence and content of the 
rules of treaty interpretation in customary international law. At the time that the 
Vienna Convention was formulated, there were essentially three major approaches 
to the interpretation of treaties, which were identified as the “textual approach”, 
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“intentions approach” and “teleological approach”.411 These three approaches 
diverge from each other in the question as to the relevance of the elements that 
may be taken into consideration in interpreting a treaty. According to the 
intentions approach, in order to establish the correct meaning of a treaty, the 
process of treaty interpretation should aim at achieving the real intention of the 
parties to the treaty as a subjective element distinct from its text. In this sense, the 
intentions approach advocates a liberal recourse to elements extraneous to the text 
of the treaty, especially to the preparatory works of treaties, even if the text of the 
treaty is unambiguous. The teleological approach, on the other hand, focuses on 
the declared and apparent objects and purposes of a treaty as the main source of 
treaty interpretation. According to this approach, treaties, especially general 
multilateral treaties, are “living documents” that have their existence detached 
from the initial intention of their parties. Hence, this approach advocates the use 
of teleological constructions that may go beyond the text of the treaty.  
Finally, for the textual approach, which was adopted in the Vienna Convention, 
treaty interpretation should be primarily based on the text of the treaty, as the 
main source of the intention of the parties. For this reason, the textual approach, 
which is based on two major principles of interpretation — the principle of 
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actuality and the principle of the natural meaning412 —, admits very limited 
recourse to elements extraneous to the text of the treaty, such as the preparatory 
works of treaties, only allowed in cases in which the text of the treaty is not 
conclusive, and rejects teleological constructions that go beyond the text of the 
treaty. This approach is reflected in the general rule of treaty interpretation set 
forth in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, which provides that “[a] treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”413 
The doctrine of textual interpretation, embodied in the Vienna Convention, finds 
support in the practice of the PCIJ and of the ICJ. According to GERALD 
FITZMAURICE, whose work inspired the codification of the general rule of treaty 
interpretation by the International Law Commission (“ILC”): 
“Doctrine of textual interpretation. The thought of the majority [of the 
ICJ] could be summed up by saying that in their view the intentions of 
the framers of a treaty, as they emerged from the discussions or 
negotiations preceding its conclusion, must be presumed to have been 
expressed in the treaty itself, and are therefore to be sought primarily 
in the actual text, and not in any extraneous source. Furthermore, 
treaties must be interpreted as they stand, and subject to the limitations 
inherent in the fact that they only contain so many articles, phrases, 
and words. The intentions or presumed intentions of the framers 
cannot be invoked to fill in gaps, or import into the treaty something 
of which is apparently plain, or to give them a sense different from 
that which they possess according to their normal and natural 
meaning. In short, the attitude of the Court to a text is not, primarily, 
to ask itself what was this text intended to mean (still less of course 
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what ought it to mean, or to be made to mean), but what does it in fact 
mean on its actual wording?”414 
In the advisory opinion given in the Polish Postal Service in Danzig case, the 
predecessor of the ICJ, the PCIJ, observed that “[i]t is a cardinal principle of 
interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense which they would 
normally have in their context, unless such interpretation would lead to something 
unreasonable or absurd.”415 This approach was followed by the ICJ in the 
decisions prior to the conclusion of the Vienna Convention. As the ICJ observed 
in the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the 
United Nations case:  
“The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a 
tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a 
treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and 
ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant 
words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their 
context, that is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in 
their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an 
unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort to 
other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties 
really did mean when they used these words. […]. 
[…] 
When the Court can give effect to a provision of a treaty by giving to 
the words used in it their natural and ordinary meaning, it may not 
interpret the words by seeking to give them some other meaning. 
[…].”416 
                                                 
414
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The doctrine of textual interpretation was reaffirmed in subsequent decisions of 
the ICJ. For instance, in the case concerning the Constitution of the Maritime 
Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 
the ICJ stated that: 
“The words of Article 28(a) must be read in their natural and ordinary 
meaning, in the sense which they would normally have in their 
context. It is only if, when this is done, the words of the Article are 
ambiguous in any way that resort need be had to other methods of 
construction. […].”417 
In the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, the ICJ noted that “the Court 
must apply its normal canons of interpretation, the first of which, according to the 
established jurisprudence of the Court, is that words are to be interpreted 
according to their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they 
occur.”418 
While the purpose of treaty interpretation is the search for the intention of the 
parties to the treaty in order to give effect to the consent of the parties to be bound 
by the treaty, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention establishes a method in 
which each element plays a relevant role as a source of the parties’ intention.419 
Above all, under the general rule of treaty interpretation, the primary source of the 
intention of the parties are the actual terms employed in the treaty — the text of 
the treaty —, which must be assumed to have been employed in the light of its 
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ordinary or natural meaning.420 The interpreter may only give to a term a meaning 
that differs from its ordinary meaning — a special meaning — if the parties to the 
treaty intended to do so. In this sense, Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention 
provides that “[a] special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that 
the parties so intended.”421 This situation occurs especially in treaties containing a 
definition of a term,422 such as, for instance, investment treaties setting forth a 
definition of investment. In this case, the definition of investment of the treaty 
prevails if it does not correspond to the ordinary meaning of the term 
“investment” because the parties expressly intended to confer a special meaning 
on the term. But the interpreter of a treaty may not rely on its object and purpose 
in order to demonstrate that the parties intended to confer a special meaning on a 
term.  
Under the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention, the 
reference to the object and purpose of a treaty — which provides for a teleological 
element in treaty interpretation and is also linked to the principle of effectiveness, 
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 As observed by the ICJ: 
“The Court will thus proceed to the interpretation of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the 
Statute, and will do so in accordance with customary international law, reflected in 
Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to 
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or the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat423 —is not an autonomous source 
of the intention of the parties; its use is a second step and contingent upon the 
ordinary meaning of the terms and may not be used to override the text of the 
treaty.424 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms […] in the light of its object and purpose”425 and not that the treaty shall 
be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose.426 The general rule of treaty 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention provides for an order of factors of 
interpretation that do not operate independently from or alternatively to the 
ordinary meaning of the text.427 
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 Criticizing the view that Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides for a “holistic rule of 
interpretation”, ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI points out that:  
“What stands out in this approach is the prejudice against the relevance of the text, 
manifested by the use of the adjective ‘raw’. There is in reality no legal concept of 
raw text. There is instead the concept of plain and ordinary meaning under Article 
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The practice of the ICJ shows that the reliance on the object and purpose of the 
treaty is a second step and may not contradict the textual interpretation in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms. In the Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island case, the ICJ relied on object and purpose of a treaty in order to “clarify the 
meaning to be given to its terms,”428 given the various meaning that could be 
conferred on the term “main channel” as employed in the Treaty of July 1, 1890, 
concluded between the United Kingdom and Germany. A similar approach was 
followed in the LaGrand case, in which the ICJ had to decide whether provisional 
measures ordered under Article 41 of its Statute should be binding.429 After 
considering the ordinary meaning of term “indicate” as employed in Article 41 
was not conclusive, the ICJ relied on the object and purpose of the Statute in order 
                                                                                                                                     
31 of the Vienna Convention. This provision speaks of ‘the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’. Thus, the ultimate task is to use context and object and purpose to find the 
meaning of the text. This is substantially different from the Panel’s projection of 
‘one holistic rule of interpretation than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a 
hierarchical order’. As for the Panel’s observation that ‘Text, context and object-
and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological 
methodologies of treaty interpretation’, these relevant factors of interpretation do not 
really refer to different methods that operate independently from, or as an alternative 
to, each other. These factors refer only to the methods of interpretation that are laid 
down in strict order of hierarchy under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
As the consistent jurisprudence of the Appellate Body demonstrates, neither context 
nor object and purpose are viewed as alternative to the plain textual meaning of 
words, which they would have to be unless their relevance was subordinated to that 
of the ordinary meaning of words 
[…] 
The essence of a ‘holistic’ approach seems to be the balance of interpretative 
outcomes under particular methods of interpretation. The ‘holistic’ approach in 
essence reflects the possibility of political factors impacting on the process of 
interpretation, and also the possibility that the decision-maker replaces the outcome 
of consensual agreement between States with what this outcome should be according 
to his own perception. In other words, the essence of the ‘holistic’ approach is about 
blurring the distinction between law and politics, and about promoting subjectivism 
in the process of interpretation” (Orakhelashvili, A., supra note 30, at 310-311). 
428
 Supra note 34, at 1072. 
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 Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that: 
“Article 41 
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that 
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to 
preserve the respective rights of either party.  
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall 
forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council” (39 AJIL Sup. 215 
(1945), at 224). 
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to conclude that the interpretation of the term “indicate” would entail that 
provisional measures ordered are binding on the parties.430 
The practice of the ICJ also shows that the object and purpose of a treaty cannot 
be used as an independent source of the intention of the parties in the 
interpretation of treaty provisions.431 In the Oil Platform case, in interpreting the 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights of August 15, 1955, 
concluded between Iran and the United States, the ICJ considered that, while it 
would take into account the object and purpose the interpretation of the treaty’s 
provisions, it could not rely on the object and purpose as an independent source in 
disregard of the other provisions of the treaty: 
“In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the objective of 
peace and friendship proclaimed in Article I of the Treaty of 1955 is 
such as to throw light on the interpretation of the Treaty provisions, 
and in particular of Articles IV and X. Article I is thus not without 
legal significance for such an interpretation, but cannot, taken in 
isolation, be a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court.”432 
In the practice of the PCIJ and of the ICJ prior to the codification of the general 
rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention, the principle of 
effectiveness was also applied as a secondary element in the interpretation of 
treaties. In the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex case, the PCIJ, 
interpreting the special agreement entered into by France and Switzerland, 
considered that “in case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement by which a 
dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence to their 
terms, be construed in a manner enabling the clauses themselves to have 
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appropriate effects.”433 In the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ, in interpreting the 
special agreement entered into between Albania and the United Kingdom, 
considering that the text of the special agreement would give rise to certain 
doubts, applied the principle of effectiveness in order to adopt the interpretation 
that would give effect to the provision contained in the special agreement: 
“In the first question of the Special Agreement the Court is asked: 
(i) Albania under international law responsible for the explosions and 
for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and 
(ii) is there any duty to pay compensation? 
This text gives rise to certain doubts. If point (i) is answered in the 
affirmative, it follows the establishment of responsibility that 
compensation is due, and it would superfluous to add point (ii) unless 
the Parties had something else in mind than a mere declaration by the 
Court that compensation is due. It would indeed be incompatible with 
the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision 
of this sort occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of 
purport or effect. […].”434 
In the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania 
case, the ICJ observed that the principle of effectiveness would not have the 
ability to allow an interpretation that is inconsistent with the text of the treaty: 
“The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: Ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, 
cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions for the 
settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which, as stated 
above, would be contrary to their letter and spirit.”435 
In the South West Africa cases, the ICJ refused to follow a teleological approach 
in the interpretation of treaty provisions: 
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“It may be urged that the Court is entitled to engage in a process of 
‘filling in the gaps’, in the application of a teleological principle of 
interpretation, according to which instruments must be given their 
maximum effect in order to ensure the achievement of their 
underlying purposes. The Court need not here enquire into the scope 
of a principle the exact bearing of which is highly controversial, for it 
is clear that it can have no application in circumstances in which the 
Court would have to go beyond what can reasonably be regarded as 
being a process of interpretation, and would have to engage in a 
process of rectification or revision. Rights cannot be presumed to exist 
merely because it might seem desirable that they should. […]”436 
In the light of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention and of the practice of the 
PCIJ and of the ICJ prior and subsequent to the codification, it is well settled that 
the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention does not admit 
any construction that goes beyond the text of the treaty. If the main source of the 
intention of the parties is the text of the treaty, which must be interpreted in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning, in order for the object and purpose of a 
treaty to have the effect of conferring a special meaning on a term, one would 
have to admit that the object and purpose could contradict the ordinary meaning of 
the term and, thus, contradict the text of the treaty. For this reason, although one 
of the main purposes of the ICSID Convention is the promotion of economic 
development through the flow of foreign investments, the object and purpose of a 
treaty may not be used to contradict the ordinary meaning of its terms and be used 
to confer a special meaning on a term “investment”. 
This construction may also be confirmed by the drafting history of the ICSID 
Convention. There is no indication that the Preamble of the ICSID Convention 
was ever intended to create a jurisdictional requirement whereby an ICSID 
tribunal would be allowed to deny the jurisdiction of the Centre based on the 
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argument that the dispute arises out an investment that does not contribute to the 
economic development requirement of the host State.437 Likewise, the drafting 
history of the ICSID Convention shows that it was not intended to confer on the 
meaning of the term “investment”, as employed in the wording of Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention, an element that could justify the existence of the economic 
development requirement.438 
The teleological character of the decisions that admitted the existence of the 
economic development requirement is evident. In the dissenting opinion to the 
MHS decision on annulment, Judge MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN asserts that “[i]f 
it is agreed that there are outer limits to an ICSID investment outside of the will of 
the parties, it is not arguable that those limits do not comprise a requirement for 
contribution to the economic development of the host State.”439 While Judge 
SHAHABUDDEEN admits that the economic development requirement “is not 
expressly laid down in the relevant texts,”440 he argues nonetheless that “a thing 
which is not expressly stated is yet law if it can be worked out from the 
context.”441 But the meaning of “context” in the dissenting opinion does not seem 
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to correspond to what the term means in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention.442 Most arguments used by Judge SHAHABUDDEEN in support of his 
interpretation are based on a purported real intention of the Contracting States not 
expressed in the text of the ICSID Convention, relied on as a primary means of 
treaty interpretation, which he inferred from the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention. 
The first ground on which the dissenting opinion is based is the Preamble of the 
ICSID Convention. Judge SHAHABUDDEEN considered that the reference to 
“economic development” in the Preamble evidences the fact that the ICSID 
Convention does not “contemplate economic development of entities divorced 
from the economic development of States.”443 According to him, “[a]n ICSID 
investment might indeed be made in favour of private entities but not for their own 
enrichment exclusively: only on the basis that, though made in favour of private 
entities, such an investment would — not might — promote the economic 
development of the host State.”444 In order to support this argument, the dissenting 
opinion relies on the fact the Centre was established under the auspices of the 
                                                 
442
 The Vienna Convention adopts a narrow meaning of “context”, which is intended to express the 
rule derived from the principle of integration, according to which the terms of a treaty must 
interpreted as a whole (supra note 87). The term “context” does not mean that a treaty must be 
interpreted in accordance with its historical or political context and the circumstances surrounding 
its conclusion. In accordance with Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention: 
“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty” (8 ILM 679 (1969), at 692). 
See Jabobs, F., supra note 411, at 335; Sinclair, I., supra note 34, at 127; Gardiner, R., supra note 
112, at 177-178; Wälde, T., supra note 5, at 754; Orakhelashvili, A., supra note 30, at 340. 
443
 Supra note 363, at 1107. 
444
 Idem. 
 172 
IBRD and on statements made in the Report of the Executive Directors,445 
according to which the conclusion of the ICSID Convention envisaged the 
promotion of economic development.446 
Moreover, Judge SHAHABUDDEEN considered that the economic development 
requirement could be inferred from the idea that no State would agree to incur the 
financial burden resulting from the establishment of the Centre if there were no 
benefits to the economic development of the host State. According to him, “[a] 
reasonable inference is that Contracting States did not agree that these burdens on 
them would apply to benefit transactions which did not promote the economic 
development of the host State.”447 However, this inference constitutes an attempt 
to justify the existence of purported real intention of the Contracting States not 
expressed in the text of the ICSID Convention. In addition, the dissenting opinion 
relies at this point on the opinion of SCHREUER that “it was always clear that 
ordinary commercial transactions would not be covered by the Centre’s 
jurisdiction.”448 This demonstrates the confusion between the questions as to 
whether ordinary commercial transactions would fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre and whether an activity or transaction must contribute to the economic 
development of the host State in order to comply with the investment requirement 
of the ICSID Convention. The fact that an investment is considered not to have 
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contributed to the economic development of the host State does not necessarily 
make such investment an ordinary commercial transaction. 
The dissenting opinion recognizes nevertheless that the documents pertaining to 
the drafting history of the ICSID Convention do not contain any indication that 
the existence of a jurisdictional requirement based on the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State was intended.449 Despite this fact, Judge 
SHAHABUDDEEN concluded that, if the existence of the economic development 
requirement could not be justified, there would be “nothing to separate an ICSID 
investment from any other kind of investment; in the result, an ICSID arbitration 
would be indistinguishable from any other kind of arbitration (and there are 
several) concerning an investment dispute.”450 This argument confirms that the 
interpretation advocated in the dissenting opinion lies in the idea that the purpose 
of fostering economic development would have the effect of conferring a special 
meaning on the term “investment”, necessary to “call back the organization to its 
original mission.”451 This is expressly admitted: 
“The effect of reasoning opposed to that advanced above is that, if it 
happens that an investment does not play a role in the economic 
development of the host State, that investment is nonetheless fully 
entitled to claim the protection of ICSID if it meets dictionary criteria 
of what is an investment. That is strange: one would have thought that 
an ICSID investment was a special kind of investment. A microscopic 
approach could no doubt reach a different result, but such a result 
would be at variance with the discernible motivation of the ICSID 
scheme which, in my opinion, was designed to contribute to the 
economic development of host States. That purpose is not 
satisfactorily put by merely stating that an ICSID investment plays a 
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role in the economic development of the host State; it has to be stated 
that such development is a condition of an ICSID investment.”452 
The basis of the dissenting opinion — the special meaning conferred on the term 
“investment” — is very similar to the arguments used in other decisions that 
admitted the economic development requirement. In CSOB, the tribunal 
considered that the wording of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention “permits an 
inference that an international transaction which contributes to cooperation 
designed to promote the economic development of a Contracting State may be 
deemed to be an investment as that term is understood in the Convention.”453 In 
the Salini decision, the tribunal made a clear distinction between the elements that 
“[t]he doctrine generally considers that investment infers”454 — which would be 
based on the ordinary meaning of investment — and the economic development 
requirement as an additional element, the existent of which would be detached 
from the other elements and could be inserted in the notion of investment “[i]n 
reading the Convention’s preamble.”455 In Mitchell likewise, the ad hoc 
committee supported its decision on the idea that “[t]he Preamble of the 
Washington Convention sets forth a number of basic principles as to its purpose 
and aims, which imbue the individual provisions of the Convention, including 
Article 25,”456 and made no reference to the ordinary meaning of investment. In 
the MHS award, the sole arbitrator expressly stated that the existence of the 
economic development requirement could be justified “taking a teleological 
approach to the interpretation of the ICSID Convention.”457 In his dissenting 
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opinion to the Abaclat decision on jurisdiction, Professor ABI-SAAB noted that 
“[t]he Preamble of the Convention clearly reveals its ‘developmental’ object and 
purpose, as a means of encouraging ‘international cooperation for development, 
and the role of private international investment therein’.”458  
What is common in all these decisions is that none of them attempted to justify 
their interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term 
“investment” as employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Their 
grounds were limited to the idea that the purpose of the ICSID Convention 
envisages the economic development of its Contracting States. Even though most 
decisions were allegedly applying the general rule of treaty interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention,459 these decisions engaged in a teleological interpretation that 
goes beyond the text of the ICSID Convention.460 As the ICJ observed in the 
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note 283, at para. 236). 
This type of approach can be compared with the interpretative approach adopted by the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in the interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950, 213 
UNTS 222, (entered into force September 3, 1953) (“ECHR”)), which, however, is inconsistent 
with the rules of treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention (see Sinclair, I., supra 
note 34, at 131-135). The decision rendered in the Golder case is one example of the interpretative 
approach adopted by the ECtHR. In this case, the majority of the ECtHR decided that Article 6.1 
of the ECHR implied the right of access to courts, although such right was not expressly conferred 
by the ECHR. While recognizing the applicability of the rules of treaty interpretation of the 
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Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania case, “[i]t 
is the duty of the Court to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them.”461 
2.3. Interpretation in Good Faith 
In the dissenting opinion to the MHS decision on annulment, Judge 
SHAHABUDDEEN asserted that “[a] reasonable inference is that Contracting States 
[of the ICSID Convention] did not agree that these burdens [— arising out of the 
expenditures of the Centre —] on them would apply to benefit transactions which 
did not promote the economic development of the host State.”462 The reliance on a 
“reasonable inference” raises the question as to whether the existence of the 
economic development requirement could be justified in interpreting the ICSID 
Convention in the light of the principle of good faith in accordance with the 
general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention.  
The application of the principle of good faith is usually found in the practice of 
ICSID tribunals in the interpretation of arbitration agreements, but not in the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention. In the case of Amco Asia Corporation 
and Others v. Indonesia (“Amco”), the tribunal noted that:  
                                                                                                                                     
Vienna Convention, the majority of the ECtHR, based on the object and purpose of the ECHR, but 
against its text, concluded that the existence of the right of access to courts could be justified by 
inference (see Judgment of February 21, 1975, 57 ILR 201 (1980), at 212-218). See Letsas, 
George, Intentionalism and the Interpretation of the ECHR, in Treaty Interpretation and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On 257 (Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, Elias, 
Olufemi, and Merkouris, Panos, eds., Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), at 259-263; 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties and the European Court of 
Human Rights, in 40 Years of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 54 (Orakhelashvili, 
Alexander, and Williams, Sarah, eds., London: British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2010). 
461
 Supra note 435, at 229. 
462
 Supra note 363, at 1107. 
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“In the first place, like any other conventions, a convention to arbitrate 
is not to be construed restrictively, nor, as a matter of fact, broadly or 
liberally. It is to be construed in a way which leads to find out and to 
respect the common will of the parties: such method of interpretation 
is but the application of the fundamental principle pacta sunt 
servanda, a principle common, indeed, to all systems of internal law 
and to international law. 
Moreover — and this is again a general principle of law — any 
convention, including conventions to arbitrate, should be construed in 
good faith, that is to say by taking into account the consequences of 
their commitments the parties may be considered as having reasonably 
and legitimately envisaged.”463  
In the decision, the Amco tribunal did not apply the principle of good faith in the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention, but relied on it in the interpretation of the 
extension of the parties’ consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The question 
before the tribunal was whether there was an agreement to consider a locally 
incorporated company as a national of another Contracting States for the purposes 
of the second clause of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.464  
The principle of good faith was also mentioned in the award rendered in the case 
of Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Senegal (“SOABI”). In the 
award, the tribunal observed that: 
“In the Tribunal’s opinion, an arbitration agreement must be given, 
just as with any other agreement, an interpretation consistent with the 
                                                 
463
 Decision on Jurisdiction of September 25, 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 389 (1993), at 394 – 
emphasis in the original. 
464
 As mentioned earlier, pursuant to the ICSID Convention, the nationality of juridical persons is 
defined in accordance with the place of incorporation or set criterion (see supra note 84). The 
second clause of Article 25(2)(b) provides, nevertheless, that “‘[n]ational of another Contracting 
State’ means […] any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be 
treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention” (1 ICSID 
Reports 3 (1993), at 9-10). It has been disputed in ICSID practice, however, whether the mere 
consent to ICSID arbitration entails an implied agreement to treat a locally incorporated company 
as a national of another Contracting States or whether the second clause of the Article 25(2)(b) 
entails an express agreement of the disputing parties (see Schreuer, C., supra note 23, at 296-301; 
Castro de Figueiredo, R., supra note 84, at 9, footnote 28). 
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principle of good faith. In other words, the interpretation must take 
into account the consequences which the parties must reasonably and 
legitimately be considered to have envisaged as flowing from their 
undertakings. It is this principle of interpretation, rather than one of a 
priori strict, or, for that matter, broad and liberal construction, that the 
Tribunal has chosen to apply.”465 
Similarly to the Amco decision, in SOABI the tribunal did not apply the principle 
of good faith in the interpretation of the ICSID Convention, but of the arbitration 
agreement that provided for the consent of the disputing parties to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre.466 
In commercial arbitration practice, it has been suggested that, in interpreting an 
arbitration agreement, the principle of good faith allows an arbitral tribunal to give 
primacy to true intention of parties over the declared intention if it is proved that 
the parties intended something different from what is stated in the arbitration 
agreement: 
“The first and most widely accepted principle of interpretation applied 
to arbitration agreements is the principle of interpretation in good 
faith. This principle does not of course mean, as is sometimes 
suggested, that to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration 
is necessarily an act of bad faith. In order for there to be bad faith, the 
existence and validity of the agreement on which a party seeks to 
renege must have been previously established. In fact, this rule of 
interpretation means that a party’s true intention should always 
prevail over its declared intention, where the two are not the same. An 
example of bad faith will be the conduct of a party relying on an 
argument of pure form, which is wholly out of context or plainly 
contrary to the structure or the purpose of the agreement, in a bid to 
evade obligations which it had clearly undertaken to perform but 
which were expressed in ambiguous terms. Here, ‘interpretation in 
good faith’ is simply a less technical way of saying that ‘when 
interpreting a contract, one must look for the parties’ common 
                                                 
465
 Award of February 25, 1988, 2 ICSID Reports 190 (1994), at 205-206. 
466
 See also CSOB, supra note 252, at 263; and Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil 
S.A. v. Ecuador, Award of August 18, 2008, 20(6) World Trade and Arb. Materials 189 (2008), at 
223-224. 
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intention, rather than simply restricting oneself to examining the literal 
meaning of the terms used.’ However, the moral connotation of the 
expression ‘interpretation in good faith’ is more in keeping with the 
tenor of general principles of law.”467 
Accordingly, one could argue that, in the light of the principle of good faith, the 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention reasonably expected that, given the 
object and purpose of the ICSID Convention to promote the economic 
development and the consequences of their obligations under the ICSID 
Convention, the contribution to the economic development of the host State would 
be an element of the jurisdiction of the Centre, even though there is no declared 
intention in the ICSID Convention that entails the economic development 
requirement. In other words, States grant access to the ICSID dispute settlement 
system in exchange for the contribution to their economic development by the 
transaction or activity carried out by the investor.468 
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 Gaillard, Emmanuel, and Savage, John, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), at 257-258 – emphasis 
added. 
468
 According to OMAR E. GARCÍA-BOLIVAR: 
“At a fundamental level, the arguments put forward in this chapter are grounded in 
the nature of the State itself. Inarguably, the welfare and development of their 
nationals and residents is of primary concern to States. It is also clear that in 
promoting that development, significant amounts of capital can be required. 
Accordingly, a range of strategies is often adopted by States to attract that capital, a 
key one of which is enhancing the domestic investment climate through entering 
into international legal instruments that provide protection to foreign investment. In 
concluding international investment agreements (IIAs), States agree to grant 
international protection to foreign investments — and, in return, they expect to 
attract the capital needed to promote their economic development. For host States, 
this assumption is a central, if often unarticulated, rationale behind the conclusion of 
the agreement. For this reason, it is important to consider the intention of States 
when entering into IIAs and to gain a proper understanding of why the treaties were 
concluded. This understanding could, in turn, influence the interpretation of the 
IIAs’ provisions under international law. The argument presented in this chapter is 
that this type of analysis should play an important role in the interpretation and 
application of IIAs, and in adjudicating fair solutions to the disputes that might arise 
between investors and States” (see supra note 50, at 586-487). 
See also Mortenson, J., supra note 257, at 258. 
 180 
Under the general rule of treaty interpretation, however, the principle of good 
faith does not have such effect. To allow the interpreter of a treaty to disregard the 
ordinary meaning of the text based on the idea that treaty interpretation should 
seek what the parties to the treaty reasonably expected would result in a direct 
contradiction with the principles of actuality and of ordinary meaning.469 The 
reference to “good faith” in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention has been 
interpreted as an indication that the task of treaty interpretation is to give effect of 
the intention of the parties.470 Interpretation in good faith would also be one of the 
grounds in the Vienna Convention for the application of the principle of 
effectiveness.471 In any case, interpretation in good faith does not have an 
independent function in the general rule of treaty interpretation.472 
                                                 
469
 According to FRANCIS G. JACOBS: 
“Taken in its broadest sense, the principle of good faith when applied to 
interpretation of treaties would amount to no less than a direct contradiction of the 
ordinary meaning rule. In its broadest sense the principle would require that the 
spirit of the agreement should prevail over the text, and it is invoked specifically to 
justify a departure from the literal terms of the document: semper in fide quid 
senseris, non quid dixeris cogitandum. 
Taken in the context of Article 27 of the Draft Convention, it is clear that the 
principle of good faith has a more restricted scope. What is less clear, at first sight, is 
what its precise significance is intended to be. Used as an integral part of the textual 
approach, it is presumably intended to restrain an excessive literalism. On the other 
hand, it is not to be construed to narrowly as merely to preclude a State from relying 
on an error in the wording of the text, since this eventuality provided for by Article 
74; nor even as simply precluding a State from relying on an error of substance in 
the treaty, a situation regulated by Articles 45 and 42. 
The role of good faith between these extremes must remain, in the absence of any 
direct guidance from the Commentary or from the practice of international tribunals, 
a matter for speculation. It might be taken more narrowly, as precluding a State from 
exploiting an ambiguity in the text or a genuine misunderstanding between the 
parties. Alternatively, more broadly, a State might be precluded, in certain 
circumstances, from advancing an interpretation contrary to its own previous 
practice, or contrary to the shared expectations of the parties” (Jacobs, F. G., supre 
note 126, at 333 – footnotes excluded). 
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 See Vitányi, Bela, Treaty Interpretation in the Legal Theory of Grotius and Its Influence on 
Modern Doctrine, 14 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 41 (1983), at 62; Gardiner, R., 
supra note 112, at 148. 
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 As noted by ROBERT JENNINGS: 
“The qualification ‘in good faith’ is the central component of the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda: it comprises and qualifies inter alia the principle of effectiveness — 
ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The ‘terms of the treaty … in their context’, that is 
to say the text, is indeed the primary place, but to be viewed ‘in the light of’ the 
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The principle of good faith is also linked to the idea that interpretation of treaties 
must be reasonable, in the sense that it prevents a party to the treaty from an 
interpretation that results in abuse of rights.473 To this effect, the principle of good 
faith directs the interpreter to adopt an interpretation that will not create 
ambiguities or lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.474 That is 
to say that, if the interpretation of the text of a treaty is clear enough in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context, the interpreter 
in good faith should not rely on a different interpretation that leaves the text of the 
treaty unclear.475  
The practice of the ICJ, however, does not provide for a clear picture of the 
application of the principle of good faith in the interpretation of treaties. The ICJ 
has usually referred to principle of good faith as “[o]ne of the basic principles 
governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their 
source,”476 which “obliges the Parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such a 
                                                                                                                                     
object and purpose of the treaty. Thus, the list of factors approach is rejected; but the 
rule adopted, though primarily textual, also incorporates with it, the principles of the 
‘object and purpose’ and of the intention of the parties, both of these firmly coupled 
to the agreed text as the accepted expression of them. Thus, the object and purpose, 
and the intention of the parties, are to be collected, primarily, from ‘the terms of the 
treaty in their context’. […]” (Jennings, Robert Y., Treaties, in International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects 135 (Bedjaoui, Mohammed, ed., Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), at 145 – footnotes excluded). 
See also Gardiner, R., supra note 112, at 148; Orakhelashvili, A., supra note 30, at 396-398. 
472
 See Gardiner, R., supra note 112, at 152. 
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 According to SINCLAIR, “[i]t is often said that that the principle of good faith in the process of 
interpretation underlies the concept that interpretation should not lead to result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable” (Sinclair, I., supra note 34, at 120). See also Gardiner, R., supra note 112, 
at 151, 157. 
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 See Linderfalk, U., supra note 88, at 45.  
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 In the dissenting opinion given in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judge KREA noted that “interpretation in 
good-faith implies that ‘if the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in 
their context, that is an end of the matter’” (Order of September 13, 1993, ICJ Reports 325 (1993), 
at 459). 
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 Nuclear Tests case, Judgment of December 20, 1974, ICJ Reports 253 (1974), at 268. 
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manner that its purpose can be realized.”477 But the application of the principle of 
good faith in the interpretation of treaties is scarce. The reference to good faith is 
normally linked with the duty of States to perform their legal obligations in good 
faith,478 as required by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.479 HUGH THIRLWAY, 
analyzing the practice of the ICJ on the interpretation of treaties from 1960 to 
1989, observed that: 
“One further preliminary remark is necessary: no reference will be 
found in the discussion below to the requirement stated at the outset of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention that ‘A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith…’. The simple and sufficient reason for this is that the 
Court has not, during the period under consideration, had to examine 
the significance of this requirement, whether under the Vienna 
Convention or in the general law of treaties. It is also to be observed 
that what may be in question is the good faith of the parties; an 
interpretation by the Court in which the Court itself was animated by 
something other than good faith is not to be thought of. […] 
It is however difficult to conceive circumstances in which the Court 
would find it necessary to reject an interpretation advanced by a party 
on the sole ground that it was not made in good faith. Such 
interpretation would almost certainly offend at the same time against 
some specific canon of interpretation; and the Court will be slow to 
accuse a State in its judgment of bad faith.”480 
The lack of application of the principle of good faith in the interpretation of 
treaties in the practice of the ICJ indicates that such principle, pursuant to the 
general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention, does not play a role 
as a factor of interpretation that is independent from or alternative to the text of 
the treaty. 
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 Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, Judgment of September 25, 1997, ICJ Reports 7 (1997), at 
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 See Gardiner, R., supra note 112, at 157. 
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 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention provides that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the 
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added). 
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 Thirlway, H., supra note 90, at 17-18 – footnotes excluded. 
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Accordingly, while one may argue that it is a reasonable inference that States 
would not agree to be bound by the ICSID Convention unless the jurisdiction of 
the Centre is limited or extends to disputes that arise out of transactions or 
activities that contribute to the economic development of the host State, such 
inference is not enough to create a requirement that contradicts the text of the 
ICSID Convention. Even though, in the light of the policies and goals that led to 
the conclusion of the ICSID Convention, it would be desirable to limit or to 
expand the jurisdiction of the Centre to dispute arising out of transactions or 
activities that contribute to the economic development of the host State, the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention may not disregard the hierarchy of 
elements provided for in the general rule of the Vienna Convention in order to 
achieve a result that the interpreter might consider more desirable or consistent 
with the reasonable expectation of the Contracting States of the ICSID 
Convention.481 
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 As observed by ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI:  
“With the adoption of articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, the hierarchically arranged 
rules of interpretation have overtly replaced the relevance of the imaginative impact 
as the schools of interpretation independently had. If the aim of interpretation is to 
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to which States parties never agreed” (Orakhelashvili, A., supra note 419, at 418-
419). 
 184 
3. ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
3.1. Territoriality of the Investment under the ICSID Convention 
Another problem of the decisions that, following the Salini approach, applied the 
economic development requirement in order to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Centre is that the existence of such requirement was based on assumptions that are 
inconsistent with Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.  
The first inconsistent assumption is that the economic development requirement 
implies that, in order to fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre, the investment 
must be made in territory of the State party to the dispute. In the Salini approach, 
the economic development requirement is defined as “the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State of the investment as an additional 
condition.”482 The term “host State” means the State that is receiving the 
investment and it was used in the decisions that followed the Salini approach to 
refer to the State party to the dispute. Accordingly, if the investment must 
contribute to the economic development of the State party to the dispute as the 
State that is receiving the investment, the investment must be made in the territory 
of the State party to the dispute. 
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 Salini, supra note 259, at 622 – emphasis added. Similarly, in Joy Mining, the tribunal pointed 
out that the investment “should constitute a significant contribution to the host State’s 
development” (supra note 261, at 500 – footnote excluded). In Bayindir, the tribunal considered 
that the investment “must represent a significant contribution to the host State’s development” 
(supra note 263, at 201 – footnote excluded). In the dissenting opinion to the MHS decision on 
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ILM 1105 (2009), at 1105 – emphasis added) and that “[t]he outer limits in this case included a 
requirement that an investment must contribute to the economic development of the host State” 
(idem – emphasis added.). 
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In his dissenting opinion to the Abaclat decision, Professor ABI-SAAB considered 
that “[t]he investment that the Convention seeks to encourage by providing it with 
an international procedural guarantee is that which contributes to the economic 
development of the host country.”483 In addition, Professor ABI-SAAB made an 
express reference to an inherent territorial requirement in the notion of investment 
within the meaning of the ICSID Convention that entails the investment to be 
made in the territory of the State party to the dispute: 
“A territorial link or nexus is inherent in the concept of ‘investment’ 
in article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The whole idea behind the 
Convention was to encourage the flow of private foreign investment to 
developing countries by offering an international guarantee in the 
form of an alternative neutral adjudication of disputes arising out of 
such investment in the territory of the host States, typically subject to 
its laws and courts.”484 
The Report of the Executive Directors contains several references that suggest the 
existence of a territoriality requirement that entails the investment to be made in 
the territory of the State party to the dispute. First, in its paragraphs 9 and 12, 
which state the general purposes behind the conclusion of the ICSID Convention, 
the Report of the Executive Directors the ICSID Convention envisages the flow of 
foreign investments into the territory of its Contracting States: 
“In submitting the attached Convention to governments, the Executive 
Directors are prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership 
between countries in the cause of economic development. The 
creation of an institution designed to facilitate the settlement of 
disputes between States and foreign investors can be a major step 
toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus 
stimulating a larger flow of private international capital into those 
countries which wish to attract it. 
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 Supra note 288, at para. 50 – emphasis added. 
484
 Ibid., at para. 74. See also Waibel, M., supra note 257, at 727. 
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[…] 
 
The Executive Directors believe that private capital will continue to 
flow to countries offering a favorable climate for attractive and sound 
investments, even if such countries did not become parties to the 
Convention or, having joined, did not make use of the facilities of the 
Centre. On the other hand, adherence to the Convention by a country 
would provide additional inducement and stimulate a larger flow of 
private international investment into its territories, which is the 
primary purpose of the Convention.”485 
In addition, the Report of the Executive Directors employs several times the term 
“host State” as a reference to the State party to the dispute. In its paragraph 13, the 
Report of the Executive Directors states that “the provisions of the Convention 
maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors and those of host 
States” and that “the Convention permits the institution of proceedings by host 
States as well as by investors.”486 Similar references are also made in paragraphs 
24 and 33 of the Report of the Executive Directors.487  
As discussed before, however, the Report of the Executive Directors is not part or 
an annex to the ICSID Convention and has very limited value in the interpretation 
of the ICSID Convention.488 Accordingly, one may not infer from the Report of 
the Executive Directors a jurisdictional requirement that is not set forth in the 
ICSID Convention.  
The ICSID Convention does not have any provision that requires the investment 
to be made in the territory of the State party to the dispute and makes no reference 
in its text to the term “host State”. The only reference from which a territoriality 
                                                 
485
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requirement of the investment may be inferred is contained in the first recital of 
the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, which refers to “the role of private 
international investment”489 and not merely to “investment” as Article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention does. Although the reference to “international investment” 
in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention has relevant consequences in the 
assessment of compliance with the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention, it does not create a requirement that entails the investment to be 
made in the territory of the host State. 
While Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention refers to “investment” without a 
qualification as to its territoriality, the use of the term “international investment” 
in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention indicates that the investment 
requirement of the ICSID Convention contains an element that places a territorial 
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Centre. As mentioned earlier, the reference to 
“context” in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention reflects the so-called 
principle of integration, pursuant to which the treaty must be interpreted as a 
whole.490 A rule that derives from this principle is that a term used on different 
occasions in a treaty must be assumed to have a consistent meaning.491 By the 
same token, the use of similar but not identical terms in a treaty indicates that the 
parties intended to confer different meanings on these terms.492 Applying this rule 
in the interpretation of the ICSID Convention, one could assume the meaning of 
the term “investment”, as employed in Article 25(1), is distinct from the meaning 
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of the term “private international investment” contained in the first recital of the 
Preamble. This idea, however, would lead to the conclusion that the ICSID 
Convention refers to two distinct things in the Preamble and in Article 25(1). But 
while the use of similar but not identical terms may indicate the intention of the 
parties to confer on them distinct meanings, another rule that also derives from the 
principle of integration is that it must be assumed that different provisions of a 
treaty do not contradict one another.493  
As seen before, the wording of the Preamble and of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention indicate the intention, which may be confirmed by the drafting history 
of the ICSID Convention, to confer on the Preamble a normative function in the 
delineation of the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention.494 And in the 
Preamble, the term “investment” is used in its second recital495 in direct reference 
to the term “private international investment”: 
“The first recital, which recognizes ‘the need for international 
cooperation for economic development, and the role of private 
international investment therein’ as the main purpose of the ICSID 
Convention, is the single express reference in the whole ICSID 
Convention to ‘economic development’, adopted by the Salini test, 
and to ‘international investment’. However, the following recitals 
cannot be understood without any reference to the first recital and 
especially to ‘international investment’. The second recital refers to 
‘the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in 
connection with such investment between Contracting States and 
nationals of other Contracting States.’ It is clear that the reference in 
the second recital to ‘such investment’ is a direct allusion to 
‘international investment’ contained in the first recital. Furthermore, 
the third and fourth recitals of the preamble recognize ‘that while such 
disputes would usually be subject to national legal processes, 
international methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain 
cases [and the] particular importance to the availability of facilities for 
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international conciliation or arbitration to which Contracting States 
and nationals of other Contracting States may submit such disputes if 
they so desire.’ The expression ‘such disputes’ contained in the third 
and fourth recitals is an allusion to the second recital. Consequently, it 
is not difficult to conclude that, although the first recital is the single 
indication of the foreign character of the notion of investment, the 
subsequent recitals of the ICSID Convention’s preamble are referring 
to disputes in connection with international investment.”496 
In this sense, the use of the term “investment” in the second recital, with the 
purpose of placing objective limits on the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID 
Convention, is a direct reference to the term “private international investment”. 
This indicates that the term “investment” was, in fact, employed in the ICSID 
Convention, including Article 25(1), with the same meaning. Otherwise, one 
would have to assume the existence of contradictory provisions in the ICSID 
Convention, to the extent that it would be dealing with two different things. 
For this reason, the reference to “international investment” in the Preamble of the 
ICSID Convention creates a territorial requirement as an element of the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. Within its ordinary meaning, 
the term “international investment” may be interpreted as a synonym for foreign 
investment, used in opposition to the concept of domestic investment,497 entailing 
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a transfer of capital from one country into another.498 This does not mean, 
however, that the investment must be made in the territory of the State party to the 
dispute. Provided that the transaction or activity is a foreign investment, there is 
nothing in the ICSID Convention that prevents from being submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre a dispute that arises out of an investment made in the 
territory of a third State. 
Differently from the ICSID Convention, however, most investment treaties 
contain a territoriality requirement that limits their scope to investments made in 
the territory of the contracting parties.499 For instance, Article 26 of the ECT, 
which provides for arbitration as a mechanism for the settlement of disputes 
between a Contracting Party to ECT and an investor of another Contracting Party, 
applies to “[d]isputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another 
Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the 
former.”500 But for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, the restriction 
contained in the investment treaties as to the territoriality of the investment is a 
matter of the scope of the consent given by the State party to the dispute and not a 
question as to whether the dispute complies with the investment requirement of 
the ICSID Convention.501 
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The issue of the territoriality of the investment was discussed in the Fedax case. 
As seen before, the dispute in this case arose out of promissory notes that were 
acquired by the claimant by of endorsement.502 Among other reasons, Venezuela 
challenged the jurisdiction of the Centre on the basis that the claimant did not 
make an investment in the territory of Venezuela. The tribunal, however, rejected 
Venezuela’s contentions based on the idea that, while the transaction might not 
have involved the physical transfer of funds into the territory of the host State, the 
relevant question was whether the funds were made available to and utilized by 
Venezuela. But in assessing the territoriality issue, the tribunal was not 
considering this issue as a requirement of the ICSID Convention, but as 
requirement of the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT: 
“Like a number of other bilateral investment treaties and multilateral 
arrangements, the Agreement [the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT] 
contains several references to investments made ‘in the territory’ of 
the Contracting Parties. In this context, the Republic of Venezuela has 
argued that Fedax N.V. does not qualify as an investor because it has 
not made any investment ‘in the territory’ of the Venezuela. While it 
is true that in some kinds of investments listed under Article 1(a) of 
the Agreement, such as the acquisition of interests in immovable 
property, companies and the like, a transfer of funds or value will be 
made into the territory of the host country, this does not necessarily 
happen in a number of other types of investments, particularly those of 
a financial nature. It is a standard feature of many international 
financial transactions that the funds involved are not physically 
transferred to the territory of the beneficiary, but put at its disposal 
elsewhere. In fact, many loans and credits do not leave the country of 
origin at all, but are made available to suppliers or other entities. The 
same is true of many important offshore financial operations relating 
to exports and other kinds of business. And of course, promissory 
notes are frequently employed in such arrangements. The important 
question is whether the funds made available are utilized by 
beneficiary of the credit, as in the case of the Republic of Venezuela, 
so as to finance its various governmental needs. It is not disputed in 
this case that the Republic of Venezuela, by means of the promissory 
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notes, received an amount of credit that was put to work during a 
period of time for its financial needs.”503 
The issue of the territoriality of the investment also arose in the cases of SGS 
Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan (“SGS Pakistan”) and of SGS 
Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines (“SGS Philippines”). In SGS 
Pakistan, referred to ICSID arbitration pursuant to the Switzerland-Pakistan 
BIT,504 the jurisdiction of the Centre was challenged because the transaction out 
of which the dispute arose “did not constitute an investment within the territory of 
Pakistan within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the [Switzerland-Pakistan] BIT 
[and not within the meaning of the ICSID Convention] because SGS’s obligations 
were performed outside Pakistan.”505 In SGS Philippines, like in the Fedax case, 
the territoriality of investment was discussed by the tribunal as a requirement of 
the investment treaty, the Switzerland-Philippines BIT,506 and not of the ICSID 
Convention: 
“In accordance with Article II, the BIT [the Switzerland-Philippines 
BIT] applies to ‘investments in the territory of the one Contracting 
Party made in accordance with its laws and regulations by investors of 
the other Contracting Party, whether prior to or after the entry into 
force of the Agreement’. The language is clear in requiring that 
investments be made ‘in the territory of’ the host State, and this 
requirement is underlined by other references to the territory of the 
host State in the BIT (see Preamble, para. 2, Articles II(1), (2), IV(1), 
(2), (3), VIII(2) and X(2)). In accordance with normal principles of 
treaty interpretation, investments made outside the territory of the 
Respondent State, however beneficial to it, would not be covered by 
the BIT. For example the construction of an embassy in a third State, 
or the provision of security services to such an embassy, would not 
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involve investments in the territory of the State whose embassy it was, 
and would not be protected by the BIT.”507 
In Fedax, SGS Pakistan and SGS Philippines, accordingly, the issue of the 
territoriality of the investment was addressed as a requirement of the relevant 
investment treaty and not as an element of the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention. None of these tribunals suggested that the ICSID Convention 
requires the investment to be made in the territory of the State party to dispute. 
3.2. Foreign Direct Investments and Foreign Portfolio Investments 
In his dissenting opinion to the Abaclat decision on jurisdiction, Professor ABI-
SAAB questioned whether the acquisition of bonds, as a foreign portfolio 
investment, could fulfill the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention. 
According to Professor ABI-SAAB, the mere availability of funds resulting from 
the bonds issuance was not enough; in order to fulfill the economic development 
requirement, the funds had “to be concretely traced, even at several removes, to a 
particular productive project or activity in the territory of the host country.”508  
Professor ABI-SAAB’s dissenting opinion was based on the idea that the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention limits the jurisdiction of the 
Centre to disputes arising out of foreign direct investments. According to him, 
“[d]irect foreign investment is then the ‘ideal type’ of investment (in the Weberian 
sense of the term) for ICSID purposes,”509 a notion of investment that would 
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be consistent with his “ideal” of economic development: “the expansion of [the 
host State’s] productive capacity, a contribution that presupposes a commitment 
to this task not only of economic resources, but also in terms of duration in time 
and the taking of risk, with the expectation of reaping profits and/or revenue in 
return.”510 
Accordingly, Professor ABI-SAAB would only admit that foreign portfolio 
investments could contribute to the economic development of the host State if it 
could be established a direct link between the funds resulting from such 
investments and “a particular productive project or activity in the territory of the 
host country,”511 once the funds resulting from the transaction “can be used to 
finance wars, even wars of aggression, or oppressive measures against restive 
populations, or even be diverted through corruption to private ends.”512 
Professor ABI-SAAB’s dissenting opinion is based, however, on a misleading 
assumption that the term “investment” for the purposes of the ICSID Convention 
envisages foreign direct investments and excludes foreign portfolio investments. 
According to him: 
“A clear distinction has to be made between the use of the term 
‘investment’ in the financial context and in the ICSID context. In 
financial markets, ‘investment’ covers the acquisition of any kind of 
assets such as deposit accounts, debt and equity securities, credit 
default swaps and derivatives. 
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This over-wide financial concept of investment is fundamentally 
different from the concept of investment envisaged when drafting the 
ICSID Convention and followed in its context since. […].”513 
As Professor ABI-SAAB explains, the ICSID dispute settlement system “is 
basically needed by private foreign direct investment, for it is this type of 
investment that once it is carried out in the host country, for example by building 
factories or establishing enterprises, falls under the imperium of the host State in 
terms of legislation and adjudication.”514 This, according to dissenting opinion, 
would create a presumption against the submission to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre of disputes arising out of foreign portfolio investments: 
“Direct foreign investment is then the ‘ideal type’ of investment (in 
the Weberian sense of the term) for ICSID purposes. But does it 
exhaust the ambit of ICSID jurisdiction ratione materiae? And if not, 
how far can an alleged investment depart from the ideal type and still 
be covered by the Convention, i.e. and still be considered as falling 
within the objective outer-limits set by article 25? 
This question arises particularly in relation to ‘portfolio investments’ 
and other financial negotiable products traded in the financial markets, 
which cover a wide spectrum ranging from standardized instruments 
such as shares, bonds and loans to structured and derivative products, 
such as hedges (of currencies, oil, etc.) and credit default swaps. 
Such widely dispersed off-the shelf financial products, with their high 
velocity of circulation and their remoteness, the same as their holders, 
from the State in whose territory the investment is supposed to take 
place (being traded within seconds at the touch of a button in capital 
markets, with no involvement or knowledge of the borrowing country, 
nor passage through the territory or the legal system of that State), 
seem at first blush to be worlds apart from the direct foreign 
investment model, which is usually long negotiated and extensively 
embedded in the legal environment of the host State. 
This raises acutely the question of the conformity of these financial 
products with the requirements of article 25 and evokes a kind of 
informal presumption that, because of their intrinsic characteristics 
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described above, they are excluded per se, i.e. automatically, from the 
protected or covered investments under the Convention.”515 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention does not make, however, any distinction 
between foreign direct investments and foreign portfolio investments. The 
reference to “directly”516 in the wording of Article 25(1) does not qualify the term 
“investment” as to limit the jurisdiction of the Centre to disputes arising out of 
foreign direct investments. As the Fedax tribunal observed: 
“In addition to the background of Article 25(1) of the Convention, 
there is also a problem of textual interpretation that the Tribunal must 
consider. The Republic of Venezuela has made the argument that the 
disputed transaction is not a ‘direct foreign investment’ and therefore 
could not qualify as an investment under the Convention. However, 
the text of Article 25(1) established that the ‘jurisdiction of the Centre 
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.’ 
It is apparent that the term ‘directly’ relates in this Article to the 
‘dispute’ and not to the ‘investment.’ It follows that jurisdiction can 
exist even in respect of investments that are not direct, so long as the 
dispute arises directly from such transaction. This interpretation is 
also consistent with the broad reach that the term ‘investment’ must be 
given in light of the negotiating history of the Convention”517  
The distinction between foreign direct investments and foreign portfolio 
investments is also not made in most investment treaties, which might play a 
supplementary role in the interpretation of the ICSID Convention as an element of 
the subsequent practice of the Contracting States.518 The broad definitions of 
investment contained in these treaties may evidence the idea shared by most of the 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention that foreign investments, regardless 
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of the type, direct or portfolio investments, do contribute to the economic 
development of the host State.519 
As economic development through the flow of foreign investments into 
developing economies was one of the main goals of the ICSID Convention,520 the 
rationale behind its conclusion was clearly based on the idea that foreign 
investments were a valuable source in order for developing economies to tackle 
their shortage of resources needed in the process of economic growth. Those who 
supported the conclusion of the ICSID Convention often relied on the benefits 
brought by foreign investments to developing economies. In the address made at 
the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the IBRD of September 30, 
1963, the president of the IBRD pointed out that: 
“My enthusiasm for the proposal to establish a conciliation and 
arbitration center is simply a reflection of my interest in exploring all 
possible ways in which the Bank can help to widen and deepen the 
flow of private capital to the developing countries. It is not the 
business of the Bank, nor of its President, to tell the developing 
nations within the Bank’s membership that they must accept private 
capital from abroad as a partner in their development efforts or what 
kind of price it is reasonable for them to pay in order to achieve such a 
partnership. Those are issues which our members, as sovereign 
nations, must decide for themselves. Whatever decisions they make, 
the Bank, as a non-political international organization, must and does 
accept without reservation. For my part, however, I believe that, to a 
great extent, the attitudes of many of the less developed countries 
toward foreign private investment are based on the outdated past 
rather than on present facts. And I am convinced that those of our 
members who adopt as their national policy a welcome for 
international investment — and that means, to mince no words about 
it, giving foreign investors a fair opportunity to make attractive profits 
— will achieve their development objectives more rapidly than those 
who not. For a country which is known to be hospitable to private 
investment will have access over the years to a much larger and more 
stable pool of capital than its neighbor which relies solely on 
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government-to-government aid. It will have access, too, to a much 
larger pool of industrial personnel — managerial, administrative and 
technical — and to a much larger mass of scientific and technological 
information than it could possible acquire in any other way. Most 
important of all, its economy will be stimulated and invigorated by the 
many different contacts, at many different levels, which a hospitable 
investment climate will make possible between enterprises and 
individuals within its own borders and those within the borders of the 
industrialized countries. None of these advantages is likely to be fully 
available to any nation whose government, however well motivated 
and however well administered, decides to relegate the private sector 
to a subordinate role.”521 
In another address made to the Board of Governors on September 7, 1964, few 
days before the adoption of the resolution of the Board of Governors that 
authorized the executive directors to formulate the ICSID Convention,522 the 
president of the IBRD, encouraging the members of the IBRD to vote in favor of 
the proposal to establish the ICSID dispute settlement system, emphasized the 
benefits provided by foreign investments: 
“The foreign investor, made to feel welcome, can be a most effective 
instrument of economic growth, not only because of the capital and 
technology he can provide, but equally because of the help he can 
extend in training the labor force and developing local managerial 
and supervisory skills. Consequently, we regard it as one of the 
important responsibilities of the Bank and IFC to do what we can to 
facilitate such investment. 
One possible measure to that end is multilateral investment insurance, 
the feasibility of which we have studied in the past and to which, at 
the request of the recent United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, we shall again be turning our attention. Another 
approach, which we have actively sponsored, is the establishment of 
international machinery which would be available to deal on a 
voluntary basis with investment disputes between governments and 
nationals of other states. This is proposed in the draft Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes on which the Executive 
Directors have submitted a report to you. If you agree, the Executive 
Directors, assisted by a committee of legal experts designed by 
interested governments, propose to work out a final text for 
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submission of governments in 1965 and I hope, early in 1965. This 
proposal, in my view, holds great promise. I recommend it and urge 
your unanimous approval of it.”523 
In those speeches, no distinction was made between the roles played by foreign 
direct investments and by foreign portfolio investments in developing economies. 
Like other institutions, such as the IBRD, ICSID dispute settlement system is a 
legacy of the postwar era. While the origins of the term “economic development” 
date from the nineteenth century, it was only after the World War II that its 
concept was developed and gained importance in the international community. At 
that time, the promotion of economic development became a goal of the 
international community,524 especially due to the decline of the former colonial 
powers, such as Great Britain and France, which resulted in the process of 
decolonization in Africa and Asia; and to the rise of communist governments 
supported by the Soviet Union, which led to the emergence of a new balance of 
power in international relations.525 The new goal of the international community 
was reflected in the establishment of the postwar institutions. Article 1(3) of the 
Charter of the United Nations included within “[t]he purposes of the United 
Nations” the achievement of “international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic […] character.”526 The constitution of the IBRD, with 
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the purpose of encouraging “the development of productive facilities and 
resources in less developed countries,”527 also evidences this new goal. 
At the outset, economic development was meant to describe a process that 
envisages the enhancement of life standards, which is mainly fostered by 
economic growth, defined in technical terms as the increase of the national gross 
product and income per capita rate of a country.528 Early theories of economic 
development, which emerged in reaction to the neoclassical economic thought, 
advocated the idea that the economic growth could only be achieved through the 
industrialization of developing economies.529 At this time, it was thought that the 
major problem for the industrialization of developing economies — and, 
consequently, for economic development — lies in the fact that developing 
economies were deficient in capital accumulation. Developing economies have, in 
general, low rates of savings, impairing capital accumulation and making 
investment scarce.530 In this scenario, foreign investment was seen as a relevant 
source for developing countries to overcome their lack of domestic savings and, 
thus, provide the needed investments for the industrialization of their economies 
(physical capital). Foreign investments would also increase the supply of foreign 
exchange and help developing economies, generally constrained by balance-of-
payments problems,531 to meet the import needs of the industrialization process.532 
Foreign investments, moreover, could also contribute to the economic 
development of the host State by providing human capital and technology. By the 
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end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, the lack of physical capital 
accumulation was not seen as the only cause of underdevelopment. While 
economic growth was still considered the key factor for economic development, 
the debate among development economists shifted its focus on physical capital 
accumulation, as the main source for economic growth, to the problems related to 
the lack of human capital and technology in poor countries. It was generally 
considered that developing economies had poor skilled workers and access to 
technology, which undermined the process of economic growth.533 In this sense, 
foreign investments, especially in the case of foreign direct investments, were a 
source for human capital and technology, providing the training of labor forces 
and the use of new techniques.534 
In this scenario, there is a general idea that foreign direct investments will always 
contribute in some way to the economic development of the host State by 
providing physical capital, human capital or technology, while the contribution of 
foreign portfolio investments to the economic development, on the other hand, 
due to the short-term character of such investments, is controversial.535 
Foreign direct investments, unlike portfolio investments, are more likely to create 
positive externalities in the host economy than portfolio investments. First, 
foreign direct investments involve new economic activities in the host economy, 
increasing the level of productivity and employment, benefiting other sectors of 
the economy by the rise of the income of the workers and revenue of the host 
State. Secondly, the establishment of new economic activities involves the 
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training of the labor force and the use of new technology, which may be applied in 
other economic activities and by domestic investors. Thirdly, foreign direct 
investments in infrastructure projects also benefit other economic sectors by 
reducing costs in other activities. Finally, new economic activities may increase 
the demand for goods and services in the host economy.536 
Foreign portfolio investments, on the other hand, do not generally involve the 
contribution in human capital and technology nor the establishment of an 
economic activity by the foreign investor. The most typical form of portfolio 
investments is the acquisition of shares in a company in an amount that does not 
give to the investor control over the company. Foreign portfolio investments 
provide nevertheless the host economy with financial resources coming from 
abroad that may be essential for the economic development process. The flow of 
foreign portfolio investments into the host State increases its foreign exchange 
reserves and, thus, mitigates problems pertaining to the balance-of-payments 
deficit. Foreign portfolio investments, moreover, increase the level of credit 
available in host economy and, thus, contribute to the creation of other economic 
activities.537 All these factors show that foreign portfolio investments do 
contribute to the economic development of the host State. In fact, the argument 
against foreign portfolio investments lies in the idea that the volatility of this type 
of investment and speed in which they may exit the host economy might cause 
more harmful effects than benefits, leading developing economies into financial 
                                                 
536
 Ibid., at 109-111. 
537
 See Vandevelde, K. J., supra note 57, at 123-124. 
 203 
crises, and not in the idea that such investments are not capable of providing 
elements necessary for the economic development.538 
Accordingly, in addition to the fact that the ICSID Convention does not make any 
distinction between foreign direct investments and foreign portfolio investments, 
the idea espoused in Professor ABI-SAAB’s dissenting opinion to the Abaclat 
decision that only foreign direct investments can contribute to the economic 
development of the host State is not accurate. Professor ABI-SAAB’s dissenting 
opinion is in fact based on a misconception of economic development — “the 
expansion of its productive capacity”539 —, which disregards the benefits of 
foreign portfolio investments to the host State’s economy. 
3.3. The Requirement of Significant Contribution to the Economic 
Development of the Host State 
Another difficulty of some of the decisions that admitted the existence of the 
economic development requirement is how the compliance with such requirement 
should be assessed by ICSID tribunals. In particular, some decisions considered 
the mere contribution to the economic development of the host State is not 
sufficient for a dispute to comply with the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention; the contribution to the economic development must be significant.  
Most decisions that applied the economic development requirement did not 
directly address this question, especially because the tribunals considered that the 
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contribution to the economic development of the host State was evident. In Salini, 
which involved the construction of a highway in Morocco, the tribunal laconically 
stated that “the contribution of the contract to the economic development of the 
Moroccan State cannot seriously be questioned. In most countries, the 
construction of infrastructure falls under the tasks to be carried out by the State or 
by other public authorities. It cannot be seriously contested that the highway in 
question shall serve the public interest.”540 In Jan de Nul, which involved a 
contract for the dredging of the Suez Canal, the tribunal asserted that “one cannot 
seriously deny that the operation of the Suez Canal is of paramount significance 
for Egypt’s economy and development.”541 Likewise, in Helnan, where the 
dispute arose out of investments made in the hotel industry of Egypt, the tribunal 
pointed out that “[a]s for the contribution to the development of the EGYPT’s 
development, the importance of the tourism industry in the Egyptian economy 
makes it obvious.”542 In Toto, which involved the construction of a highway in 
Lebanon, while the tribunal did not mention the criterion on which the decision on 
the fulfillment of the economic development requirement was made, it concluded 
that “[t]he project at hand is a major construction work that will facilitate land 
transportation between Lebanon, Syria and other Arab countries and thus increase 
Lebanon’s position as a transit country for goods from and to Middle East 
countries.”543 In Millicom, the tribunal decided that “the setting up and financing 
of a company operating a mobile telephone network […] allowed for encouraging 
the economic development of Senegal through the concessionary company.”544 
Given that the investments in these cases were made in relevant sectors of the 
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countries’ economies, it was not difficult for these tribunals to conclude that a 
particular investment contributed to the economic development of the host State, 
regardless of their individual characteristics. 
In other cases, however, the question as to whether the dispute complied with the 
economic development requirement was not straightforward. In Mitchell, which 
arose out of the seizure by military forces of a law firm owned by a national of the 
United States in Congo, the ad hoc committee considered that: 
“[T]he existence of a contribution to the economic development of the 
host State as an essential — although not sufficient — characteristic 
or unquestionable criterion of the investment, does not mean that this 
contribution must always be sizable or successful; and, of course, 
ICSID tribunals do not have to evaluate the real contribution of the 
operation in question. It suffices for the operation to contribute in one 
way or another to the economic development of the host State, and 
this concept of economic development is, in any event, extremely 
broad but also variable depending on the case..”545  
In Joy Mining, however, the tribunal pointed out that the investment “should 
constitute a significant contribution to the host State’s development.”546 And in 
assessing whether the investment contributed significantly to the economic 
development of the host State, the tribunal made a direct link with the amount of 
money involved in the transaction: 
“The duration of the commitment is not particularly significant, as 
evidenced by the fact that the price was paid in its totality at an early 
stage. Neither is therefore the regularity of profit and return. Risk 
there might be indeed, but it is not different from that involved in any 
commercial contract, including the possibility of the termination of the 
Contract. The amount of the price and of the bank guarantees is 
relatively substantial, as is probably the contribution to the 
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development of the mining operation, but it is only a small fraction of 
the Project. Certainly there is nothing here to be compared with the 
concept of ‘contrats de développement económique’ or even contracts 
entailing the concession of public services.”547 
Similarly, in MHS the sole arbitrator, in opposition to the approach followed in 
Mitchell, asserted that: 
“The Tribunal considers that the weight of the authorities cited above 
swings in favour of requiring a significant contribution to be made to 
the host State’s economy. Were there not the requirement of 
significance, any contract which enhances the Gross Domestic 
Product of an economy by any amount, however small, would qualify 
as an ‘investment’. […]. The Tribunal is therefore left only with the 
contributions made by the Claimant, and has to determine whether 
these contributions would represent a significant contribution to the 
host State’s economic development.”548 
In addition, the sole arbitrator noted that: 
“Any contract would have made some economic contribution to the 
place where it is performed. However, that does not automatically 
make a contract an ‘investment’ within the meaning of Article 25(1). 
As stated by Schreuer, there must be positive impact on a host State’s 
development.”549 
The view espoused by the sole arbitrator was supported by the dissenting opinion 
to the MHS decision on annulment given by Judge SHAHABUDDEEN. According to 
the dissenting opinion, the sole arbitrator “was correct in finding that the 
contribution to the economic development of the host State had to be substantial 
or significant.”550 As the argued: 
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“As recalled above, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention enjoins a 
search for the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ Whatever 
the strict sequence of the statutory steps, the search for the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of ‘investment’ sooner or later throws the searcher back on 
the understanding of the international legal community. The 
international legal community would have rejected out of hand the 
idea that any contribution to the economic development of the host 
State, however miniscule that contribution is, is sufficient to qualify 
the whole outlay as an ‘investment’ within the meaning of Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention. I am confident that the common 
understanding would have preferred the notion of a ‘substantial’ or 
‘significant’ contribution, as the Tribunal did.”551  
The majority of the MHS ad hoc committee concluded, however, that the idea 
advocated by the sole arbitrator constituted a manifest excess of power in the 
sense of Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention, once this idea places a 
condition on the jurisdiction of the Centre that is not found in the text of the 
ICSID Convention.552 While the MHS sole arbitrator observed that requirement of 
significant contribution does not mean that investments of relatively small cash 
sums can never amount to an ‘investment’,”553 the majority of the ad hoc 
committee considered that the requirement of significant contribution adopted in 
the decision of the sole arbitrator had the effect of introducing a monetary floor 
for the submission of disputes the jurisdiction of the Centre, a requirement that is 
not set forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. According to the decision 
of the majority, this interpretation of the ICSID Convention could be confirmed 
by the fact that, during its drafting process, a monetary floor for the submission of 
disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre was rejected and excluded from the final 
text of the ICSID Convention. For this reason, the sole arbitrator could not have 
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relied on a purported requirement of significant contribution in order to deny the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.554 
The first recital of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention states that the ICSID 
Convention was concluded considering “the role of private international 
investment” in the economic development. In considering the “role” of foreign 
investments to the economic development, the Preamble does not qualify the 
contribution made by the investment. It does not entail that the contribution must 
be significant or that the economic development must have effectively occurred.  
In addition, the main problem of admitting the requirement of significant 
contribution is that this requirement has the effect of placing a jurisdictional bar 
based on the size of the investment. There is nothing in the wording of Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention that the jurisdiction of the Centre is limited to 
disputes arising out of an investment of a particular size, excluding small and 
medium investments from the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention. And 
as pointed out by the MHS decision on annulment, the drafting history of the 
ICSID Convention confirms that the idea to place a monetary floor on jurisdiction 
of the Centre was rejected.555 Section 1(3) of Article IV of the Working Paper of 
June 5, 1962, the first draft version of the ICSID Convention, provided that:  
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“Except otherwise agreed between the parties, the Center shall not 
exercise jurisdiction in respect of disputes involving claims of less 
than the equivalent of one hundred thousand United States dollars 
determined as of the time of submission of the dispute.”556  
This provision was excluded from the subsequent drafts and was not included in 
the final text of the ICSID Convention. Therefore, there is nothing in the text of 
the ICSID Convention that could justify the existence of a monetary floor on the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. 
It must be noted, however, that the requirement of significant contribution to the 
economic development of the host State would only place a monetary floor on the 
jurisdiction of the Centre if the economic development requirement is applied in 
order to restrict the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID Convention and not to 
expand it. If the economic development requirement is applied following the 
Salini approach, as an additional condition in order for a dispute to fulfill the 
investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, the requirement of significant 
contribution would exclude small and medium investments from the jurisdiction 
of the Centre.  
On the other hand, following the CSOB approach, such exclusion would not 
happen, given that this approach is only applied in order to expand and not to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the Centre. For this approach, regardless as to whether 
the transaction or activity contributed to the economic development of the host 
State, the dispute would still fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre if the 
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transaction or activity out of which it arises qualifies as an investment within the 
ordinary meaning of the term.  
4. INVESTMENT TREATIES AS SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE IN THE APPLICATION 
OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
In case of Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania (“Biwater”), referred to ICSID 
arbitration pursuant to the Tanzania-United Kingdom BIT,557 the notion of 
investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention advocated in the Salini 
test — including the economic development requirement — was expressly 
rejected by the tribunal. According to the Biwater tribunal, the exclusion of a 
definition of the term “investment” in the text of the ICSID Convention was made 
with the idea that the Contracting States of the ICSID Convention would 
subsequently agree on a definition of investment: 
“In the Tribunal’s view, there is no basis for a rote, or overly strict, 
application of the five Salini criteria in every case. These criteria are 
not fixed or mandatory as a matter of law. They do not appear in the 
ICSID Convention. On the contrary, it is clear from the travaux 
préparatoires of the Convention that several attempts to incorporate a 
definition of ‘investment’ were made, but ultimately did not succeed. 
In the end, the term was left intentionally undefined, with the 
expectation (inter alia) that a definition could be the subject of 
agreement as between Contracting States.”558 
In addition, the Biwater tribunal noted that the elements of the Salini test 
contradicted not only the definition of investment contained in the Tanzania-
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United Kingdom BIT, but they are also inconsistent with most investment treaties, 
which set forth definitions of investment that are broader than the Salini test: 
“Further, the Salini Test itself is problematic if, as some tribunals have 
found, the ‘typical characteristics’ of an investment as identified in 
that decision are elevated into a fixed and inflexible test, and if 
transactions are to be presumed excluded from the ICSID Convention 
unless each of the five criteria are satisfied. This risks the arbitrary 
exclusion of certain types of transaction from the scope of the 
Convention. It also leads to a definition that may contradict individual 
agreements (as here), as well as a developing consensus in parts of the 
world as to the meaning of ‘investment’ (as expressed, e.g., in 
bilateral investment treaties). If very substantial numbers of BITs 
across the world express the definition of ‘investment’ more broadly 
than the Salini Test, and if this constitutes any type of international 
consensus, it is difficult to see why the ICSID Convention ought to be 
read more narrowly.”559 
The reliance of the Biwater decision on “a developing consensus in parts of the 
world as to the meaning of ‘investment’” leads to the idea that the definitions of 
investment set forth in investment treaties could be considered by ICSID tribunals 
in determining the content of the investment requirement of the ICSID 
Convention as evidence of the subsequent practice of the Contracting States. 
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As pointed out by the Biwater tribunal, the elements of the notion of investment 
advocated by the Salini test, including the economic development requirement, 
are not found in most investment treaties. With very few exceptions, most 
investment treaties set forth definitions of investment that are broader in scope 
than the elements of the Salini test. And while some investment treaties contain 
certain elements of the Salini test, none of them restricts its scope to disputes that 
arise out of an investment that contributes to the economic development of the 
host State or extends the scope to the disputes arising out a transaction or activity 
that, although it is not an investment within the ordinary meaning of the term, 
contributed to the economic development of the host State. For instance, the 
investment chapter of the Chile-United States FTA provides in its Article 10.27 
that “investment means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such 
characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of 
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”560 Such characteristics of investment 
may also be found in the definitions of investment contained in recent model 
BITs, such as the 2012 United States Model BIT561 and the 2007 Norwegian 
Model BIT.562 These instruments, however, represent a very small minority. The 
overwhelming majority of investment treaties do not entail the fulfillment of the 
elements of the Salini test in order for an activity or transaction to qualify as an 
investment. 
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Before the Biwater decision was rendered, the view that the definition of 
investment contained in investment treaties should be considered as evidence of 
subsequent practice was suggested in the case of Mihaly International 
Corporation v. Sri Lanka (“Mihaly”). In this case, submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the Centre pursuant to the Sri Lanka-United States BIT,563 the tribunal had to 
decide whether expenditures incurred by the claimant in the development of a 
project that was never initiated could qualify as an investment for the purposes of 
the ICSID Convention. The dispute arose out of the non-conclusion by Sri Lanka 
of a contract for the construction of a power plant in the country, after 
negotiations between the disputing parties failed. The claimant alleged that the 
failure of Sri Lanka to conclude the contract violated the provisions of the BIT. 
Sri Lanka, however, argued that the dispute would not fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Centre, to the extent that the expenditures incurred by the claimant in the 
development of the project would be mere pre-investment expenditures and would 
not qualify as an investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, unless the 
host State had committed itself through a contract or had consented to receive or 
to admit the investment in the country. The tribunal concurred with the arguments 
of Sri Lanka and dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds.564  
In reaching its decision, the tribunal considered the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention “as an objective requirement” and the definition of investment 
set forth in the BIT “as part of the consent of the disputing Parties.”565 The 
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tribunal noted nevertheless that the meaning of the term “investment”, as 
employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, could be determined by the 
subsequent practice of the Contracting States: 
“The most crucial and controversial contentions of the Parties were 
concentrated upon the existence vel non of an ‘investment’ for the 
purpose of Article 25(1) to found the jurisdiction of ICSID Centre and 
the Tribunal. A fortiorissime, without proof of an ‘investment’, there 
can be no dispute, legal or otherwise, arising directly or indirectly out 
of it, which could be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Centre and 
the Tribunal. 
Neither Party asserted that the ICSID Convention contains any precise 
a priori definition of ‘investment’. Rather the definition was left to be 
worked out in the subsequent practice of States, thereby preserving its 
integrity and flexibility and allowing for future progressive 
development of international law on the topic of investment.”566 
The tribunal noted further that the evidence of such subsequent practice would be 
found in the decisions of ICSID tribunals and in investment treaties: 
“In the absence of a generally accepted definition of investment for 
the purpose of the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal must examine the 
current and past practice of ICSID and the practice of States as 
evidenced in multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements binding 
on States, notably the United States-Sri Lanka BIT. It is for the 
Tribunal to determine the meaning or definition of ‘investment’ for 
this purpose as a question of law. Opinions of experts on the theory 
and practice of multinational corporations are not to be identified with 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, which as such constitute subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. Only subject to Article 59 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice are judicial decisions to be 
considered as such subsidiary sources of law.”567 
The analysis of investment treaties as an element of subsequent practice in the 
interpretation of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention may serve 
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two purposes. First, the definitions of investment contained in such treaties might 
also provide elements for the achievement of the ordinary meaning of the term 
“investment” for the purposes of the ICSID Convention. This analysis is also 
relevant especially due to the fact that the meaning (or meanings) of the term 
“investment” existing in 1965, when the ICSID Convention was concluded, might 
have changed. The possibility of temporal variations of the ordinary meaning of a 
term raises the question as to whether the term “investment”, as employed in the 
ICSID Convention, should be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
it had at the time of the conclusion of the ICSID Convention, or with the current 
ordinary meaning of the term if such meaning changed.  
Pursuant to the sixth major principle of treaty interpretation identified by 
FITZMAURICE, the so-called principle of contemporaneity, “[t]he terms of a treaty 
must be interpreted according to the meaning which they possessed, or which 
would have been attributed to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage, at 
the time when the treaty was originally concluded.”568 The principle of 
contemporaneity is founded on the idea that, if the purpose of treaty interpretation 
is to reveal the intention of the parties, the text of the treaty, as the main source of 
the intention of the parties, has to be understood in accordance with the meaning 
the parties intended to give to the terms. Accordingly, the starting-point of the 
interpretation of a treaty must be based on the ordinary meaning its terms had at 
the time that the treaty was originally concluded.569  
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The principle of contemporaneity finds support in the practice of the ICJ. In the 
Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco case, in 
determining the meaning of certain terms employed in two treaties concluded 
between Morocco and the United States in 1787 and 1836, the ICJ observed that 
“in construing the provisions of Article 20 — and, in particular, the expression 
‘shall have any dispute with each other’ — it is necessary to take into account the 
meaning of the word ‘dispute’ at the time when the two treaties were 
concluded.”570  
This does not mean, however, that the interpreter is prevented from taking into 
account temporal variations of the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty. The 
question as to whether one should interpret a term of a treaty in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, or with 
its current ordinary meaning, is contingent upon the specific wording adopted in 
the treaty. Generic terms employed in treaties with continuing duration are 
assumed to be intended to follow temporal variations of their ordinary meaning.571  
In the case concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), interpreting the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, which was concluded in 1919, the ICJ observed that: 
“Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument 
in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its 
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conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the 
concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant — ‘the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world’ and ‘the well-being and 
development’ of the peoples concerned — were not static, but were by 
definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the 
‘sacred trust’. The parties to the Covenant must consequently be 
deemed to have accepted them as such.”572 
Likewise, in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ concluded that the use 
of a generic term creates the presumption that such term was employed with the 
intention to follow temporal variations of its ordinary meaning. In this case, the 
ICJ had to decide whether the expression “the territorial status”, contained in the 
instrument of accession of Greece to the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes of 1928, could be deemed to refer to the rights over the 
continental shelf. This question arose out of the fact that, at the time that Greece 
acceded to the General Act in 1931, the concept of continental shelf had not been 
developed in international law. The ICJ, however, noted that: 
“Once it is established that the expression ‘the territorial status of 
Greece’ was used in Greece’s instrument of accession as a generic 
term denoting any matters comprised within the concept of territorial 
status under general international law, the presumption necessarily 
arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law 
and to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the 
law in force at any given time.”573 
In the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, the ICJ noted that “[i]n order to illuminate 
meaning of the words agreed upon in 1890, there is nothing that prevents the 
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Court from taking into account the present-day state of scientific knowledge, as 
reflected in the documentary material submitted to it by the Parties.”574 
In the Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 
the ICJ interpreted a term employed in a treaty concluded in 1858 in accordance 
with its current ordinary meaning and not with the meaning the term had at the 
time that the treaty was concluded. In this case, the question before the ICJ was 
whether the term “comercio”, as employed in a treaty concluded by Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua in 1858, should be interpreted as referring exclusively to 
commerce of goods or could be deemed to include services providing the 
transport of persons. The ICJ decided that, once “comercio” was a generic term, 
used in a treaty entered into for an unlimited duration, it had to be understood in 
the light of the ordinary meaning of the term existing at the time of the application 
of the treaty. According to the decision: 
“It is true that the terms used in a treaty must be interpreted in light of 
what is determined to have been the parties’ common intention, which 
is, by definition, contemporaneous with the treaty’s conclusion. That 
may lead a court seised of a dispute, or the parties themselves, when 
they seek to determine the meaning of a treaty for purposes of good-
faith compliance with it, to ascertain the meaning a term had when the 
treaty was drafted, since doing so can shed light on the parties’ 
common intention. The Court has so proceeded in certain cases 
requiring it to interpret a term whose meaning had evolved since the 
conclusion of the treaty at issue, and in those cases the Court adhered 
to the original meaning […]. 
This does not however signify that, where a term’s meaning is no 
longer the same as it was at the date of conclusion, no account should 
ever be taken of its meaning at the time when the treaty is to be 
interpreted for purposes of applying it. 
On the one hand, the subsequent practice of the parties, within the 
meaning of Article 31 (3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, can result in a 
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departure from the original intent on the basis of a tacit agreement 
between the parties. On the other hand, there are situations in which 
the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the treaty was, or may be 
presumed to have been, to give the terms used — or some of them — 
a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for 
all, so as to make allowance for, among other things, developments in 
international law. In such instances it is indeed in order to respect the 
parties’ common intention at the time the treaty was concluded, not to 
depart from it, that account should be taken of the meaning acquired 
by the terms in question upon each occasion on which the treaty is to 
be applied.”575 
Referring to the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ noted that the 
decision given in that case “is founded on the idea that, where the parties have 
used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been aware that the 
meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has 
been entered into for a very long period or is ‘of continuing duration’, the parties 
must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an 
evolving meaning.”576 
The practice of the ICJ allows the conclusion that the term “investment”, as 
employed in the text of the ICSID Convention, may be deemed to have been used 
as a generic term and, for this reason, there is the presumption that its terms must 
be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning existing at the time of the 
application of the ICSID Convention. But whether or not the definitions of 
investment contained in investment treaties may be used in the determination of 
the current ordinary meaning of the term “investment” is contingent upon the 
question as to whether these treaties qualify as subsequent practice for the 
purposes of the Vienna Convention. 
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In accordance with Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, “[t]here shall be 
taken into account, together with the context […] any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation.”577 While investment treaties seem to meet the requirement that 
the subsequent practice must be “in the application of the treaty”,578 investment 
treaties do not easily comply with the condition that the subsequent practice must 
establish “the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”  
The first element of this condition is that the subsequent practice must establish an 
“agreement”; it must demonstrate a common understanding of the parties as to the 
meaning of the interpreted treaty.579 For the purposes of the Vienna Convention, 
in order for investment treaties to be considered subsequent practice in the 
application of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, it must be 
demonstrated that in these treaties the Contracting States share a common 
understanding as to the meaning of the term “investment” set forth in Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention. This condition may be deemed to be fulfilled by 
the fact that when a Contracting State enters into an investment treaty that 
provides for the submission of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre, it is 
aware of the requirements set forth in the ICSID Convention. Accordingly, if the 
Contracting State agrees that the disputes arising out of the investment treaty may 
be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Centre, there is no difficulty to conclude 
that the Contracting State agrees that these disputes comply with the requirements 
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of the ICSID Convention. In this sense, if the Contracting State agrees in an 
investment treaty that a dispute arising out of an investment as described in the 
treaty may be referred to ICSID arbitration, the Contracting State is in agreement 
that the definition of investment set forth in the investment treaty complies with 
the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention.580 To conclude otherwise, 
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economic activity, and when the BIT provides that disputes between investors and 
States relating to such activity may be resolved through ICSID arbitration, it is 
appropriate to interpret the BIT as reflecting the State’s understanding that that 
activity constitutes an ‘investment’ within the meaning of the ICSID Convention as 
well. That judgment, by States that are both parties to the BIT and Contracting 
States to the ICSID Convention, is entitled to great deference. A tribunal would have 
to have very strong reasons to hold that the States’ mutually agreed definition of 
investment should be set aside” (supra note 285, at para. 314 – footnote excluded, 
emphasis in the original). 
In Abaclat, in opposition to the Salini test, the tribunal observed that: 
“If Claimants’ contributions were to fail the Salini test, those contributions — 
according to the followers of this test — would not qualify as investment under 
Article 25 ICSID Convention, which would in turn mean that Claimants’ 
contributions would not be given the procedural protection afforded by the ICSID 
Convention. The Tribunal finds that such a result would be contradictory to the 
ICSID Convention’s aim, which is to encourage private investment while giving the 
Parties the tools to further define what kind of investment they want to promote. It 
would further make no sense in view of Argentina’s and Italy’s express agreement to 
protect the value generated by these kinds of contributions. In other words — and 
from the value perspective — there would be an investment, which Argentina and 
Italy wanted to protect and to submit to ICSID arbitration, but it could not be given 
any protection because — from the perspective of the contribution — the investment 
does not meet certain criteria. Considering that these criteria were never included in 
the ICSID Convention, while being controversial and having been applied by 
tribunals in varying manners and degrees, the Tribunal does not see any merit in 
following and copying the Salini criteria. The Salini criteria may be useful to further 
describe what characteristics contributions may or should have. They should, 
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one would have to assume that the Contracting State acted in a contradictory 
manner, to the extent that there would be a conflict between the definition of 
investment set forth in the investment treaty and the provision allowing investors 
to submit to ICSID arbitration disputes that comply with the requirement of the 
investment treaties, including the definition of investment.581 As seen before, a 
rule that derives from the principle of integration is that the provisions of a treaty 
form a unity that must be assumed to have a consistent meaning and be free of 
contradictions.582 
                                                                                                                                     
however, not serve to create a limit, which the Convention itself nor the Contracting 
Parties to a specific BIT intended to create” (supra note 285, at para. 364). 
581
 As observed by GAILLARD, “it is thus difficult to imagine that the drafters of investment 
protection treaties who included the ICSID option after having broadly defined covered 
investments could have envisaged that some of the transactions so defined could nonetheless be 
excluded from the Centre’s jurisdiction because they do not constitute an investment under Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention” (Gaillard, E., supra note 54, at 410).  
In Bureau Veritas, after the tribunal concluded that the dispute complied with the definition of 
investment set forth in the investment treaty which provided for the submission of disputes to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, it noted that: 
“Having concluded that BIVAC made an ‘investment’ within the meaning of the 
BIT, the question arises whether a different conclusion arises in relation to the 
meaning of ‘investment’ in the ICSID Convention. At a formal level, the question 
may be put as follows: does the definition in the BIT exceed what is permissible 
under the Convention? Framed in that way the answer is self-evidently negative. The 
definition in the BIT follows the approach adopted in many other BITs concluded 
around the world. Paraguay would have to argue that its own BIT is inconsistent 
with the requirements of the ICSID Convention. Sensibly, it has chosen not to go 
down that path” (supra note 34, at para. 94). 
In AFT, on the other hand, where an non-ICSID tribunal applied the Salini test in the assessment of 
the compliance with the definition of investment contained in the Slovak-Switzerland BIT, the 
tribunal considered that the ICSID arbitration option given to investors meant that “although the 
BIT gives a broad ‘investment’ definition, the two Contracting States must have inevitably 
intended to refer to what constitutes ‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention as concretely 
applied in the relevant case-law” (supra note 283, at para. 239). The difficulty of the decision is 
that, when the Slovak-Switzerland BIT was concluded in 1990, there were very few cases 
concerning the notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention and the 
decisions that indicated the existence of such notion of investment were rendered years after the 
conclusion of the BIT (see supra at pp. 29 et seq.). 
582
 See supra note 491. 
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A typical example of such situation may be found, for instance, in the Germany-
Guyana BIT.583 In accordance with its Article 11(2): 
“If the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the date when it 
has been raised by one of the parties in dispute, it shall, at the request 
of either of the parties to the dispute be submitted for arbitration. 
Unless the parties in dispute agree otherwise, the dispute shall be 
submitted for arbitration under the Convention of 18 March 1965 on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States.”584  
It may be inferred from the language of the BIT that the Contracting State party to 
the investment treaty considered that all disputes referred to ICSID arbitration 
pursuant to the BIT would comply with the requirements of the ICSID 
Convention and, for this reason, one may consider that the Contracting State 
assumes that the disputes that fulfill the definition of investment of the BIT also 
meet the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention.  
On the other hand, a typical example of a situation where the submission of a 
dispute to the jurisdiction of the Centre is contingent upon the agreement of the 
disputing parties may be in found in the Argentina-United Kingdom BIT.585 
Pursuant to Article 8 of the BIT, the investor has the option of submitting disputes 
to international arbitration. However, by virtue of Article 8(3), if the dispute is 
referred to international arbitration, the disputing parties have to agree either to 
submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of the Centre or to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal 
                                                 
583
 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Co-operative Republic of Guyana 
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of December 6, 1989 
(entered into force March 8, 1994). 
584
 Available at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_guyana.pdf>, (last 
visited on June 1, 2009). 
585
 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments of December 11, 1990 (entered into force February 19, 1993). 
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constituted pursuant to the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL tribunal”). If the disputing parties 
cannot reach an agreement, the dispute must be referred to a UNCITRAL 
tribunal.586 In this case, there is no clear indication that the Contracting State 
agreed that all disputes referred to arbitration pursuant to the investment treaty 
would comply with the requirements of the ICSID Convention. In particular, a 
Contracting State may not agree to submit a dispute to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre precisely because it does not agree that such dispute arises out of an 
investment in the sense of the ICSID Convention. For this reason, investment 
                                                 
586
 Article 8(1), (2) and (3) of the Argentina-United Kingdom BIT provides that: 
“(1) Disputes with regard to an investment which arise within the terms of this 
Agreement between an investor of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting 
Party, which have not been amicably settled shall be submitted, at the request of one 
of the Parties to the dispute, to the decision of the competent tribunal of the 
Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made. 
(2) The aforementioned disputes shall be submitted to international 
arbitration in the following cases: 
(a) if one of the Parties so requests, in any of the following circumstances: 
(i) where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment 
when the dispute was submitted to the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in 
whose territory the investment was made, the said tribunal has not given its final 
decision; 
(ii) where the final decision of the aforementioned tribunal has been made 
but the Parties are still in dispute; 
(b) where the Contracting Party and the investor of the other Contracting 
Party have so agreed. 
(3) Where the dispute is referred to international arbitration, the investor and 
the Contracting Party concerned in the dispute may agree to refer the dispute either 
to: 
(a) the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(having regard to the provisions, where applicable, of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, 
opened for signature at Washington DC on 18 March 1965 (provided that both 
Contracting Parties are Parties to the said Convention) and the Additional Facility 
for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding Proceedings); 
or 
(b) an international arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal to be appointed 
by a special agreement or established under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
If after a period of three months from written notification of the claim there is no 
agreement to one of the above alternative procedures, the Parties to the dispute shall 
be bound to submit it to arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law as then in force. The Parties to the 
dispute may agree in writing to modify these Rules” (available at 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_argentina.pdf>, (last visited 
on June 1, 2009)). 
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treaties that do not establish the unconditional offer of consent may not be 
considered as subsequent practice for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention. 
Investment treaties would also not qualify as subsequent practice in the 
application of the ICSID Convention in the sense of the Vienna Convention if the 
investment treaty provides that the submission of the dispute to the jurisdiction of 
the Centre is contingent upon the compliance with requirements set forth in the 
ICSID Convention. One example of such investment treaties is the Czech 
Republic-Ireland BIT.587 Pursuant to Article 8(2)(a) of the BIT: 
“If any dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and the 
other Contracting Party cannot be thus settled within a period of six 
months from the written notification of a claim, the investor shall be 
entitled to submit the case either to: (a) the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) having regard to the 
applicable provisions of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 
opened for signature at Washington D.C. on 18 March 1965.”588  
Although the BIT provides for an unconditional offer of consent, the wording 
“having regard to the applicable provisions of the [ICSID Convention]” suggests 
that this option is only available if the dispute fulfills the requirements of the 
ICSID Convention. In this case, it could be suggested that the Contracting State 
did not consider that all disputes arising out of the investment treaty would 
comply with the requirements of the jurisdiction of the Centre.  
                                                 
587
 Agreement between the Czech Republic and Ireland for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments of June 28, 1996 (entered into force August 1, 1997). 
588
 Available at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech_ireland.pdf>, (last visited 
on June 1, 2009) – emphasis added. 
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Accordingly, an investment treaty will qualify as subsequent practice for the 
purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention if the offer of consent to 
the jurisdiction of the Centre provided by the Contracting State in the investment 
treaty is not contingent upon any further subsequent action of acceptance by the 
disputing State, but it is entirely up to the investor and such choice is not 
expressly limited by the fulfillment of requirements other than those set forth in 
the investment treaty. 
Moreover, the second element entailed by Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention is that the subsequent practice must establish the agreement of the 
“parties”. For the purposes of the Vienna Convention, “‘party’ means a State 
which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in 
force.”589 Consequently, the investment treaty may only qualify as subsequent 
practice of a Contracting State in the sense of the Vienna Convention if the State 
party to the investment treaty was a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention at 
the time that the treaty was concluded. For this reasons, investment treaties such 
as the Argentina-United States BIT590 would not fulfill the requirements of Article 
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention in relation to Argentina, once Argentina was 
not a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention at the time of its conclusion.591  
                                                 
589
 Article 2(1)(g) of the Vienna Convention, 8 ILM 679 (1969), at 681. 
590
 Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment of November 14, 1991 (entered into force 
October 20, 1994). 
591
 The Argentina-United States BIT was concluded on November 14, 1991. Argentina, however, 
only became a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention on November 18, 1994, thirty days after 
the deposit of its instrument of ratification (see 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDataRH&reqFrom=Main&ac
tionVal=ViewContractingStates&range=A~B~C~D~E>, (last visited on February 1, 2009).  
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In addition, this second element requires that the subsequent practice must 
establish an agreement that is attributable to all parties to the treaty. This seems to 
be the main difficulty of admitting the definitions of investment set forth in 
investment treaties as subsequent practice for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of 
the Vienna Convention. Contracting States such as Bahamas, Fiji, Micronesia, 
Samoa and the Solomon Islands are not parties to investment treaties,592 and other 
Contracting States, while parties to investment treaties, might not be parties to 
investment treaties that fulfill all the elements of Article 31(3)(b). 
In the comments to Article 27(3)(b) of the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of 
Treaties, the draft version of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention,593 the 
ILC noted that “[i]t considered that the phrase ‘the understanding of the parties’ 
necessarily means ‘the parties as whole’.”594 The ILC explained, however, that it 
was not required that “every party must individually have engaged in the practice 
[but] it suffices that it should have accepted the practice.”595 Accordingly, the fact 
                                                 
592
 According to the databases of the Centre (see 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=
ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main>, (last visited on February 1, 2009)), of the Organization of 
American State's Foreign Trade Information System (see <http://www.sice.org>, (last visited on 
February 1, 2009)), and of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (see 
<http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx>, (last visited on February 1, 
2009)). 
593
 The wording of Article 27(3)(b) of the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties was adopted 
in Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention without few modifications. Article 27(3)(b) provided 
that “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context […] [a]ny subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which established the understanding of the parties regarding its 
interpretation” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, at 218).  
594
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, at 222.  
595
 Idem. This comment was meant to explain the effects of the changes made in the wording of the 
earlier version of Article 27(3)(b) of the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties. In the 2004 
version of the ILC Draft Article on the Law of Treaties, Article 69(3)(b) provided that “[t]here 
shall also be taken into account, together with the context […] [a]ny subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which clearly establishes the understanding of all the parties regarding its 
interpretation” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, vol. II, at 199 – emphasis 
added). The exclusion of “all” in the final draft was intended to avoid the idea that each party must 
have actively contributed to the subsequent practice in order to be considered. See also Elias, T. 
O., The Modern Law of Treaties (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1974), at 76; Sinclair, I., supra note 34, at 
138; McGinley, G., supra note 121, at 216-217; Linderfalk, U., supra note 88, at 167; Gardiner, 
 228 
that not all Contracting States of the ICSID Convention have concluded 
investment treaties that meet the requirements of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention is not conclusive. The subsequent practice reflected in investment 
treaties could still fall within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention if one considers that the Contracting States that have not actively 
contributed to the subsequent practice have accepted nevertheless the practice of 
the other Contracting States. But it is not clear whether Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention entails a positive acceptance of the subsequent practice or 
whether such acceptance may be inferred from the silence of the parties that have 
not actively participated in such practice. 
In the Beagle Channel Arbitration, the tribunal considered that the subsequent 
practice of one of the parties could only be considered in the interpretation of a 
treaty if the other party has acquiesced in such practice. In this case, which 
involved the sovereignty over three islands in the Beagle Channel disputed by 
Argentina and Chile, the tribunal had to interpret a boundary treaty concluded by 
the parties in 1881. In support of its territorial claim, Chile argued that the 
subsequent practice favored its interpretation of the treaty. In particular, Chile 
claimed that after the conclusion of the treaty it adopted several acts of 
jurisdiction in the disputed islands that were never contested by Argentina. For 
this reason, due to the silence of Argentina, this subsequent practice would qualify 
for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. For its turn, 
Argentina alleged that it could not be deemed to have accepted the Chilean 
practice due to the lack of protest, unless such practice has been expressly 
                                                                                                                                     
R., supra note 112, at 235-236, 239; Orakhelashvili, A., supra note 30, at 356-357; Villiger, M., 
supra note 126, at 429. 
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accepted. The tribunal, however, concurred with the Chilean interpretation of 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, concluding that the “agreement” 
required by Article 31(3)(b) may be deemed to exist if one of the parties to treaty 
fails to protest against the acts of the other party. According to the decision: 
“[T]he Court cannot accept the contention that no subsequent conduct, 
including acts of jurisdiction, can have probative value as a subsidiary 
method of interpretation unless representing a formally stated or 
acknowledged ‘agreement’ between the Parties. The terms of the 
Vienna Convention do not specify the ways in which ‘agreement’ may 
be manifested. In the context of the present case the acts of 
jurisdiction were not intended to establish a source of title independent 
of the terms of the Treaty; nor could they be considered as being in 
contradiction of those terms as understood by Chile. The evidence 
supports the view that they were public and well-known to Argentina, 
and that they could only derive from the Treaty. Under these 
circumstances the silence of Argentina permits the inference that the 
acts tended to confirm an interpretation of the meaning of the Treaty 
independent of the acts of jurisdiction themselves.”596 
This conclusion also finds support in the American Law Institute’s Second 
Restatement of the Law on the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(“Second Restatement”). Although in the Second Restatement there was no 
distinction between primary and supplementary rules of treaty interpretation, its § 
147(1)(f) provided that: 
“International law requires that the interpretative process ascertain and 
give effect to the purpose of the international agreement which, as 
appears from the terms used by the parties, it was intended to serve. 
The factors to be taken into account by way of guidance in the 
interpretative process include: 
[…] 
                                                 
596
 Award of February 18, 1977, 52 ILR 93 (1979), at 224. See also Linderfalk, U., supra note 88, 
at 174-177. 
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(f) the subsequent practice of the parties in the performance of 
the agreement, or the subsequent practice of one party, if the other 
party or parties knew or had reason to know of it.”597 
If it is admitted that the tacit acceptance of the subsequent practice suffices for the 
purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, one could argue that the 
practice reflected in investment treaties has been accepted by all Contracting 
States of the ICSID Convention, even though not all Contracting States have 
concluded investment treaties providing for ICSID arbitration. Given the 
extraordinary number and publicity of investment treaties providing for ICSID 
arbitration, it seems unlikely that not all Contracting States are aware of the 
practice reflected in these treaties. The conclusion of investment treaties plays 
nowadays a relevant role in the relations between States, and even for those States 
that have not concluded any of these treaties, this option is not unknown. In this 
sense, the Contracting States that have not concluded investment treaties would be 
deemed to have accepted the practice in these treaties, to the extent that it has not 
been reported so far any formal protest against the terms of investment treaties 
providing for ICSID arbitration. 
Nonetheless, the fact that all Contracting States may be deemed to be aware of 
investment treaties providing for ICSID arbitration does not necessarily mean that, 
                                                 
597
 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law: Second. Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (St. Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute Publishers, 1965), at 451 – emphasis added. It 
should be noted, however, that the Third Restatement of the Law on the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States (“Third Restatement”) did not adopt the same language. In accordance with its § 
325(2), which was based on Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, “[a]ny subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the agreement, and subsequent practice between 
the parties in the application of the agreement, are to be taken into account in its interpretation” 
(American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law: Third. Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (St. Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute Publishers, 1987), at 196 – emphasis added). 
The reference to “subsequent practice between the parties” in the Third Restatement gives the idea 
that, in order for the practice of not all of the parties to be taken into account in the interpretation 
of a treaty, the other parties must have at least positively accepted it. 
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in the absence of protest, they acquiesced in the practice reflected in those treaties. 
Acquiescence may only result from the absence of protest in a case in which there 
is an obligation to protest.598 For this reason, the acceptance of the practice in the 
application of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention by a 
Contracting State would only occur if there were in the ICSID Convention an 
obligation for the Contracting States to protest against the potential misuses of the 
dispute settlement facilities of the Centre. But this obligation to protest does not 
arise unless a Contracting State is directly affected by the misuse of the dispute 
settlement facilities of the Centre. This would be the case where, due to the 
misuse of the Centre, a Contracting State is required to do or to refrain from doing 
something, contrary to its interpretation of the ICSID Convention. This situation 
does not seem to occur by the mere conclusion by certain Contracting States of an 
investment treaty providing for the submission to the jurisdiction of the Centre of 
disputes that do not comply with the jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID 
Convention in accordance with the interpretation given by other Contracting 
States. 
On the other hand, while investment treaties might not qualify as subsequent 
practice for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, they may 
still be considered in the interpretation of the ICSID Convention as a 
supplementary means of treaty interpretation in the sense of Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention.599 Especially in the case of general multilateral treaties with a 
great number of parties, such as the ICSID Convention, the fact the subsequent 
practice is not attributable to all parties to the treaty, but to a great majority, favors 
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 See MacGibbon, I. C., The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 BYIL 143 (1954), 
at 143, 146-147; Müller, Jörg Paul, Acquiescence, I EPIL 14 (1992), at 14. 
599
 See supra note 126. 
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the use of such subsequent practice in the interpretation of the treaty, even though 
not all elements of the Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention are met. It 
seems that FITZMAURICE favored such flexible approach in relation to general 
multilateral treaties. According to him, “[i]t is, of course, axiomatic that the 
conduct in question must have been that of both or all — or, in the case of general 
multilateral conventions, of the great majority of the parties, and not merely of 
one.”600  
In this sense, the fact that investment treaties do not entail the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State in order for an activity or transaction to 
qualify as an investment may be taken into account in order to confirm the 
interpretation that the economic development requirement is not an element of the 
notion of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention. 
5. CONCLUSION 
As discussed in this chapter, the decisions that admitted that the ICSID 
Convention allows ICSID tribunals to expand or to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Centre on the basis of the contribution to the economic development of the host 
State are based on an interpretation of the ICSID Convention that is inconsistent 
with the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. In the 
absence of an express requirement, the economic development requirement is 
founded on the idea that the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention has 
a special feature that distinguishes the notion of investment within the meaning of 
the ICSID Convention from the ordinary meaning of the term. While the 
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 Supra note 90, at 223. 
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conclusion of the ICSID Convention envisaged the promotion of the economic 
development of its Contracting States, the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention, under the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention, may not be relied on in disregard of the ordinary meaning of the term 
“investment”. In addition to the fact that some of the decisions were based on 
grounds that contradict Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the subsequent 
practice of the Contracting States of the ICSID Convention, relied on as a 
supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention, confirms the construction that the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State is not an element of the notion of investment within 
the meaning of the ICSID Convention.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES AND FRAGMENTATION IN THE ICSID 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The decisions that admitted the existence of the economic development 
requirement either to expand or to restrict the jurisdiction of the Centre reveal an 
inherent problem of the dispute settlement system established by the ICSID 
Convention that derives from its hybrid foundations: the fragmentation of the 
ICSID decision-making process. Although the ICISD Convention envisages a 
system for the settlement of disputes between two opposing sides, the effects of 
the submission of a dispute to the jurisdiction of the Centre are not limited to the 
disputing parties; the ICSID Convention imposes multilateral obligations that 
potentially affect all Contracting States. But while the ICSID Convention 
establishes a multilateral system, the dispute settlement procedure is essentially 
confined to the parties to the dispute. Except for the authority conferred on the 
Secretariat of the Centre by Article 36(3) of the ICSID Convention to refuse 
registration of a request for arbitration if the dispute is manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre,601 the ICSID Convention does not set forth any 
mechanism whereby questions relating to the jurisdiction of the Centre may be 
referred to a central body.602 On the contrary, pursuant to Article 41(2) of the 
ICSID Convention, each ICSID tribunal has the express authority to determine 
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 See supra note 28. 
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 See supra note 32. 
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whether or not a dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the Centre,603 and the 
decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals on the jurisdiction of the Centre are not 
subject to review by a central body.604 
The decisions that that admitted the existence of the economic development 
requirement were based on the assumption that the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention is distinct from the will the disputing parties and must be 
fulfilled independently from the consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre. This 
construction of the ICSID Convention, which, as discussed in Chapter I, is 
consistent with the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 
is a recognition that, although arbitral proceedings are instituted under the ICSID 
Convention for the settlement of a dispute between two sides, the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre is contingent upon the compliance with jurisdictional 
requirements that govern a multilateral dispute settlement system. Regardless of 
the consent of the disputing parties, arbitral proceedings may not be instituted 
under the ICSID Convention if the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Article 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention are not fulfilled.  
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 See supra at pp. 9 et seq. 
604
 See Schill, S., supra note 380, at 293. In accordance with Article 52(3) of the ICSID 
Convention, the disputing parties do not participate in the appointment of the members of ad hoc 
committees. The three members of an ad hoc committee are chosen from the Panel of Arbitrators 
by the Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Centre. Article 52(3) provides that: 
“On receipt of the request the Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of 
Arbitrators an ad hoc Committee of three persons. None of the members of the 
Committee shall have been a member of the Tribunal which rendered the award, 
shall be of the same nationality as any such member, shall be a national of the State 
party to the dispute or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, shall have 
been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall have 
acted as a conciliator in the same dispute. The Committee shall have the authority to 
annul the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (1)” 
(1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993), at 17). 
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But while the decisions that admitted the existence of the economic development 
requirement recognized the objectiveness of the investment requirement of the 
ICSID Convention, they are based on a misapplication of the general rule of treaty 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention. As demonstrated in Chapter II, in the 
absence of an express requirement that allows ICSID tribunals to deny the 
jurisdiction of the Centre to disputes that arise out of investments that do not 
contribute to the economic development of the host State, or to extend the 
jurisdiction to disputes that arise out of transactions or activities that, although not 
an investment, contributed to the economic development of the host States, these 
decisions viewed the contribution to the economic development of the host State 
not as an autonomous jurisdictional requirement, but as an element of the notion 
of investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention. The problem of this 
construction of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention is that it 
disregards the ordinary of term “investment” and confers on this term a special 
meaning based on the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention. This 
construction is inconsistent with the general rule of treaty interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention, once the use of the object and purpose of a treaty is a second 
step in the interpretation process and may not contradict the ordinary meaning of a 
term. 
The inconsistent decisions rendered by the ICSID tribunals and ad hoc 
committees that admitted the economic development requirement is a downside of 
the ICSID dispute settlement system that derives from the fragmentation of the 
ICSID decision-making process. This downside threatens the functionality of the 
system. Under the CSOB approach, disputes that were not supposed to be 
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submitted to the Centre because they do not arise out of an investment may be 
submitted nevertheless if they arise out of transactions or activities that 
contributed to the economic development of the host State. On the other hand, 
under the Salini approach, disputes that were supposed to be submitted the 
jurisdiction of the Centre may be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Centre if 
they arise out of investments that do not contribute to the economic development 
of the host State. In both cases, there is a misuse of the ICSID dispute settlement 
system.  
2. HARMONIZATION IN THE ICSID DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The problem of inconsistent and divergent decisions in investment treaty 
arbitration has led to the idea of establishing an appellate system against decisions 
rendered by arbitral tribunals constituted for the settlement of investment 
disputes.605 In a discussion paper prepared by the Secretariat of the Centre with 
the purpose of initiating discussions for the improvement of the ICSID dispute 
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settlement system, it was suggested that the establishment of an appellate system 
had been considered “desirable to ensure coherence and consistency in case law 
generated in ICSID and other investor-to-State arbitrations initiated under 
investment treaties”606 and, consequently, “enhance the acceptability of investor-
to-State arbitration.”607  
The discussion paper recognizes that the main problem of creating an appellate 
system lies in the text of the ICSID Convention. In particular, Article 53(1) of the 
ICSID Convention states that “[t]he award shall be binding on the parties and 
shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for 
in this Convention.”608 For this reason, the creation of a system that allows 
disputing parties to appeal against ICSID awards would require the amendment of 
Article 53(1).609 However, in accordance with Article 66(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, in order for any amendment of the ICSID Convention to come into 
effect, it must have the consent of all Contracting States.610 As admitted in the 
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discussion paper, given the wide participation of States in the ICSID Convention, 
it would be unrealistic to pursue any amendment of the ICSID Convention.611  
In order to avoid the need of any formal amendment of the ICSID Convention, the 
discussion paper suggests that the wording of Article 53(1) could be modified 
through the conclusion of subsequent investment treaties, in accordance with 
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention.612 In this sense, the discussion paper 
suggests that: 
“In accordance with the general treaty law rules reflected in Article 41 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, the treaty with 
the submission to the Appeals Facility might also modify the ICSID 
Convention to the extent required, as between the States parties to that 
treaty, provided that the modification was not prohibited by the ICSID 
Convention, did not affect the enjoyment of rights and performance of 
obligations of the other Contracting States under the ICSID 
Convention and was compatible with the overall object and purpose of 
the ICSID Convention.”613 
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But apart from the difficulties of modifying the ICSID Convention, as a 
constitutive treaty of an international organization, between certain of its parties 
only,614 the creation of an appellate system under the auspices of the Centre, 
which was denominated in the discussion paper as the “ICSID Appeals Facility”, 
presupposes the adoption of procedural and institutional rules and, most 
important, the establishment of an appellate organ. According to the proposal 
made by the Secretariat in the discussion paper, the ICSID Appeals Facility would 
be created by a resolution of the Administrative Council of the Centre, which 
would adopt the ICSID Appeals Facility Rules.615 These Rules would establish the 
Appeals Panel, which would comprise a list of 15 persons elected for a defined 
term by the Administrative Council upon the designation of the Secretary-General 
of the Centre.616 The appeals tribunals would be constituted by three members of 
the Appeals Panel, appointed by the Secretary-General for each case.617 
The proposal for the creation of an appellate system made by the Secretariat was 
designed in a way to avoid the need of any amendment of ICSID Convention. 
However, a question that is not addressed in the proposal is whether the 
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Administrative Council would have sufficient authority to create this system. As 
discussed before in the context of the adoption of the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules, the authority of the Administrative Council is not unlimited; it may only 
exercise powers and functions set forth in the ICSID Convention.618 In the 
absence of a provision that expressly authorizes the Administrative Council to 
create an appellate system, the Administrative Council would have to act under 
Article 6(3) of the ICSID Convention, which confers on the Administrative 
Council the general authority to adopt any measure necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of the ICSID Convention.619 However, it seems 
difficult to admit that the creation of an appellate system could be considered a 
necessary measure within the meaning of Article 6(3), to the extent that it 
envisages the establishment of a mechanism that is not provided in the ICSID 
Convention. On the contrary, the introduction of an appellate mechanism against 
ICSID awards goes against the ICSID Convention itself. Consequently, the 
Administrative Council would extrapolate its powers and functions.620 
In addition to the legal problems it would have for its implementations, the 
creation of an appellate system under the auspices of the Centre could have more 
disadvantages than benefits. It would certainly create additional costs for the 
disputing parties and delays in the decision-making process under the ICSID 
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Convention.621 It seems that it was because of these issues that the Secretariat 
decided not to put forward its proposal for the appellate system. In a subsequent 
paper prepared by the Secretariat, it was stated that: 
“The members of the Administrative Council and others who provided 
comments on the Discussion Paper expressed appreciation for the 
initiative to review the framework for ICSID arbitration and identify 
possible improvements. There was general agreement that, if 
international appellate procedures were to be introduced for 
investment treaty arbitrations, then this might best be done through a 
single ICSID mechanism rather than by different mechanisms 
established under each treaty concerned. Most, however, considered 
that it would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID 
mechanism at this stage, particularly in view of the difficult technical 
and policy issues raised in the Discussion Paper. The Secretariat will 
continue to study such issues to assist member countries when and if it 
is decided to proceed towards the establishment of an ICSID appeal 
mechanism.”622 
As an alternative to the establishment of an appellate system, it was suggested the 
creation of a system of preliminary rulings, whereby ICSID tribunals could 
request the opinion of a permanent body on legal issues pertaining to pending 
decisions and that could avoid the need of amending the wording of Article 53(1) 
of the ICSID Convention.623 This idea was first suggested by Professor 
GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, who observed that: 
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“Another possible solution may be to introduce a consultation 
mechanism at the level of the arbitration proceedings. Any ICSID 
tribunal could request guidance about legal issues from a permanent 
consultative body. A possible model may be provided by the 
procedure of Article 234 (formerly 177) of the EEC Treaty, pursuant 
to which national courts of Member States request interpretative 
rulings from the European Court of Justice on matters of European 
law. If properly designed, such a mechanism would ensure 
consistency, without the drawbacks of a full-fledged appellate 
procedure.”624 
The creation of a system of preliminary rulings would avoid the need of any 
formal amendment of the ICSID Convention and could qualify as a measure 
necessary for the implementation of the ICSID Convention in the sense of its 
Article 6(3). This system could be introduced by the amendment of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules. However, the problems of additional costs to be incurred by the 
disputing parties and of delays in the decision-making process under the ICSID 
Convention still remain. Moreover, the establishment of a preliminary rulings 
procedure and the authoritative status of such preliminary rulings for matters 
concerning the interpretation of the ICSID Convention might raise the question as 
to whether Contracting States not involved in a particular dispute would have the 
right to intervene in such procedures. 
But moving away from the ideas of establishing an appellate or a preliminary 
rulings body, another solution for the problem of inconsistent decisions on issues 
pertaining to the application of the ICSID Convention could be the adoption of 
resolutions by the Administrative Council of the Centre containing an 
authoritative interpretation of the ICSID Convention. While this solution has 
received no attention in the debate on the harmonization in the ICSID decision-
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making process, the adoption of interpretative resolutions has the advantage of not 
creating additional costs and delays. It also has the advantage of not requiring any 
amendment of the ICSID Convention or of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.625 The 
authority of the Administrative Council to adopt interpretative resolutions may be 
justified under Article 6(3) of the ICSID Convention.626 The correct application of 
the provisions of the ICSID Convention, especially of those governing the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, qualifies as a measure necessary for its implementation. 
The initiative for the adoption of interpretative resolution could come from the 
Secretariat of the Centre. The Secretariat could identify which issues have been 
controversial in the decisions of ICSID tribunals and ad hoc committees, such as 
the content of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, and suggest 
the adoption of an authoritative interpretation by the members of the 
Administrative Council in its annual meeting.627 
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As a matter of interpretation and not of modification, interpretative resolutions 
have immediate effect not only on future disputes submitted to the Centre, but 
also on those in which a final decision is pending. If adopted without opposition 
by the Administrative Council, as the political organ of the Centre composed by 
one representative of each Contracting State, interpretative resolutions may be 
deemed to constitute an interpretative agreement in the sense of Article 31(3)(a) 
of the Vienna Convention. Pursuant to this provision, the interpreter of a treaty 
must take into account “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.”628 The 
“subsequent agreement” mentioned in Article 31(3)(a) does not entail the 
formalities required for the conclusion of treaties.629 On the other hand, however, 
in order for an interpretative agreement to fall within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(a), it must constitute the agreement of all parties to the treaty.630 
Nevertheless, interpretative resolutions approved not by all members of the 
Administrative Council, but by a substantive majority, may still be used in the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention in the sense of Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention.631 
Interpretative resolutions adopted by the Administrative Council would not be 
free from individual interests of each Contracting State of the ICSID Convention. 
To the extent that there is nothing in the ICSID Convention that prevents a 
Contracting State from participating in the deliberations of the Administrative 
Council that might directly affect the outcome of a dispute in which such 
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Contracting State is a disputing party, some Contracting States might advocate a 
more restrictive approach towards the jurisdictional scope of the ICSID 
Convention than others.632 But while one can fear the political interferences in this 
mechanism, Contracting States should not be viewed as disputing parties, but as 
States whose intention is the essence of the dispute settlement system established 
under the ICSID Convention. A decision on the fulfillment of the requirements set 
forth in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention is not limited to the question as to 
whether a particular ICSID tribunal has the authority to entertain a claim referred 
to it, but it also involves the question as to whether the Centre, as an international 
organization, is acting within the mandate that was conferred on it by the 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention. In addition, the problem of 
interference in the approval of interpretative resolution is mitigated by the fact 
that this mechanism may not be used in a way that would lead to a de facto 
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amendment of the ICSID Convention. The Administrative Council does not have 
the authority to modify the ICSID Convention; it may not create requirements for 
the establishment of the jurisdiction of the Centre that are not set forth in the 
ICSID Convention. For this reason, ICSID tribunals and ad hoc committees may 
disregard interpretative resolutions of Administrative Council that are, in fact, 
disguised amendments of the ICSID Convention.633 
For these reasons, the adoption of interpretative resolutions by the Administrative 
Council, as a source of the intention of the Contracting States, may represent a 
feasible mechanism against the problems caused by the fragmentation of the 
ICSID decision-making process and misinterpretations made by ICSID tribunals 
and ad hoc committees, assuring the integrity of dispute settlement system 
established under the ICSID Convention. While this solution might be 
implausible, it is no less plausible than the idea of establishing an appellate or a 
preliminary rulings body. 
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